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Firms’ profitability is no longer a single measure of their success as CSR has 
started becoming the cornerstone of modern corporate accomplishment. Due to recent 
corporate scandals and unethical business practices, stakeholders are compelling firms to 
act responsibly and make a positive change in the environment, society and the world. 
Companies are investing heavily in CSR related programmes, and there has been a 
significant rise in the CSR performance reporting over the recent years. It is, therefore, 
the business benefits for implementing CSR initiatives is a rationale of this study. This 
thesis contains three empirical investigation chapters that provide compelling evidence 
on the impact of CSR on the firms’ financial performance. 
Prior studies examining the CSR effect on financial results mainly report mixed 
results. However, although there is a large prior literature on the link between CSR and 
firms’ financial performance, studies on the link between CSR and long-term operating 
performance, long term stock performance are limited. Especially, prior studies 
examining the impact of CSR index’s re-compositing on firms’ financial performance 
focus on short term stock return and are from a single country/market. Very limited focus 
on more extensive geographical coverage (including emerging market) as CSR is 
becoming the global spectacle. Also, the CSR initiatives vary company to company and 
the nature of the industry they are operating. Hence, it is also vital to examine the potential 
heterogeneity in CSR-CFP relationship among industries/sectors.  
In order to examine the impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance, I 
conducted three empirical investigations. I use the FTSE4Good index series addition 
(deletion) and its ESG (Economic, Social and Governance) rating for CSR conformity.  
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First empirical investigation (chapter 4) focuses on the long-term operating 
performance and use FTSE4Good Global index and a proxy for CSR conformity; the 
sample comprises 819 additions and 462 deletions between March 2002 and December 
2015 (26 countries). I compared the operating performance of the FTSE4Good companies 
against the median performance of a relevant benchmark, e.g. industry-, size-, B/ME-, 
and momentum-matched portfolios of non-CSR firms (firm-matching approach). The 
first empirical result shows a statistically significant increase (decrease) in the operating 
performance of firms added (deleted) in the CSR index. Further comparisons with non-
CSR benchmarks show that firms’ addition in the FTSE4Good index is followed by a 
positive and statistically significant increase in most of the operating indicators studied 
and across all firm-matching criteria. On the contrary, firms’ deletion from this CSR 
index is usually followed by consistent deterioration in all operating performance 
measures. 
Similarly, in the second empirical investigation (chapter 5), I examine both short-
term and long-term stock return. To examine the short-term stock return, I use a total of 
1,302 companies (725 additions and 577 deletions) and use Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return (CAAR) methodology. Whereas, using the Buy-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) model and a sample of 596 added and 410 deleted companies, I examine the 
long-term stock return. The second empirical results report a positive and statistically 
significant abnormal long-term stock return for firms added in the FTSE4Good index 
over the long term. Investors can enjoy up to 4.41% in a matter of a year. However, for 
the firm deleted from FTSE4Good experience a negative and statistically significant stock 
return of 1.09% throughout 30 days and no material changes afterwards. In case of a 
short-term stock return, firms experienced a significant negative abnormal return when 
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they are added, but no material changes in stock return for the firms deleted from the 
index.  
In the third empirical investigation (chapter 6), I examine the impact of CSR on 
CFP in emerging markets by using a total of 1,244 firms-year observations representing 
779 individual companies from 23 emerging nations between 2016 and 2017. I further 
evaluate the heterogeneity in CSR-CFP relationship across industries/sectors. The result 
of a final empirical investigation from the emerging market shows a positive and 
statistically significant impact of CSR rating on firms’ financial performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q and ROA. The robustness test confirms the positive impact of CSR on CFP 
using PTBV and ROIC.  I also report that the CSR-CFP varies across industries/sectors. 
In this chapter, I further examine the moderating impact of cross-listing on CSR-CFP 
relationship and find that the positive impact of CSR on CFP is more pronounced for 
firms that are cross-listed in the foreign stock market. 
Overall, the results of this study support the assumption of the stakeholder theory 
(instrumental stakeholder theory). Consistent with the signalling hypothesis, CSR 
reputation signals firms having strong internal resources and management capabilities to 
capitalise on potential investments and other corporate expansion opportunities in the 
future. Managers/corporate executives must maintain consistency in the firm’s CSR 
engagement as any inverse changes could negatively impact firms’ future performance. 
Hence, firms’ engagement in the CSR-related initiative is a cornerstone of long-term 
business success. 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, FTSE4Good Index, Operating 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR hereafter) has gained significant attention in 
modern business operation and researches. Due to the increase in corporate scandals over 
the years, stakeholders have increased their presence in companies’ affairs and their 
activities/operation. Stakeholders closely monitor firms’ commitment and investment in 
socially responsible business practices. Due to stakeholders’ intense pressure, businesses 
are nowadays compelled to devote their resources and investment in the good cause of 
making a positive change in the world. Also, CSR reporting is becoming an essential 
element of a corporate annual report. The growth of CSR reporting is increasing 
significantly over the years. The most recent survey by KPMG (2017) reports that about 
93% of the top 250 global companies and 75% of 4,900 worldwide companies comprising 
top 100 companies by revenue of 49 countries adopt the corporate social responsivity1. 
Also, 78% of the top 250 global companies include CSR information in their annual 
financial report (KPMG, 2017, p.21.). Such an increasing trend in CSR reporting is due 
to the increased regulation of the state/country, the requirement of stock exchanges and 
investor pressure.  CSR is becoming a cornerstone of corporate success because it 
improves firms’ reputation, innovation, risk management and revenue (Sen, Du, and 
Bhattacharya 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011; Godfrey et al., 2009). 
 





Literature evidenced that a large number of studies that have examined the impact 
of the CSR to the firms’ performance in different dimensions (Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Orlitizky et al., 2003; Margolish et al., 2009, Peloza, 2009; Berrone and Gomez-
Mejiam, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Omar and Zallom, 2016; Qui et al., 2016; Wang et 
al., 2016; Du et al., 2017; Shiu and Yang, 2017; Feng et al., 2017; Li et al. 2018; Siueia 
et al., 2019; Zou et al., 2019). Overall, prior studies have reported mixed results; the 
positive, negative and neutral relationship between CSR and firms financial performance. 
However, the majority of studies have reported the positive impact of CSR on corporate 
financial performance (Peloza, 2009).  
In this study, I examine the relationship between CSR and CFP in several ways. 
First, I examine the impact of CSR index addition and deletion on the firm's long-term 
operating performance. Second, I investigate the impact of firns addition and deletion 
from the socially responsible index on the stock price in the short-term and long-term. 
For both of this investigation, I use 26 cross country sample companies from the 
FTSE4Good Global index. Finally, I investigate the heterogeneousness in CSR-CFP 
relationship among industry sectors using companies from 23 emerging economies and 
associate with the FTSE4Good emerging index.  
 
1.2. Research Problem 
The awareness of the impact of business/companies to environment, society and 
community have increased significantly among stakeholders. Companies are 
implementing CSR practices to persuade their stakeholders who closely follow and react 
to the firms’ operation. Stakeholders are explicitly demanding transparency of the 
companies CSR policy, investment, and commitment that ensure a positive impact on the 
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society, community and the world. Further, Porter and Kramer (2011) argue that 
implementing CSR practice is a foundation of business success as it helps to gain a 
competitive advantage in the long-term. Hence, companies are investing in CSR and also 
using several ways (such as corporate reporting in annual financial report, websites, 
socially responsible index) to communicate the information regarding their commitment 
to the stakeholders’ issues.  
The popularity of the CSR index has increased significantly since the introduction 
of Kinder Liebenberg Domini (KLD hereafter) in 1990. At present, there are several CSR 
indices covering several geographical locations such as Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI) (1999), Calvert Social Index (CSI) (2000), the FTSE4Good Index Series (2001), 
and most recently the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) ESG index (2014). 
These indices evaluate companies by their commitment and investment towards the 
environmental, social and governance issues. Companies are putting significant efforts 
and resources in CSR initiatives so that they can get membership of CSR related indices.  
Prior studies have examined the impact of CSR index association on firm’s 
financial performance using CSR index (Kappou and Oikonomou, 2016; Obrendorfer et 
al.,2013; Becchetti et al.,2012; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Lourenco et al., 2012, 
Robinson et al., 2012). Especially within the context of the social index effect, studies 
have primarily focused on short-term stock performance and given lesser attention to the 
long-term impact. Also, the samples of these studies are from a single market, or a single 
country from a developed economy with a limited number of studies are from the 
emerging market or countries. Hence, it is worthwhile to examine the long-term 
performance with cross-country setting to cover the broader geographical and to improve 
the generalisability of the CSR-CFP relationship. Also, a limited number of studies have 
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examined the heterogeneousness in the CSR-CFP relationship among industry sector 
(Hoepner and Yu, 2010; Omar and Zallom, 2016; Feng et al., 2017). The result of these 
studies is somewhat mixed with limited sample sizes. Since CSR differs industry to 
industry, it is vital to investigate to see if the impact of CSR on financial performance 
differs from industry to industry.  
Hence, based on the above discussion and the gaps in the literature, I will 
investigate the impact of CSR (CSR index association) on the firm's financial 
performance in several dimensions. I first compare the long-term operating performance 
of CSR firms against the median of the operating performance of non-CSR (not listed in 
CSR index) firms matched benchmark portfolio. I also investigate the operating 
performance after the addition and deletion from the CSR index to find if there any 
significant changes in the operating performance after the event. Secondly, I will examine 
the short-term and long-term stock return after addition and deletion from the CSR index. 
I also examine if impact differs from country to country. Finally, I investigate the 
heterogeneousness in the CSR-CFP relationship among industry sector using cross-
country emerging market samples. I further examine if the cross-listing in the foreign 
stock market moderates the CSR-CFP relationship. 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
In the above section, I discussed the increased popularity as well as the 
compulsion for companies to implement CSR practice in their business model. 
Companies tend to implement CSR to satisfy their stakeholders and win their confidence 
and loyalty towards them. Hence, corporate social responsibility has now become a 
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necessity and not a choice (Grant Thornton, 2018). However, there are still a few 
questions that need to be answered and examined. 
The primary research questions of this study are listed below: 
i) Does addition in the CSR index differentiate firms among competitors?  
ii) Do CSR firms perform better than their non-CSR counterparts? 
iii) Does the firm’s addition (deletion) in the CSR index lead to an increase (decrease) 
in their long-term operating performance? 
iv) Do firms’ involvement in CSR lead towards improved long-term stock 
performance?  
v) Does CSR-CFP relationship differ industry to industry sector? 
vi) Does the impact of CSR on financial performance differ across the country and 
geographical location? 
vii) Does the CSR-CFP relationship is more pronounced for the firms that are cross-
listed in the foreign stock market? 
 
1.4. Research Objectives 
Corporate scandals have compelled businesses to adopt socially responsible 
initiatives. Corporate social responsibility is high on the business agenda. It is becoming 
valuable investment criteria/information for investors, and other stakeholders to assess 
the performance of the firm to make their decision. The higher financial profitability is 
no longer the most critical aspect of business success; and the concept of CSR provides 
the framework of value creation through the both achieving sufficient profit and satisfying 
various stakeholders’ needs (Lopez, Gracia & Rodriguez, 2007). In this study, I aim to 
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examine the impact of CSR on the firms’ performance. The objectives of this study are 
listed below: 
i. To determine the impact of CSR on firms’ long-term operating performance. 
ii. To determine if firms listed in a CSR index performs better after addition than 
those listed in a non-CSR index. 
iii. To determine if firms that implement CSR initiatives are valued higher by the 
stock market in the long-term. 
iv. To determine if there is a different impact of CSR in CFP among industry sectors. 
v. To determine if CSR-CFP relationship varies across geographical location 
(developed and emerging market). 
vi. To determine if the CSR-CFP relationship is more pronounced for the firms that 
are cross-listed in the foreign stock market. 
 
1.5. Theoretical Framework 
The relationship between CSR and CFP is widely discussed in CSR literature over 
the years. Studies in the past used several theoretical frameworks to investigate the impact 
of CSR on the CFP. After having an extensive literature review, in this study, I employ 
several theoretical concepts that link to the CSR and corporate financial performance. To 
achieve the research objective and to answer the research question of this study, I employ 
stakeholders theory (instrumental aspect) and the signalling hypothesis. 
The concept of CSR primarily focuses on satisfying companies’ stakeholders. 
Stakeholders are individuals or group that can affect, or affected by the companies’ 
operation (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders confidence and loyalty is vital for a company’s 
success and growth. According to the stakeholder theory, a firm should also focus on 
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addressing the needs and demands of stakeholders to achieve corporate objectives. Hence, 
the instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory argues that CSR is instrumental for 
improved financial performance (Jones, 1995). Also, a firm with better stakeholder 
management through CSR tend to signals the firm's resources, capability and aspiration 
towards future growth and success. I use the signalling hypothesis (Spence, 1973) along 
with stakeholder theory to investigate the firm's long-term performance. 
Further, the news and information regarding firms’ commitment to CSR signal 
valuable and useful information for investors. Since the availability of new information 
signals valuable information and could affect the stock price behaviour, I use the 
signalling hypothesis in conjunction with stakeholder theory to examine the impact of 
CSR news on the short-term and long-term stock price. The detail of the theoretical 
framework and theories are explained later in the chapters. 
 
1.6. Research Methodology 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the impact of CSR on the firm’s 
financial performance and expect a positive impact. In this study, I view the relationship 
between social entities and business as real, and their relationship is observable in the 
same way as a physical object or natural phenomena. This study also aims to contribute 
credible and meaningful knowledge to the CSR-CFP relationship literature. Hence, I 
employ positive epistemology. I derive the research question and testable hypotheses 
from the existing literature of CSR, stakeholder theory and signalling theory. In this study, 




The selection of the research methodology should be based on the suitability to 
answer the research question (Bryman, 2004). In this study, I am investigating the impact 
of CSR on firms’ financial performance by following the positive epistemology and 
deductive research approach.  Hence, I adopt quantitative methods of research. Chapter 
3 of this thesis outlines the detail of the research methodology used in this study. 
 
1.7. The scope of the Study 
In the past, a larger number of studies have been carried out in examining the 
CSR-CFP relationship and are based on a single country and a single market. To achieve 
the objectives of this study outlined in the previous section, I examine the impact of CSR 
on the firm’s financial performance in different dimensions. I used the FTSE4Good Index 
series (FTSE4Good Global Index and FTSE4Good Emerging Index) as a proxy of the 
CSR performance and sample consist of the companies from 26 developed and 23 
emerging economies. First, using a sample of 1,281 (819 additions and 462 deletions) 
companies from developed economies, I investigate the impact of CSR on long-term 
operating performance. In this investigation, I compared the operating performance of the 
CSR companies against the median operating performance of the matched non-
FTSE4Good benchmark portfolio. Further, I analysed the post-event (addition/deletion) 
operating performance.  
In the second investigation, using a sample of 725 added and 577 deleted 
companies from FTSE4Good Global index, I investigated the short-term stock return. 
Similarly, I used a sample of 1,006 (596 additions and 410 deletions) to investigate the 
long-term stock return after the companies added and deleted from the FTSE4Good 
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Global index series. I also conducted a country-wide investigation on the share price 
reaction on the CSR event. 
In the third investigation, I use a sample of 1,244 firm-year observations from 23 
emerging economies. I examine the relationship between the CSR rating and firms’ 
financial performance. Also, I investigate the heterogeneousness of CSR-CFP 
relationship among industry sectors. Further, I examined the moderating impact of cross-
listing on firms CSR-CFP relationship. 
 
1.8. Contribution and significance of the Study 
In this study, I examined the impact of CSR on the firms’ financial performance. 
This study makes a significant contribution to CSR-CFP literature in several ways.  
The first contribution is that this study contributes to the CSR-CFP literature, 
especially with stakeholder theory, signalling hypothesis through the CSR index re-
composition as the proxy of CSR performance. As I find the positive impact of CSR on 
CFP, this study is consistent with instrumental stakeholder theory, which asserts that 
firms’ involvement in CSR initiatives improves their financial performance. Also, firms’ 
addition and deletion from the CSR index signal credible information to the stakeholders 
regarding the firms’ commitment to CSR. The CSR index addition and deletion also 
signal the firms’ capability, resources and ability to pursue their operation towards future 
growth and success.  
Secondly, this study fills the gap in the research about the CSR index membership 
and its impact on the firm's long-term operating performances and long-term stock return. 
Studies in the past primarily focused on short-term market performance and gave lesser 
attention to long-term operating performance. I focus on examining the long-term 
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operating performance because, for the corporate manager’s perspective, the long-term 
operating performance is more important for the decision-making process. Also, I 
evidenced a positive and significant impact of CSR index configuration to the long-term 
stock return.  
Thirdly, studies in the past have investigated the impact of CSR on CFP in 
aggregate and almost minimal attention on the industry-wide examination with a handful 
of studies using a sample from a single country (Feng et al., 2017; Omar and Zallom’s, 
2016). In this study, I use cross-emerging economies’ company data to examine the 
heterogeneousness in the CSR-CFP relationship among industry sector. I find that the 
CSR-CFP relationship varies across the industrial sector.  
Fourth, this is study is among in the front to examine the moderating impact of 
cross-listing on CSR-CFP relationship. I find the positive impact of CSR on CFP is more 
pronounced for cross-listed firms.  
Further, this study is among in the front in utilising the cross-country data to 
examine the impact of CSR on firms financial performance. The sample consisted of 
companies from the FTSE4Good index services, which contains companies from 26 
developed and 23 emerging economies. Since the result is derived from the sample 
covering a full geographical setting hence improve the generalisability of CSR-CFP 
relationship. 
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, for the first time, I have used a unique set 
of CSR performance rating score provided by the FTSE4Good index series. I examined 





1.9. The outline of the study 
The objective of this study is to determine the impact of CSR on the firm’s 
financial performance. In order to do this, I break down the thesis into seven chapters. I 
began this study by reviewing the literature of the CSR and impact on firms’ financial 
performance in chapter 2. I explore the concept, theory, and motivation for implementing 
CSR initiatives. Then I review the past empirical studies on CSR-CFP relationship. 
Chapter 3 consist of the discussion on the research philosophy, methodology and 
framework that I applied to shape the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance. In the fourth chapter, I investigate the impact of CSR on the firms’ long-
term operating performance by comparing the operating performance of CSR and non-
CSR companies. I also examine the operating performance of companies  after the CSR 
index addition and deletion. Chapter 5 investigates and explains the short-term and long-
term stock price return of a company after their addition and deletion from the CSR index. 
In the sixth chapter, I extend my investigation to the emerging economies. Using the 
sample companies from 23 emerging countries, I examine the heterogeneousness in CSR-
CFP relationship among different industrial sectors. I also explore the relationship 
between the CSR rating score produced by FTSE5Good index series and companies’ 
financial performance. Further, in chapter 6, I examine the moderating impact of cross-
listing on the CSR-CFP relationship. In the seventh chapter of this thesis, I presented the 
overall summary, the conclusion of the study and followed by the future research avenues 






Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore some of the most important concepts of corporate social 
responsibility by reviewing the contextual, conceptual, and historical development of the 
field. In addition, a thorough understanding of CSR’s historical development and the 
plethora of CSR-related theories will assist me in identifying appropriate gaps in the 
literature and proceed to the next part of my thesis, the formulation of appropriate testable 
hypotheses which will be further explored in the following chapters, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
According to Figure 2.1, this chapter is structured in different sections and 
subsection beginning with the various definitions of corporate social responsibility in 
section 2.2. The theoretical frameworks for each empirical chapter are based on different 
theories related to CSR. I discuss these theories in detail in section 2.3, followed by 
section 2.4 discussing the past empirical studies examining CSR-CFP relationship. This 
chapter concludes by discussing the gap identified in the CSR-CFP literature. The 
following cognitive map exhibit a snapshot of this chapter. 
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Table 2. 1 Overview of key studies on CSR-CFP relationship 
Authors Title of Papers Source Methodology CSR 
Measure 
CFP Measure Result 
Cochran and 
Wood (1984) 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Financial Performance. 






CSR Ranking Operating earnings 
to Assets 
Operating earnings 
to Sales Excess 
Market Return 
Positive 
       
Waddock and 
Graves (1997) 









KLD Rating ROA, ROE, ROS Positive 
       
Ruf et al., 
(2001) 
An Empirical Investigation of the 
Relationship Between Change in 
Corporate Social Performance 
and Financial Performance: A 
Stakeholder Theory Perspective. 




KLD  Return on Sales, 
Return on Equity, 
Sales Growth 
Positive 
       
Orlitzky et al., 
(2003) 
Corporate social and financial 












       
Curran and 
Moran (2007) 
Impact of the FTSE4Good Index 








Stock Return No impact 





Corporate social responsibility 
and corporate performance: 
evidence from a panel of US-
listed companies. 






net sales per 
employee,                 
return on equity,  
Positive                                               
Negative 
       
Godfrey et al., 
(2009) 
The Relationship between 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Shareholder Value: An 









KLD Rating Stock Return Positive 
       
Choi and 
Wang (2009) 
Research notes and commentaries 
stakeholder relations and the 







KLD Rating ROA, Tobin's Q Positive 
       
Shen and 
Chen (2009) 
Ambition Versus Conscience, 
Does Corporate Social 
Responsibility Pay off? The 
Application of Matching 
Methods. 






CSR Award EPS, ROA, ROE, 
Gross profit to 
sales, Income to 
sales 
Positive 
       
Margolis et 
al., (2009) 
Does it pay to be good, and does 
it matter? A meta-analysis of the 
relationship between corporate 
social and financial performance. 
SSRN Meta-analysis CSR CFP Positive 
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Doh et al., 
(2010) 
Does the Market Respond to an 
Endorsement of Social 
Responsibility? The Role of 











Stock Return Positive 
       
Cheung et al., 
(2009) 
Does Corporate Social 
Responsibility Matter in Asian 
Emerging Markets? 








Tobin's' Q, MTBV Positive 
       
Hoepner and 
Yu (2010)  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Across Industries: When Can 







Stock Return Positive 
       
Jiao (2010) Stakeholder Welfare and Firm 
Value' 
Journal of Banking 
and Finance  
Regression 
Analysis 
KLD Rating Tobin's' Q Positive 




Leadership: Empirical Evidence 
of the Value of DJSI 
Membership. 






DJSI Stock Return Positive 
(addition) 




Do Announcements About 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Create or Destroy Shareholder 
Wealth? Evidence from the UK. 








Stock Return No impact 
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Cheung 
(2011) 
Do Stock Investors Value 
Corporate Sustainability? 
Evidence from an Event Study. 






Stock Return Increase- 
Addition                      
Decrease- 
Deletion         
El Ghoul et 
al., (2011) 
Does corporate social 
responsibility affect the cost of 
capital? 




KLD Rating cost of equity reduction on 
the cost of 




Corporate Governance and Firm 
Value: The Impact of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. 




KLD Rating ROA, Tobin's Q Positive 
       
Becchetti et 
al., (2012) 
Corporate social responsibility 
and shareholder's value. 













nt         
Lourenco et 
al., (2012) 
How Does the Market Value 
Corporate Sustainability 
Performance? 








Stock Return positive 
       
37 
 
Xu et al., 
(2012) 
Stock Market’s Reaction to 
Disclosure of Environmental 
Violations: Evidence from China. 









Stock Return Negative 
       
Ziegler (2012) Is it Beneficial to be Added in a 
Sustainability Stock Index? A 










Return on assets, 
Tobin's Q 
Increase- 
Addition      
       
Nakai et al., 
(2013) 
Sustainability membership and 
stock price: an empirical study 








Stock Return positive on 
inclusion 
       
Oberndorfer 
et al., (2013) 
Does the stock market value the 
inclusion in a sustainability stock 
index? An event study analysis 













       
Deng et al., 
(2013) 
Corporate social responsibility 
and stakeholder value 
maximization: Evidence from 
mergers. 






KLD Rating Stock Return Positive 
       
Cordeiro and 
Tewari (2015) 
Firm Characteristics, Industry 
Context, and Investor Reactions 
to Environmental CSR: A 
Stakeholder Theory Approach. 









Stock Return (long 













Evidence from Newsweek’s 










Stock Return Positive 
impact 




Is There a Gold Social Seal? The 
Financial Effects of Additions to 
and Deletions from Social Stock 
Indices. 




















EPS        
Su et al., 
(2016) 
The Signalling Effect of 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
in Emerging Economies. 









Tobin's Q Positive 
       
Omar and 
Zallom (2016) 
Corporate social responsibility 
and market value: evidence from 
Jordan. 









Tobin's Q Positive 
       
39 
 
Hawn et al., 
(2017) 
Do investors actually value 
sustainability? New evidence 
from investor reactions to the 











Stock Return Positive/ 
increased 
       
Feng et al., 
(2017) 
Corporate social responsibility 
and firm financial performance: 
Comparison analyses across 





KLD Rating Tobin's Q ROA Positive 
       
Du et al., 
(2017) 
The Business Case for 
Sustainability Reporting: 
Evidence from Stock Market 
Reactions. 














Performance and Firm Value. 




KLD Rating Tobin's Q Positive 
       
Chen et al., 
(2018) 
The effect of mandatory CSR 
disclosure on firm profitability 












ROA ROE Negative 
Zou et al., 
(2019)  
Does doing good lead to doing 
better in emerging markets? 
Stock market responses to the 
SRI index announcements in 
Brazil, China, and South Africa. 










Stock Return Positive 
return - 
inclusion 




2.2. Background and definition of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Stakeholders’ needs have increased substantially over the years, while 
organisations consider it necessary to satisfy most of these demands. In recent times, there 
has been greater consensus on the likely impact of the organisational operation on the 
global environment, society and economy as a whole. These increased claims for the 
transparency and accountability have forced all organisations to follow a socially 
responsible business practice which not only focuses on maximising shareholders’ wealth 
but also taking into account the needs of the broader society (Arvidsson, 2010; Swanson, 
1999; Epsten and Freedman, 1994). By building and maintaining a good CSR reputation, 
companies can achieve both long-term corporate survival and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. CSR has gained more credence and popularity in recent years, and for most 
companies, it is now part of their corporate strategy. In a survey by KPMG (2013), 
corporate social practices have increased by approximately 93% in the top 250 global 
companies, 76% in America, 73% in Europe, and 71% in the Asia Pacific. The same 
report also highlights the growth in CSR reporting for the countries of India, Chile, 
Singapore, Australia, Taiwan and China of 53%, 46%, 37%, 25%, 19%, and 16% 
respectively (KPMG, 2013). 
On the other hand, the increased popularity of CSR can be attributed to the 
emerging popularity of socially responsible investing (SRIn) of recent years with an 
estimated $6.57 trillion invested in socially responsible funds in the US at the beginning 
of 2014 compared to $3.74 trillion in 2012 and $3.1 trillion at the end of 2010 (USSIF, 
2014, p. 12). The socially responsible investing in the US accounts approximately for 
more than $1 out of every $6 of assets invested. Concerning the European continent, there 
is a similar trend with most recent statistics reporting a sustainability-focused investment 




of €59 billion for 2013; an increase of 22.6% compared to that of €48 billion in 2011 
(Eurosif, 2014. p.11). The same report states that total socially responsible investment 
funds in the UK have increased by 11% to €12.86 billion from €8.93 billion in the year 
2011(Eurosif, 2014. p.11). Hence, although only the business and economic textbooks 
highlight profit/wealth maximisation of the shareholder as a primary motive for a firm, 
these statistics mentioned above highlight the ever-increasing demand for responsible 
business practices, thus compelling firms to act in a socially responsible and ethical 
manner. 
According to Bernstein (2000), CSR is high on the business agenda because 
companies have ethical and moral duties towards society and therefore, should contribute 
to the welfare of the community. Moreover, firms are recognised by investor and public 
not only because of their financial performance and their size of assets but also because 
of their resources, ability, capability, and most importantly experience to confront 
problems that arise in the society (Davis, 1973). On the other hand, CSR not only makes 
executive aware of inconsistencies arise in society due to the firms’ operation but also 
inspire them to take proactive strategies towards social interests (Heal, 2004).  
CSR is getting widespread attention due to its multiple implications on economics, 
philosophy, law and ethics, and the whole society. It has gained significant attention from 
academic, professionals, the NGOs, regulatory bodies, charitable organisation, so on and 
so forth. Also, the definition of the CSR, principles, policies varies across the sectors and 
organisations. Hence, CSR is termed as a contested concept (Moon, 2004; McLachlan 
and Gardner, 2004).  
Although defining CSR varies from institution to institution, depending on the 
underlying policy agenda, the most comprehensive definition is provided by the United 




Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) which states that CSR is a 
management concept that addresses stakeholders’ expectations and integrates 
environmental and social issues to the company’s operating model. It is termed as an 
instrument of balancing the economic, environmental and social imperatives (UNIDO, 
2016) which are also known as the ‘Triple Bottom Line’. 
The above definition emphasises the role of CSR in shaping firms’ management 
policy to achieve relevant corporate objectives via the balancing of three primary 
obligations, namely the economic, social and environmental ones as created by the 
companies operations (ILO, 2016). Hence, an organisation will be able to achieve those 
objectives if and only if it successfully integrates stakeholders’ expectations, interest, and 
demand within its culture. Similarly, the World Bank (2003) states that CSR is the 
corporate commitment to improving the quality of life by contributing to sustainable 
economic development, working together with several stakeholders (employees, local 
communities, society and government). It is a win-win philosophy that benefits both 
companies and social development (World Bank, 2003, p.1). According to the above 
definition, the emphasis of multiple stakeholder interests and ethical operating practices 
is essential for the business to succeed in the modern and dynamic environment. Firms 
should improve and develop the quality of life of their workforce, their families and their 
communities which consequently improves the status of the society as a whole (WBCSD, 
2005; Johnson and Scholes, 2002).  
In an attempt to clarify CSR-compliant practice, the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) introduced ISO 26000:2010 which lists a series of criteria and 
standards for socially responsible practices of companies in the public and private sector. 
It comprises of seven key areas of social responsibility including consumer issues, human 




rights, the environment, labour practices, fair operational practices, community 
involvement and development, and organisational governance (ISO, 2010). These aspects 
of CSR, also known as the abbreviation ESG (environmental, social and governance).  
Due to the voluntary nature of CSR, its definition varies across companies, 
industries, and sector. Similarly, the conflicting academic debate on the impact of CSR 
on the businesses has contributed to the development of several theoretical concepts. 
However, the fundamental aspect of all CSR theories is that firms have responsibilities 
towards the societal interest that go beyond simply legal and ethical duties, and more 
towards the development of broader social elements.  
 
2.3. Theories of CSR 
Prior literature on CSR theories produced several classifications of CSR (Secchi, 
2007; Windsor, 2006; Garriga and Mele; 2004; Klonoski 1991 Preston, 1975). According 
to Garriga and Mele (2004), the theories of CSR are classified as instrumental, political, 
integrative and ethical theories. According to the instrumental theories, the primary social 
responsibility of a company is to create wealth for its shareholders. Any form of social 
activities is acceptable, if and only if, they are not against the primary purpose of wealth 
creation.  Hence, this group of CSR theories consider socially responsible activities as a 
mechanism of accomplishing firms’ long-term financial objective (Jones,1995; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jenson, 2010; Jamali, 2008). On the other hand, political 
theory more focuses on business-society relationships in the political ground. These group 
of theories argue that the social responsibility ascends from the social power that firm 
hold. The existence of a social contract between society and business leads to firms’ 
participation in community activities. Similarly, the third group Integrative theories; state 




that the existence, growth and continuity of the businesses depend on the society the latter 
one holds critical resources. It is, therefore, imperative for the firms should integrate 
social demands into their business model. The final group of theories, the Ethical ones 
state that firms have fiduciary duties towards their several stakeholders and the society as 
a whole and are required to implement morally and ethically acceptable practices in their 
operations (Crane et al., 2008).  Hence as Garriga and Mele (2004) state,  “companies 
should accept CSR as an ethical obligation above any other consideration”. 
This approach of classifying the CSR theories is complete and comprehensive 
since it has successfully managed to integrate multiple approaches. The clear link between 
different approaches and theories are well presented in line with the role of modern 
business in society. However, this classification is somehow weak in theoretical terms, as 
it ignores the important impact of complex interrelationships amongst the various aspect. 
For example, the instrumental theory is described as a mean of achieving firms’ economic 
objectives through social initiates but fails to appreciate the contribution of stakeholder 
management and the corporate social performance approach to the financial performance, 
further classified as an integrative theory. Similarly, this approach also fails to explain 
the reason for separating different theories since different political theories may also be 
associated with the instrumental theory of CSR (Secchi, 2007).  
Early studies have classified CSR under several alternative perspectives, 
including, amongst others, the classical shareholder view (Clarke, 1998, Lantos, 2001); 
the enlightened self-interest, moral approach linked to social expectations (Jenson, 2001) 
and the neoclassical approach (Moir, 2001). The classical (Lantos, 2001) and the neo-
classical (Moir, 2001) approaches describe CSR under the concept of shareholders’ value 
maximisation. On the other hand, the stakeholder approach represents firms’ 




responsibility beyond shareholders’ interest and address the issue of wider multi-party 
(stakeholders) expectations (Lantos, 2001). Other important theoretical concepts covered 
in hitherto CSR research are those of social legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 2002), 
institutional approach (Powell & DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood et al., 2008), the resource-
based view (Barney, 1994), so on and so forth. I further concentrate on analysing on the 
key theoretical perspectives of CSR.  
 
2.3.1. Shareholder Value Theory 
According to the shareholder value theory, the maximisation of the long-term 
wealth of the company’s owners is a primary objective for the company, and corporate 
executives are obliged to act in the best interest of that shareholder. This theory is at the 
base of the neoclassical economic approach, where the shareholders’ utility maximisation 
is the primary concern (Lantos, 2001).  Levitt (1958) concept of social responsibility is 
one of the most important notions of the neoclassical theory of CSR. According to his 
study, business people should pay more attention to social responsibility because it poses 
threats to firms instead of an economic benefit.  Levitt (1958, p.49) argues that 
“businesses will have a much better chance of surviving if there is clarity about their goals 
with the long-run profit maximisation been the key principle objective in practice as well 
as in theory”. Similarly, Carr (1968) argues that converting the firms’ resources into the 
products and services are the primary aims of the business. He compares the business 
responsibility and ethics with the game of poker where some dishonesty and deception 
are necessary for a firm to be successful. Therefore, as long as a company operates within 
the rule of law, it can shape its strategy as it pleases to maximise its profits (Carr, 1968, 
p.151). Historically, Carr’s (1968) and Levitt’s (1958) concepts that focused only on 




profit maximisation while ignoring the ethical and social responsibility and termed as the 
‘pure profit-making view’ (Lantos, 2001, p.602). 
One of the most influential supporters of the aforementioned classical view is 
Friedman (1970).  Friedman (1998) believes that in a “free economic system” there is one 
and only one social responsibility obligation for a business that is to use its resources and 
structure its operation in a way that maximises corporate profit. However, this is 
acceptable as long as the firm stays within the “rule of the game”(Friedman, 1970). 
Hence, managers should act in the best interests of their shareholders as supported by the 
agent-principal relationship of the agency theory (Smith, 2003; Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004).  Any managerial actions that dissent to shareholders’ interest could be perceived 
unethical even though such activities might be socially responsible. Based on this view, 
the participation in CSR activities represents a cost for the firm (Friedman, 1970) and can 
have an adverse impact on the firms and its shareholders (Levit, 1958).   
In line with Carr (1968), Friedman (1970) also emphasised the importance of 
economic benefit rather than social norms and values during the shareholder wealth 
maximisation process. He also agrees that business also should consider ethics, honesty 
and requirements in their operations. He believes that a manager should not act, accept 
and implement any strategies that threaten shareholders’ wealth. Any use of corporate 
resources for social objectives means imposing ‘virtual taxes’ to shareholders because 
social goals should be fulfilled by public servants and politicians rather than businesses 
(Friedman, 1970; Sternberg, 1997).  Carroll (1996) states that most of the scholars in the 
past only focuses on the first part of Friedman’s (1970) concept and ignore the second 
part which appreciates the ethical and legal aspect of the social and environmental 
responsibility in a non-deceptive way (Smith, 2003). The modern advocates of the 




classical perspective of CSR (Lantos, 2001, p.603) label Friedman’s (1970) proposition 
as the ‘constrained profit-making view’.  
In support of the shareholder view of CSR, Barry (2000, p.103) claims that firms 
can only be involved in socially responsible activities and philanthropic donations if the 
market is less competitive. He further argues that the use of corporate resources for CSR 
activities is indeed an act of dishonesty and theft. This is also corroborated by Henderson 
(2005), who further opposes CSR and claims that the latter can weaken corporate 
performance because it tends to increase corporate expense. He further argues that CSR 
merely covers the way for several-practices of over-regulation, for which the cost to 
society, in general, is greater than the benefit (Henderson, 2005, p.32). Most recent 
advocates of the shareholder theory (Jensen, 2002; Coelho et al. 2003; Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004) defend the value creation and maximisation concepts as companies’ 
primary aim but also support CSR as an important aspect of the modern business 
environment. For example, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) argue that focusing on the firm’s 
shareholder's value maximisation also cover stakeholders’ interest since the return/value 
to shareholders is the residual pay. These studies support that corporate managers’ 
decision to create and maximise shareholders’ wealth can be linked with stakeholder 
management. For example, Coelho et al., (2003) argue that interacting with stakeholders 
and maintaining a healthy relationship is vital to corporate profitability as well as it is a 
fiduciary duty of the firm’s managers to their shareholders. Hence, it is essential for 
companies to balance multiple stakeholders’ expectations with the primary objective that 
of wealth maximisation. Besides, a firm can maximise its long-term value by making 
certain adjustments with its stakeholders. For example, Jensen (2002) introduces a 
concept called ‘enlightened value maximisation' where a firm can maximise its long-term 




wealth by incorporating both social and economic responsibilities. In a follow-up study, 
Jensen (2010) indicates that “to maximise the value of the firm, corporate managers must 
not only satisfy but enlist the support of, all corporate stakeholders like employees, 
managers, customers, suppliers, governments, NGOs and local communities”. Hence, a 
firm that implements such a strategy will achieve its value creation objectives (Porter and 
Krammer, 2006; Queen, 2015).  
Overall, this shareholder viewpoint of CSR aligns with the neoclassical theory that 
seeks to maximise shareholder wealth with the notion of profit maximisation and 
efficiency within a free market economy. Corporate managers have to focus on the value 
maximisation and any resources used in the CSR should contribute to the economic 
performance of the firm. The key assumptions of this particular shareholder view are the 
followings: 
▪ Shareholders are the owners of the company and managers should focus on 
maximising their wealth. 
▪ Corporate managers must use firms’ resources efficiently to increase the profitability 
of the firm.  
▪ A company should focus on producing goods and services for society to create wealth. 
Any use of business resources to social responsibility will impair its profitability. 
▪ According to this theoretical perspective, a free and competitive market with 
minimum public interaction is the best condition for wealth creation.  
▪ Corporate managers should focus on the optimum utilisation of firms’ resources. The 
economic benefits must support manager discretion to use resources in socially 
responsible activities. 




▪ Companies are fulfilling social expectations by creating jobs, providing goods and 
services, and strengthening competition.  
However, for a large part of the CSR academic community, the shareholder value 
theory is narrow and only focuses on firms’ economic aspect. Moreover, shareholder 
theory argues that not all social problems are a responsibility for the companies but the 
state/government (Friedman, 1970; Smith, 2003 Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004); as well as, 
it ignores the fact that firms have their stakeholders and have some rights towards firms 
that can have significant impact on their operation. Due to these conceptual limitations 
and weaknesses of shareholder theory, the use of social theories such as these of the 
Stakeholder theory, the Legitimacy theory and the Institutional theory are increasingly 
used to address the wider issues of the society. For example, the stakeholder theory 
integrates the wider social aspects in achieving firms long term goal. This theory states 
that the firms cannot achieve their long-term economic success if they only focus on their 
owners, on the contrary, it argues that a wider approach is needed that incorporates firms’ 
several stakeholders and appropriate relationship management and it is vital for the 
success in the competitive marketplace. 
 Hence, the stakeholder theory states that CSR is an instrument for achieving firms’ 
objectives and can lead to higher profitability through operating responsibly in society. 
In order to be successful in a current business environment where the competition is 
intense, firms must focus on building a sustainable relationship with their stakeholders, 
attract their support, develop trust and enhance the cooperation through the process of 
stakeholder management.  In the following section, I elaborate further on this.  
 




2.3.2. Stakeholder Theory  
Stanford Research Institute firstly introduced the term “Stakeholder” (Freeman et 
al. 2010) but the foundation of the concept in academic and management literature started 
by Freeman (1984) in his seminal study. According to Freeman (1984), “stakeholders are 
any group or individuals who can affect, or affected by, the achievement of a 
corporation’s objectives, including employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, 
environmentalists, government and other groups who can help or hurt the company” 
(p.52). Hence, interests, concerns and demands of stakeholders should be considered in 
the firms’ strategic decisions. Subsequent studies widely adopt this view. 
Prior literature has classified stakeholders in numerous ways, such as internal and 
external (Zahra and Pearce, 1989); strategic and moral (Goodpaster, 1991); supportive, 
managerial, non-supportive and mixed blessing ones (Savage et al. 1991); latent, 
expectant and definitive stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997); single and multiple issue 
(Wood, 1995); voluntary and involuntary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1994). 
Clarkson (1995) divides stakeholder into primary and secondary by their interest, 
claims, ownership and rights in the firm’s activities. According to him, primary 
stakeholders include investors, employees, customers, and suppliers, and they are 
formally/officially connected to the organisation. On the other hand, secondary 
stakeholders are defined as those who can influence/affect (or are influenced/affected by) 
the corporation, but they are not engaged in a transaction with the corporations and are 
not essential for its survival (Clarkson, 1995, p.107). Without these stakeholders’ 
involvement, an organisation cannot survive 
Stakeholder theory is based on the concept that multiple stakeholders have an interest in 
the operations and the decision of corporations (Branco and Rodrigues, 2007; Crane, 




Matten and Spence, 2014) and it further elaborates the relationship between these two 
parties.  Ansoff (1965) was the very first to introduce the stakeholder theory (Fernando 
and Lawrence, 2014; Roberts, 1992).  
The doctrine of the stakeholder theory is that corporate executives/managers are 
accountable to their stakeholders and must ensure the balance of divergent interest of 
several stakeholders. It emphasises corporate accountability beyond economic and 
financial objectives. Hence, in order to be successful, firm or managers should focus on 
balancing the interest and creating the value for multiple stakeholders including 
shareholders without ignoring the interest of either party (Branco and Rodrigues, 2007; 
Guthire et al., 2006; Carroll and Buchholtz, 2003; Radin, 1999; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Clarkson, 1995; Jones, 1995).  
Stakeholder theory has been classified in many ways using various assumptions. 
For example, Berman et al., (1999) classified shareholder theory as intrinsic stakeholder 
commitment model and strategic stakeholder management. According to strategic 
stakeholder management, companies address the concern and interest of stakeholders 
because the stakeholders’ reaction and behaviour towards the firms’ activity may directly 
affect the economic performance of the company. On the other hand, the intrinsic 
stakeholder commitment model argues that firms address stakeholders concern because 
of a moral commitment to stakeholder group and that this commitment, in turn, impact 
firms’ financial performance (Berman et al., 1999. p.502).  
Similarly, Gray et al. (1996) categorise the stakeholder theory as an ethical and 
managerial perspective. This approach is later extended by Guthrie et al. (2006), Belal 
and Owen (2007), Deegan (2009), and Gray et al. (2010). Under the ethical perspective, 
organisations can be perceived to be a mechanism for meeting stakeholders’ expectations 




rather than shareholder value creation. Also, the company should treat its stakeholder 
fairly and equally (Deegan, 2009). The ethical perspective can be linked to the normative 
stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and the accountability stakeholder 
theory (Gray et al. 1996). This concept opposes Friedman’s (1984) argument and focuses 
that firms being accountable and acting in accordance with the stakeholders’ interest and 
needs even though it is not financially beneficial (Hasnas, 1998). This aspect of 
stakeholder theory overshadows the concept of shareholder value creation and priorities 
the fulfilment of stakeholders’ expectations and interests. Organisations have to 
understand that stakeholders are real players (Freeman, 1998) and corporate managers 
should consider the moral and ethical aspect of each decision taken, which may need to 
satisfy the interest and needs of these interested parties (McVea and Freeman, 2005). The 
ethical perspective also stresses the importance of the point that stakeholders are entitled 
to treat fairly and equally by corporations regardless of their power (Deegan, 2009). 
On the other hand, with regards to the managerial concept, the stakeholder theory 
state that stakeholders control the firms’ critical resources (Deegan, 2009; Mitchell et al. 
1997). Under this perspective, managerial focus and priority should be given to the 
fulfilment of those stakeholders who are economically powerful. Stakeholder 
participation is assumed to be critical to the corporate decisions that may affect the firm 
(Murray and Vogel, 1997). It is because stakeholders are contributors to wealth creation, 
risk bearers and the potential beneficiaries (Post et al., 2002).  The managerial perspective 
of the stakeholder theory focuses on the managing the relationship among the firms’ 
stakeholders than focusing only on the financial objective as according to Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) a stakeholder has resources and power to improve the financial 
performance of a firm or otherwise lower them.  




The managerial concept of stakeholder theory is primarily a strategic management 
concept (Porter and Kramer, 2006) which aims to gain and retain a competitive advantage 
in the industry through proper management of firms’ relationship with multiple 
stakeholders. Firm and stakeholder have a two-way relationship with conflicting interest 
(Preble, 2005). For example, employees expectation of high salary is conflicting to a 
customer who wants a low price but standard product quality. On the other hand, firms 
that focus on financial profitability by reducing staff expenses may affect staff 
productivity and creativity. Consequently, because of a poor standard and less quality, 
the customer may boycott the firm resulting in lower profits (Crane, Matten and Spence, 
2014).  Hence, it becomes evident that managing conflicting stakeholders’ expectations 
is a very challenging task for businesses. 
Similarly, Donaldson and Preston (1995) classify the Stakeholders theory into 
three different standpoints such as descriptive /empirical, instrumental and the normative 
theory. Among these three perspectives, descriptive and normative are more focus on 
moral reasoning and theoretical relationship between firm and stakeholders, while the 
instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory is more practical compared to others.  The 
descriptive theory is about how the corporation operates and maintains relations with its 
stakeholders while the normative dimension defines the norms, morals and principles that 
a company should follow while operating in the society. However, the instrumental 
concept describes the function of how the company manages its stakeholders to achieve 
its objectives. According to this perspective, a firm with stakeholder management policy 
in place will benefit from improved profitability.  
Mitchell et al. (1997) propose a model of ‘stakeholder identification and salience.' 
This model focuses on prioritising firms’ stakeholders on the basis of the possession of 




the attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency. Power is defined as the ability to control, 
whereas Legitimacy is the firm's behaviour that is acceptable and expected by society, 
and last, the urgency exists when there is a pressing call for attention (Magness, 2008). 
The power is noted as the most crucial attribute among the three. Mitchell et al. (1997, 
p.873) suggest that “stakeholder salience will be positively related to the cumulative 
number of stakeholders attributes- power, legitimacy, and urgency- perceived by 
managers to be present.” The corporate manager should prioritise a stakeholder with a 
high degree of all those three attributes. Neville and Menguc (2006) assert that 
stakeholders’ needs and expectations may be conflicting, complementary and 
cooperative. It is therefore that managers should not take stakeholder’s salience 
independently (individually), but rather should address with potential interaction with 
other stakeholders. The interaction between the multiple stakeholder networks and the 
salience facilitates a better understanding of the impact of stakeholders on the firms 
(Neville and Menguc, 2006). Hence, power, legitimacy, and urgency are the key 
assessment criteria for managers to respond and prioritise the interest of legitimate 
stakeholders (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al. 1997, p.882).  
Prior literature focuses on CSR and stakeholder theory instantaneously 
(Wadddock and Graves, 1997; Ullman, 1985; Richardson et al. 1999; Preston and 
O’Bannon, 1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000; Ruf et al. 2001; Moore, 2001; McWilliams 
and Siegal, 2001; Murthy, 2007; Godfrey et al. 2008; Salama et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al. 
2011). Simpson and Taylor (2013) define stakeholder theory as a systematic approach of 
the firm and its surroundings that describes the complex relationship between business 
and society. It also examines how these two elements interact with each other after taking 
into consideration a socially-responsible behaviour and accountability of the firm towards 




its various stakeholders. Hence, in order to achieve long-term success, the organisation 
should devote more resources and focus on managing and maintaining a healthy 
relationship with its stakeholder (Donaldson and Preston, 1997; Tsoutsoura, 2004). The 
fundamental theme of Stakeholder theory is to meet the needs and demand of multiple 
stakeholders through implementing a socially responsible practice that makes a positive 
change in the society (Ruf et al., 2001), and such practice is called CSR. Murthy (2007) 
defines CSR as the social practice where companies shift their responsibility towards 
meeting the needs and expectation of several stakeholders. Firms involvement in CSR 
activities (e.g. corporate philanthropy) towards secondary stakeholders generates positive 
moral capital by improving stakeholders’ confidence towards firms (Godfrey, 2005). 
Satisfying stakeholder through CSR practices improves firms reputation (Godfrey, 2005; 
Russ and Tencati, 2009), which consequently increases shareholders’ long-term wealth 
(Godfrey, 2008). Further, the empirical studies evidence that firms’ commitment towards 
satisfying and maintain the healthy relationship with their stakeholders facilitates a lower 
level of leverage and cheaper cost of capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011, 
Goss and Roberts, 2011; Bae et al., 2011).  
In line with stakeholder theory, firms’ CSR initiative communicates their level of 
involvement towards contributing to the positive changes in society and community. The 
instrumental aspect of the stakeholder theory asserts that the improved stakeholder 
relationship is an instrument of corporate success (Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). Regular communication and education will improve a firms’ legitimacy with their 
stakeholder (Lindblom, 1994; Deegan, 2002; Gary et al., 2010) via the process of CSR 
activity disclosures. Hence, firms’ involvement in CSR activities improves the 
stakeholders’ confidence towards them.  Firms’ healthy relationship with their 




stakeholders improves corporate image, reputation, and subsequently leads towards 
sustainable business growth (Mitchell et al., 1997; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Du, 
Bhattacharya, and Sen, 2010).   
Stakeholder theory is a holistic view of all parties directly or indirectly associated 
with the organisation that has a legitimate interest in the company. The key assumptions 
of the stakeholder theory are the following: 
1. Stakeholders are parties that are directly or indirectly affects and affected by 
business operations. 
2. Firms have diverse groups of stakeholders with a divergent interest in them. 
3. Stakeholders hold a significant amount of resources and power that is required for 
companies to operate and grow in the environment. 
4. Companies have responsibilities (economic, environmental, social) to fulfil and 
satisfy their stakeholder's interest and demand. 
5. Businesses should balance and priorities their stakeholders based on interest, 
power, urgency and salience (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
6. The effective management of the firms’ stakeholders is vital for their overall 
growth and success. 
7. Stakeholder satisfaction through CSR is an instrument of improved corporate 
performance.  
The stakeholder theory is a model which guides companies to take a holistic approach 
in setting their corporate objectives. The stakeholder model considers both ethical and 
economic aspect of firms and empowers them to implement socially responsible 
initiatives towards making a positive change in society. Stakeholder theory promotes 
fairness in dealing with parties associated with the companies and hence promotes both 




corporate growth and the welfare of the society. However, the stakeholder theory is not 
free from the ambiguity. For example, the definition of a stakeholder is still ambiguous 
(Jones and Wicks, 1999). Although stakeholder theory is a good integration of social 
welfare, ethics, CSR and economics, this theory has not explained on what the 
stakeholders expect from companies and how the divergent needs of stakeholder can be 
balanced. In addition, the stakeholder theory fails to explain how and from where the 
roles and responsibility of firms come from, but it only focused on fulfilling the roles and 
responsibility instead. According to the Legitimacy concept (Suchman, 1995), the roles 
and responsibility of organisations come from society. Firms are the part of the social 
system that operates within the boundary of the society and aim to fulfil the needs and 
demands of the society via offering goods and service that meet the expectation of the 
social elements (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Campbell et al., 2003). Hence, CSR can 
be explained better with the combination of the stakeholder theory and the legitimacy 
theory. In the following section, I elaborate further on this. 
 
2.3.3. Legitimacy theory 
Corporations are artificial entities created in society by humans. Hence, they have 
to act within the norms, and values of the community where they are established and must 
ensure that the operations and actions they take are perceived as being legitimate. It is 
important that companies act sincerely in line with the social systems, they should not 
compromise the social norms, values, customs, belief and laws because society gives 
them permission/license to operate, grow and use resources and market (Magness, 2008; 
Campbell et al., 2003; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). The survival and continuation of a 
company depend on the society where the corporations are operating, and its value system 




is congregant to the value system of the society (Deegan, Rankin and Tobin, 2002; 
Lindblom, 1984).  
 Legitimacy theory is a positive theory that focuses on firms’ relationship with 
the society as a whole and seeks to describe (explain) firms’ behaviour rather than 
prescribing how they should behave (Deegan, 2006; Gray et al., 2010). According to 
Suchman (1995, p.574) legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Legitimacy focuses on whether the 
behaviour of a corporation is appropriate regarding social norms, values or social contract 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011).  It enforces firms to balance their operation with the norms 
and values of the society. Firm’s behaviour and their business activities must be consistent 
with and acceptable by the social system of which they are founded (Deegan, 2002; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, p. 122), consequently improves the resource supply assurance 
and the credibility of company activities in order to achieve their goals (Gray et al. 2010; 
Laan, 2008; Seti, 1975; Suchman, 1975). 
Suchman (1995) states three types of legitimacy that are complementary and 
strengthen one another; pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. According to the practical 
perspective of legitimacy, people and individuals in society support organisations, not 
only because these are important to them in meeting individual needs, demands and 
interests, but also because they see companies as being responsive to their larger interest 
(Suchman, 1995; p.578). This view is consistent with the concept of rational self-interest 
underlying neoclassical economics (Deegan, 2009). Organisations could gain and 
maintain pragmatic legitimacy by fulfilling multiple stakeholders’ demands and 




expectations. This can be done via the implementation of CSR initiatives that focus on 
various social expectations.   
According to Suchman (1995: p.582), cognitive legitimacy is the “mere 
acceptance of the organisation as necessary or inevitable based on some taken for granted 
cultural account”. Society accepts any actions and behaviour of corporations if they are 
unavoidable or necessary to social elements. Corporate behaviour that may harm the 
general public and individual is neither accepted nor recognised by society. This 
perspective of legitimacy assumes that corporations classified as sinners, e.g. tobacco 
firms, are less legitimate than those in other industries such as the food industry. Hence, 
cognitive legitimacy is achieved if society regards corporate structures, processes, actions 
and behaviour as acceptable and desirable.  
Moral legitimacy is the third topology, which refers to the optimistic normative 
investigation of corporations and their behavioural activities towards achieving their 
goals. It is based on the assumption that corporate activity is “the right thing to do” 
(Suchman, 1995: p578). Palazzo and Scherer (2006, p.73) state that moral legitimacy 
refers to conscious moral judgment on the organisation’s output, procedures, structures, 
and leadership. According to this point of view, corporations can obtain legitimacy by 
promoting activities that support and improve social welfare. Hence, activities related to 
CSR play a vital role in promoting social welfare resulting in the achievement of moral 
legitimacy (Jamali, 2008; Wood, 1991). 
Legitimacy is one of the reasons that companies are implementing socially 
responsible initiatives in their reporting. It is vital that corporate activities must be 
legitimate in the eye of the society so firms can continue growing and it is achieved by 
operating in line with the social norms and expectations where the firms are operating 




(Arvidsson, 2010). Nevertheless, legitimatizing corporate activities constantly is difficult 
to achieve as social norms, values, and expectations change continuously. Regular 
changes could result in firms’ failing to legitimise their operations; a condition often 
referred to in the literature as Legitimacy Gap (Lindblom, 1994). There are four different 
strategies that businesses can use to legitimise their operations, including education and 
information, manipulation of perception, changing the social expectation and changing 
the perception of the stakeholders (Lindblom, 1994; Yongvanich and Guthrie 2007; 
Yongvanich and Guthrie, 2007. p160).  
The use of CSR activities facilitates Lindblom’s (1994) strategies for 
legitimisation and plays a vital role in their implementation. If legitimacy is threatened, 
communication and education play a significant role in the process of legitimation. 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) argue that public disclosure of information in firms’ annual 
report can be used as a means to implement these strategies. Similarly, Gray et al., (2010) 
argue that corporations are actively initiating CSR activities to communicate stakeholders 
that firms are legitimising their operations with regards to society. CSR activities and 
disclosure are all part of the legitimation process that an organisation can adopt (Deegan, 
2002; van der Laan, 2009).   
Carroll (1979) argues that the principle of legitimacy focuses on duties, 
responsibilities and sanctions that exist at an institutional level and determines the scope 
and limitations of the business-society relationship. However, empirical studies on this 
argument produce mixed results. In a seminal study, Honger (1982) supports the 
explanation of the legitimacy concept in corporate social reporting. The author examines 
corporate social reporting trends in the US steel industry and the content of the disclosure. 
The results show increased variation in social disclosure practice over the examined 




sample period concluding that change in disclosure occurs in response to the changing 
expectation of society towards corporate behaviour (Honger, 1982). However, Guthrie 
and Parker (1989) and O’Dwyer (2002) provide contradictory evidence. In detail, Guthrie 
and Parker (1989) examine the concept of legitimacy as a primary explanation of CSR 
using broad cross-sectional social and ethical disclosure data for Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Ltd (BHP), an Australian mining company. Their findings suggest that 
legitimacy theory appears not to be a primary explanation for CSR. 
 Similarly, using the social disclosure of the UK firms, Campbell (2000) reviewed 
Marks and Spencer’s social disclosure and found that its corporate social policies are 
motivated by the trait of the company’s chairperson rather than what is predicted by the 
legitimacy theory. This finding is further corroborated by O’Dwyer (2002), who 
interviewed senior executives of large Irish companies and reports that social and 
environmental disclosure policies are rarely motivated by legitimacy-related factors. 
Hence, he contends that CSR disclosure is not always a successful legitimisation strategy. 
 On the contrary, numerous studies are examining the link between corporate 
legitimacy and CSR that report a positive relationship. For example, Deegan et al., (2002) 
examined the relationship between community concern for social and environmental 
issues and the firm’s annual report disclosure and found a significant positive correlation. 
Companies publish positive social and environmental information in response to negative 
media attention (Deegan et al., 2002, p. 312). This result is also corroborated by Chu et 
al., (2013) who examine the factors driving companies to publish greenhouse gas report 
of Chinese firms. The author found that those big firms operating in an industry that 
produces higher-level carbon dioxide and have negative publicity, they tend to publish 
only neutral and good news (Chu et al., 2013, p.114).  




 More recently, the use of legitimacy theory in accounting research has increased 
significantly with the bulk of prior studies showing that corporate social responsibility is 
positively linked to the legitimacy (Kamal and Deegan, 2013; Mousa and Hansan, 2015; 
Bhattacharya, 2015). This is supported by the fact that corporate engagement with CSR 
initiatives has significantly increased. For example, according to KPMG (2013), the rate 
of corporate social reporting rate has risen substantially, with 93% of the top 250 global 
companies include a CSR report alongside their annual financial statements. The 
increasing trend in CSR reporting suggests a possible increased pressure on corporate 
entities to initiate CSR activities and disclose them in the annual reports (Gray et al., 
2010) so as to maintain corporate legitimacy towards the society. The social pressure has 
now become one of the key motivating factors for pursuing  CSR activities (Adams et al. 
1998; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Patten, 1992; Deegan, 2002).   
The legitimacy theory summarises the importance of firms’ long-term relationship 
with society in order to sustain and thrive in a dynamic environment. It asserts that the 
existence of business depends on the resources they acquire from society and exchange 
their product and services instead. However, legitimacy concept ignores the fact that firms 
could face tough and steer threats from other factors such as competitors, suppliers, and 
substitute products which could have a detrimental effect on the firms’ financial 
performance. Legitimacy theory does not describe or provide an alternative to what a 
company should do to overcome this threat. According to Porter (1980) in order to remain 
competitive firms must analyse external forces such power of supplier, buyer, industry 
rivalry, the threat of new entrant and substitute products. Competition inside as well 
outside the industry poses a significant threat to the survival of a firm. Companies 
implement the CSR initiatives in order to cope with the competition and to differentiate 




themselves among competitors in the industry (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Kemper et al., 
2013; Flammer, 2013). Similar to stakeholder theory, Legitimacy theory focuses on 
maintaining a close and healthy relationship with social elements and fails to explain that 
companies implement CSR to cope with companies by copying their competitors. Firms’ 
intention to pursuit CSR is better explained with the concept of the institutional theory. 
The institutional theory examines firms’ structure and explains for having homogenous 
characteristics or forms in firms which are within the same field or industry (Fernando 
and Lawrence, 2014, p.162). Hence, companies’ participation in CSR can be explained 
better with the combination of the stakeholder theory and the legitimacy theory and the 
institutional theory. In the following section, I elaborate further on institutional theory. 
 
2.3.4. Institutional Theory  
Scott (2014), defines an institution “as the symbolic and behavioural system that 
contains representational, constitutional and normative rules together with regulatory 
mechanisms. In other words, an institution is a combination of several elements and 
structures such as social processes, cultural perceptions, regulations and norms, that 
empower stability and meaning to social behaviour (Glover et al., 2015). Hillman and 
Keim (2001) classify the institution into two types, formal and informal. The formal 
institution includes rules, regulations, policies, laws, constitutions and other formal 
agreements which are formed and legalised by society and nations. On the other hand, 
informal institutions are ruled behaviour and mental models which are made by 
individuals through religious norms or beliefs, culture, and codes of society. At the 
national level, the institution consists of the socio-political, legal, and economic systems.   




Institutional theory is widely used as a theoretical concept in social sciences as it 
helps to explain the activities and policies implemented at the corporate level. The 
institutional theory investigates why firms have homogeneous characteristics within 
specific industry/sectors. According to institutional theory, corporations as legal entities 
are controlled by a social framework of norms, rules, customs, values and anticipated 
expectations that establish socially appropriate and acceptable economic behaviour 
(Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). It analyses the ways in which corporations and groups obtain 
their place and legitimacy by complying to social regulations and norms (Glover et al., 
2014). This definition is extended by Scott (2007) to include the element of adaptation in 
changing regulatory, cognitive and normative conditions. General macro-environmental 
forces such as political, social, economic, technological and legal forces affect the 
corporate decision to pursue legitimate practices towards multiple stakeholders. Hence, 
the institutional theory helps to clarify how changes in such forces influence corporate 
decisions to implement CSR initiatives. It analyses corporate behaviours, strategies and 
management practices under different institutional environments.   
The institutional theory assumes that companies are homogeneous and they 
implement similar management structures, processes, policies, practices and structures 
adopted by other corporations in the same industry, irrespective of their actual 
effectiveness, in order to resemble other corporations in the same organisational field that 
face the same environmental conditions. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) characterised the 
process of achieving homogeneity as ‘isomorphism’ and introduced three mechanisms of 
institutional isomorphism, namely coercive, normative, and mimetic.  
Coercive isomorphism is related to informal and formal pressure to adopt 
homogenous characteristics from external factors, such as governmental regulation, 




stakeholder pressure, shareholder influence, and political influence in the organisation.  
The coercive isomorphism arises from organisational dependence on powerful 
stakeholders and firms are coerced to implement similar practices and strategies such as 
corporate social responsibility practices (Deegan, 2009). This aims to maintain and 
strengthen existing relationships with powerful stakeholders, as most of the influential 
interested parties in the same organisational field usually have similar expectations. 
Similarly, other stakeholders such as, the government or environmental agencies could 
be the coercive factor that drives corporations to follow responsible practices which 
favour natural environment as and avoid possible sanctions on the company’s operations.  
On the other hand, Normative isomorphism emerges from the professional 
standards, morale, ethics, social obligations, and common values of particular 
institutional practices. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define normative isomorphism as the 
collective struggle by members of organisational field or occupational group to define, 
control and establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy 
(p.152). The normative isomorphism ensures corporations maintain relevant professional 
standards, behaviour and practices that are legitimate. Hence, it drives companies to act 
in a socially responsible way and develop a sustainable business practice that fulfils the 
expectation of its multiple stakeholders (Glover et al., 2014; Deegan, 2009). For example, 
to be a member of a particular CSR index, corporations have to meet certain conditions 
and maintain their appropriate standards regarding socially responsible behaviour (also 
known as ESG criteria). Hence, as per normative isomorphism, corporate managers tend 
to commit their resources and time consistently to gain and maintain the CSR index 
membership. Otherwise, any adverse changes in firms corporate social commitments, 
performance,  standard, and conditions may threaten their continued membership in the 




association. Hence, normative factors influence corporations to act in a socially 
responsible manner for their long-term survival and growth.   
Finally, according to mimetic isomorphism, companies tend to imitate the 
practices, behaviour, strategies and process of other organisations due to the uncertainty 
and dynamism of the environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
environmental change is one of the primary factors that drive corporations to mimic 
competitors’ practices when responding to similar problems so as to remain competitive 
in their industry. Corporations which are unable to track and capitalise the benefit of the 
superior management processes and practices adopted by the best of their competitors 
may face the risk their legitimacy towards society and may lose their competitive position 
in the market. For example, undertaking CSR initiatives could be viewed as one of many 
successful methods that a corporation can implement to meet the expectations of its 
stakeholders and strengthen/ secure its corporate legitimacy.  
The second dimension of institutional theory is decoupling. It is referred to the 
distinction between firms’ external image and their actual practices (intentional or 
unintentional), procedures and structure (Moll et al., 2006; Dillard et al. 2004). It can be 
linked to the concept of legitimacy, where good environmental and social practices (e.g. 
CSR reporting) that a company implements, as a mean to improve its image in the society, 
may vary from their actual performance (Deegan, 2009). Institutional theory drives firms 
to maintain, retain and develop legitimacy by motivating them to adopt CSR practices 
that are linked to social norms and values. These practices are important for businesses 
as it helps them to respond to the uncertainty of the environmental dynamism. Theories 
of CSR primarily focus on the relationship between business and society. Prior literature 
suggests several factors that are responsible for driving companies towards implementing 




CSR initiatives. The degree of these CSR practices varies in institutional level, 
organisational level, country level and even individual level (Dam and Scholtens 2012; 
Campbell, 2007; Chapple and Moon, 2005; Freeman, 2004; Johnson and Greening, 
1999).  
 
2.4. Empirical literature review on CSR-CFP relationship 
 Balancing the stakeholder expectation is one of the biggest challenges for any 
organisations that require regular commitment and management efforts. The manager 
should aim to address stakeholders according to their interest, power, urgency and salience 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) since they actively and closely monitor the corporate behaviours and 
events whether it is related to finance or environmental or other social agenda. Any changes 
in stakeholders and corporate relation may have an adverse effect on firm performance. 
Therefore, the company should implement CSR initiatives to respond to stakeholders’ 
expectation and maintain the relationship.  
 CSR can be defined as the programs and activities that are aimed to build and 
strengthen the relationship between a firm’s internal and external stakeholders by fulfilling 
their demands and expectations. Prior literature on the CSR-CFP relationship is rather 
mixed. Although the majority of studies suggest a positive association (Beurden and 
Gossling, 2008), there are a few also suggesting a negative (and neutral) relationship 
(Orlitizky et al., 2003; Margolish and Walsh, 2009, 2003). For example, Peloza (2009)  
reports that among 128 studies examining CSR-CFP association,  59% suggest a positive, 
27% report neutral and 14% suggest the negative correlation between them. 
 Previous studies have outlined the several benefits of implementing CSR such as; 
reputational advantage/gain, the reduction of cost through the efficient use of resources and 




improved efficiency, and reduction of risk and impact of negative events. These have a direct 
and indirect impact on the financial and operational performance of companies (Isaksson et 
al., 2014; Tarabella and Burchi, 2013; Lourenco et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2011; Carroll 
and Shabana, 2010; Crane et al., 2009). One of the key advantages of investing in CSR 
initiatives is to build a strong relationship with stakeholders and improve the firm’s 
reputation. Improved stakeholder management is an indicator of excellent corporate 
management practices (Lourenco et al., 2012; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Barone et al., 2007, p.444). It asserts that the firm's image and brand name 
differentiate businesses from their counterparts leading to a competitive advantage. This is 
because better CSR reputation will improve stakeholders’ trust, confidence, support and 
participation in company’s operations which consequently create valuable intangible assets 
(Godfrey et al., 2005; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Pittula, 2000). Furthermore, 
stakeholders (including customer, suppliers, employees) are very sensitive to environmental 
and social issues. They want to be a part of (associated with) those companies which 
implement the environment and socially friendly business practices because they enjoy the 
social image and brand name (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Carmeli et al., 2006; Brammer 
and Millington, 2004; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Pava and Krusz, 1996; Preston and 
O’Bannon, 1978). Addressing stakeholders’ expectation and demands through social 
responsible practices leads to a positive impact on consumers’ trust, loyalty on firm’s 
products, and improved overall perception towards company (Pino et al., 2016; Fishman et 
al., 2006; Becker-Olsen et al., 2005; McWilliams et al., 2006; Folkes and Kammins, 1999; 
Murray and Vogel, 1997; Fomburn and Shanely, 1990). It takes years for firms to 
build/create such a reputation but takes only overnight to destroy them (Asgary and Li, 
2016).  




 Sen and Bhattacharya (2001, p.225) examine the relationship between CSR and 
consumer attitude and perception towards firms’ products and services and report a positive 
correlation. The analysis suggests that a company’s irresponsible and unethical activities 
may destroy consumer trust and loyalty, subsequently leading to a decrease in corporate 
revenue. This is because consumers appear to punish socially irresponsible companies by 
boycotting their products and services (Russell et al., 2016; Austin et al., 2006). Starbucks’s 
tax payment case is the perfect example of consumers’ boycotting the products and services. 
There were angry voices, protest, huge criticism against Starbucks in the UK, due to which 
for the first time, the company suffers 3.4% of UK sales decline (Independent, 2014). 
Starbucks later firm made a voluntary payment of £10 million each year in 2012 and 2013 
(Guardian, 2012). 
 On the other hand, firms with better CSR practice in their operation increase sales 
through increased consumer loyalty (Pivateol et al., 2008; Bhattacharya, Korschun and Sen, 
2008). Customers are also willing to pay the premium price for the products and services 
produced by the socially responsible companies (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen, 2007; Austin 
et al., 2006, Smith, 2004). Wan et al. (2016) found that CSR company enjoys improved 
financial performance through increased consumer perception and loyalty towards the 
products and services. The demand for Fairtrade products in the UK is an excellent example 
of consumers’ attitude and preferences to socially responsible business goods and services. 
A study by Smith (2003) on consumers’ buying behaviour of free-range eggs in the UK 
suggests that although the price of the free-range eggs is much higher, its sales consist 35% 
of overall egg market. 
 Similarly, subsequent studies also provide evidence that firms’ participation on 
philanthropic donation increases their following year sales revenue and abnormal stock 




return ((Lev et al., 2010; Godfrey et al., 2009; Brammer and Millington, 2009). Kaspereit 
(2016) argues that firms with high CSR practices less likely to encounter revenue losses due 
to the loss of organisational legitimacy. Therefore, companies’ participation in socially 
responsible initiatives improves financial performance (Kang et al., 2016; Lau et al., 2016; 
Ortlizky et al., 2003, Dowling, 2002; Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
 Firm tend to implement CSR strategies in order to remain competitive among its 
rivals (Lau et al., 2016). Implementing CSR can also reduce corporate costs through 
improved operational efficiencies. Laczniak and Murphy (1991) assert that companies 
implementing socially responsible and ethical business practices would reduce the 
probability of incurring a high social cost such as fines which in turn lead to improved 
performance. For example, developing proactive strategies towards environmental and 
social compliance could prevent firms from possible fines and other cost related to damages 
(Hart, 2005; Berman et al., 1999; Shane and Spicer, 1983). On the other hand, the firm could 
save cost through the efficient use of energy and materials, waste reduction and 
minimisation of insurance expenses (Ambec and Laoie, 2008; Miles and Covan, 2000; 
Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Similarly, the firm may benefit from lower tax schemes 
and financial assistance from the government to implement environmental and social 
responsible operating practices (Berman et al., 1999). Investment in employee welfare 
programs like training and development, health and safety, rewards and work environment 
improves efficiency through increased employee productivity, turnover, efficiency, lower 
absenteeism and innovation-related behaviour that strengthen firms’ capabilities (Costa, 
2015; Turker, 2015; Turban and Greening, 1997). Prior studies suggest that companies with 
high CSR engagement may attract highly-skilled employee (Martin, 2006; Backhaus et al., 
2002; Turban and Greening, 2000). Nielsen (2011) global survey on CSR reports that 




respondents like to work for the companies contribute towards society to make a positive 
change. CSR also promote existing staff morale and goodwill (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Hart, 1995; McGuire et al., 1988). In a recent study, Sun and Yu (2015) document the 
positive relationship between CSR and employee performance. They suggest that employees 
in socially responsible companies generate a better operating performance compared to non-
CSR firms (Sun and Yu, 2015, p. 262). This is also facilitated by a reduction in costs 
associated with injuries /accidents and lower risk of workers’ health and safety (Aldana, 
2011; Cochran, 2007; Turban and Greening, 1997). 
 The third benefit of implementing CSR is the reduction in the impact of negative 
events to corporate performance. According to Shane and Spicer (1983), the firm’s 
commitment to CSR and its disclosure affects the general stakeholder's perceptions on the 
company’s compliances to socially responsible issues. The disclosure of firms’ improved 
commitment to CSR offsets the past corporate irresponsibility and also reduces the 
possibility of further negative impact (Kang et al., 2016). Moreover, CSR initiatives provide 
a way of reducing downside business risk and are an essential element in the risk 
management function of a firm (Husted, 2004, p.176). To that end, CSR practices (e.g. 
philanthropies, disclosure) are found to improve information transparency, accountability, 
corporate strategy (Jensen and Mecklin, 1976) as well as reduce the impact of negative 
events which may adversely affect firm’s profitability (Heal, 2005). Any violation of the 
environmental and social system could destroy the reputational image and may lead to a 
reduction in revenues and profit2 (Wei et al., 2013; William and Barrett, 2000). This is 
 
2 Most recently, Volkswagen was fined with $10 billion (Reuter, 2016 Viewed on 
27/06/2016) suffering a significant drop in the sales revenue for 2015 by 4.8% to 5.82 
 




because, although irresponsible and unethical practices imply a low cost to the firms in the 
short term, in the long term company will suffer significant loss (Asagry and Li, 2016). In a 
study by Wei et al., (2013) using accident data for 119 listed firm between 2005 and 2012, 
the authors investigate the impact of corporate accidents and their media coverage on stock 
market returns. Their results suggest a significant adverse effect of such events on the stock 
market performance. Therefore, implementing CSR strategies motivate managers towards 
proactive (forward-looking) culture and act as a contingency to such possible events in the 
future that can reduce corporate future cash flows (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Kang et 
al., 2016; Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
 Prior literature also suggests that CSR firms enjoy the benefit of improved credit 
rating because credit agencies are considering social performance in evaluating companies’ 
creditworthiness (Jiraporn et al., 2014; Atig et al., 2013; Spicer, 1978). This is because high-
CSR firms are benefitting from a cheaper source of finance and reduced cost of capital 
(Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011, Gross and 
Roberts, 2011; Chava, 2010). 
Hence, based on the above discussion, a firm can achieve superior operating 
performance due to the perceived benefits of investing in CSR. Any CSR-related corporate 
events, behaviours, and actions convey management’s capability and strength to run a 
business. Any favourable changes in CSR improve stakeholders’ confidence towards them 
 
million from 6.82 million cars year-on-year (BBC, 2016, viewed on 02/02/2016) due to 
the carbon emission scandal. Similarly, the Deepwater Horizon’s oil spill costs BP Plc a 
total of $18.8 billion (WSJ, 2015 Viewed on 02/03/2016) consisting mostly of fines and 
the bill to clean up the oil spill. 




and vice versa. To retain the stakeholders’ support and trust, it is necessary that a company 
should communicate their CSR commitment and performance on a regular basis.  
One of the most efficient and widely used means of communicating the socially 
responsible commitment to stakeholders is the announcement of company’s membership in 
socially responsible organisations or socially responsible stock indices (SRI) such as 
FTSE4Good, DJSI, Calvert Social Index. The SRI is based on a series of ESG (Environment, 
Social, and Governance) dimensions3.  Since the first introduction of the SRI by Kinder, 
Liebenberg and Domini (KLD) in 1990, e.g. Domini 400 Social Index, the attraction of 
investors towards these socially responsible indices has increased significantly. Companies 
are evaluated, ranked and listed according to their performance and commitment to the 
environment and society. As a result of the increased popularity of socially responsible 
investments in recent times, new SRIs have been introduced such as the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (1999), Calvert Social Index (2000), the FTSE4Good Index Series 
(2001), and most recently the MSCI ESG index (2014). These indices have now become a 
key determinant for investors’ in making allocation decisions due to their ability to 
incorporate relevant non-financial information on CSR performance (Elliot et al., 2014; 
Lopez et al., 2007; Belghitar et al., 2014; Slager, 2014; Becchitti et at., 2008; McWilliam 
and Siegel, 2002). A firm can obtain such membership only after meeting a certain level of 
socially-responsible performance over a period, while, any variation in the index 
configuration means a significant change in the firm’s social performance. Prior studies 
 
3 Such as employee welfare, labour practice, human rights, governance, 
consumer/customer issues, fair operating practices, corruption, environment, 
organisational management, and involvement in community development. 




suggest that change announcement in the index configuration can reduce information 
asymmetry (Dhaliwal et al. 2014; Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer, 2013; Healy and Palepu, 2001) as 
well as  can affect the trust and confidence of the general public or stakeholders (employees, 
customer, supplier, creditors, governments) which have a direct and indirect impact on the 
firms’ financial performance. 
Past studies that examined the CSR-CFP relationship based on the SRI mainly focus 
on financial performance with limited attention given to the impact on accounting measures. 
These studies concentrate on market reaction to CSR-related information by examining 
changes in the stock price, stock returns and business risk (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013; 
Becchetti et al., 2012; Sabbaghi and Xu, 2012; Jiao, 2010; Lee and Faff, 2009; Sharfman 
and Fernando, 2008; Kemf and Osthoff, 2007). Early studies suggest that the financial 
performance of socially responsible and ethical firms tend to be indifferent (in terms of 
economic and statistical significance) to that of non-SRI (ethical) benchmark firms 
(Kreander et al., 2005, 2002; Statman, 2000; Sauer, 1997; Gregory et al., 1997; Mallin et 
al., 1995; Luther et al., 1992). For example, Sauer (1997) and Statman (2000) did not find a 
material difference in monthly stock return between Domini 400 social index and S&P 500 
companies. On the contrary, Kempf and Osthoff (2007, p.921) assert that past SRI rating is 
valuable information for institutional investors. They suggest that a socially responsible 
investing strategy leads to high abnormal returns of approximately 8.7% per year.  This is 
also corroborated by Jiao (2010), who reports that companies focusing on addressing 
stakeholders’ expectations tend to enjoy a higher valuation of their stock. 
Studies such as those by Becchetti et al., (2012, 2009); Cheung (2011); Robinson et 
al. (2011); Doh et al., (2010); and, Curran and Moran (2007) examine the impact of 
companies’ addition and deletion from those indices to stock market returns. These studies 




document significant rise (fall) in the stock price/return after the entry (exit) announcement. 
For example, in Robinson et al., (2011), the authors suggest that the market recognises firm’s 
entry in (exit from) SRI as valuable information since such events demonstrate company’s 
commitments of being socially and environmentally friendly. Their finding conveys that the 
companies’ addition to DJSI outweighs the cost and dedication associated with it (Robinson 
et al., 2011, p.501). Similarly, Doh et al., (2010, p.1480) find an average reduction on share 
price by 1.5% following an SRI deletion event. In contrast, Oberndorfer et al. (2013) argue 
that entry to more visible SRI index may have a larger negative impact. Their study reports 
a negative cumulative average abnormal return of 2% after the companies were added in the 
DJSI STOXX (Oberndorfer et al., 2013). Similarly, Clacher and Hagendorff (2013) suggest 
no significant favourable changes in the share price during the announcement of entry to an 
SRI; while, Lourenco et al., (2013) use DJSI addition as a sustainability reputation indicator 
and examine whether book value of equity and net income for those firms added in the DJSI 
am higher than that of their non-sustainability counterparts (from Dow Jones Global Total 
Stock Market Index). Their results indicate an increased net income for businesses added in 
the DJSI (Lourence et al., 2013, p.25.).  
Other studies examine the CSR-CFP relationship using accounting-based measure 
such as ROA, ROE, ROS, sales growth, net income and profit-before-tax (Dam and 
Scholtens, 2015; Alvarez et al., 2013; Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Lee and Jhang, 2008; Ruf et al., 
2001; Berman et al., 1999; Judge and Douglas, 1998; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Simerly, 
1994; Dooley and Lerner, 1994; Cochran and Wood, 1984). One of the seminal studies by 
Cochran and Wood (1984) documents a positive relationship between operating earnings-
to-sales and operating-to-assets ratios with SRI ranking. This is supported by Lee and Jhang 




(2008), who document a similar relationship using the accounting rate of return (ARR) as a 
proxy for operating performance. 
Lopez et al., (2007) compare the performance of companies listed in DJSI (Dow 
Jones Sustainable Index) as a proxy for CSR to companies listed in DJGI (Dow Jones Global 
Index) as non-CSR firms between 1998 and 2004. They find no differences in total assets, 
capital and revenues but a statistically significant difference in the profitability of the DJSI 
firms. As the authors argue, the DJSI firms experienced only a temporary negative impact 
on the profitability which may be due to the costs associated with the index membership 
(Lopez et al., 2007, p.298). However, a recent study by Demetriades and Auret (2014) 
produced mixed results by reporting that the return on capital employed (ROCE) of DJSI 
companies is 11.18% higher than the conventional companies, but the return on assets 
(ROA) of DJSI firms is 1.82% lower than that of the traditional companies (Demetriades 
and Auret, 2014, p.1).  
However, very few studies have examined the impact of deletion and addition from 
SRI to the firm's accounting performance. Beccheetti et al., (2008) examine the effect of 
Domini Social Index 400 (DSI 400) affiliation on the firms’ performance using a sample of 
US companies between 1990 and 2004. After controlling for size, industry, business cycle, 
they find that companies’ affiliation to the DSI significantly reduces the returns on equity. 
Interestingly it reveals the existence of a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
net sales per employee indicator. Similarly, the exit from the index produces substantially 
adverse effects on the total sales per employee, return on equity, and the investment and 
capital employed. These findings are directly opposed to those reported by Ziegler (2011) 
for the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index. Using a balanced panel data approach for a sample of 
266 European companies and 1,330 observations from the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index this 




study reports a positive impact of CSR index addition on the firm's returns on assets. 
However, the impact on Tobin’s Q was insignificant in statistical terms. Their study also 
suggests a significantly positive impact on ROA for continental European firms but not for 
the Anglo-Saxon European companies.  
From the above review, it can be noted that the impact of the SRI on firms’ financial 
performance is rather mixed. The inconsistency in the results could be due to the 
methodological and conceptual differences adopted by the various studies (Lee et al., 2009; 
Wartick and Cochran, 1985). The majority of these studies have used a relatively small 
sample size and investigate the short-term effect. Similarly, those studies comparing the 
performance of CSR and non-CSR firms have ignored factors such as firms’ size, industry 
sectors, book-to-market value, business risk in the benchmark selection process although 
these factors could have a significant impact on the CSR-CFP relationship. For example, 
firms’ size may convey the ability to afford the CSR initiatives. Normally, large companies 
have more resources available to invest in CSR  project that may reduce the risk of potential 
fines and cost, which consequently leads to improved profitability (Clacher and Hagendoff, 
2012). Therefore, consideration of such factors in the benchmark firms’ selection could 
improve the reliability of the results. 
On the other hand, the result of past studies is found to be country-specific, resulting 
in a lack of generalizability across other markets, geographical areas or countries. Almost 
all of these studies are based on a single state (the USA and the UK) or a single market 
(Lurenco et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2011; Cheung, 2011), and the result could be different 
in different region like other emerging and developing economies because the CSR differs 
from country to country (Moon, 2009). There is very limited research carried out using the 
FTSE4Good index, mostly concentrating on market performance and within the UK 




domain. Hence, the investigation of the accounting-based performance of companies listed 
in the FTSE4Good Global Index in this study allows better investigation of the CSR-CFP 
relationship since it includes a widely disperse universe of stocks across different industries 
and geographical locations. 
 
2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
The empirical investigation on the relationship between CSR and CFP has been 
conducted extensively over the years and produced mixed results. Using a statistical meta-
analysis (Orlitizky et al., 2003; Peloza, 2009; Wang et al., 2016) and qualitative meta-
analysis (Margolis et al.,2009) all these studies report, on average, a positive relationship 
between CSR and CFP. Some minor inconsistency in the aforementioned results is attributed 
to the methodological and conceptual differences adopted by the various studies such as 
differences in the methodology of measuring the CSR performance, exclusion of firms-
specific factors, weak empirical analysis and stakeholder mismatching (Wartick and 
Cochran, 1985; Wood and Jones, 1995; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Lee et al., 2009).  
For example, prior studies have compared the financial performance of CSR against non-
CSR firms in several ways such as using aggregate CSR index returns against non-CSR 
index return (Belighitar et al., 2004), SRI index companies against non-SRI Index 
companies (Lopez et al., 2007; Demetriades and Aruet, 2014). The main issue of the studies 
mentioned above is that they suffer from confounding effect as they ignore other corporate 
events occur during the study period(Becchetti et al.,2012; Cheung, 2011;  Oberndorfer et 
al., 2013)  . The confounding effect occurs when the impact of CSR on firm’s financial 
performance is distorted by the presence of other variables (Austin, 2011; D’Agostino,1998), 
such as non-CSR related corporate events such as mergers and acquisition. Shen and Chang 




(2009) compare CSR firms performance against their close match using propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique to reduce the confounding effect. Even the propensity score 
matching does not provide the closest matching, and therefore more reliable, in CSR-CFP 
investigation as both CSR and CFP varies with firms specific micro characteristics. Hence 
the possible comparison of the studies using alternative matching procedures may not be 
reliable and valid because the CSR-CFP relationship is greatly affected by such firm’s 
micro-characteristics (Kang et al., 2016, Lee and Grewal, 2004). Hence, it is my belief, that 
is is essential to compare the CSR-CFP relationship using identical firm-specific matching 
criteria to improve the validity and reliability of the comparison. 
Advocates of CSR have argued that CSR increases the firms' value in the long-term 
(Porter and Krammer, 2011; Jensen, 2010; Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Nonetheless, prior 
studies examining the CSR-CFP relationship using the socially responsible index (SRI) 
mostly focused on the stock return in the short-run (Becchetti et al., 2008; Doh et al., 2010; 
Cheung, 2011; Lourenco et al., 2012; Nakai et al.,2013; Hawn et al.,2017; Zou et al.,2019;). 
A handful of studies have focused on the long term stock return. For example, Robinson et 
al., (2011) investigated the stock return for up to 60 days and reported 2.09% increase after 
addition in the DJSI, whereas Kappu and Oikonomou, (2016) investigated up  to 125 days 
and reported no material changes after the addition but significantly negative returns within 
14 days after the deletion from the MSCI 400 index. Both studies may not be effective in 
examining the long-term return as they both used cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) which tend to suffer from the bias of skewness, new listing, and measurement error 
when used long-term intervals (Ritter 1991, Lyon et al., 1999; Kothari and Warner, 2008). 
Instead, the buy and hold abnormal return (BAHR) is more powerful in detecting the long 
term-stock returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 2008). Park and Lee (2018) 




investigate the long-term return using BHAR; their study is limited to a small sample size 
from Japan. They reported a positive and statistically significant return of 33.80% within 
three years after the addition in the CSR index. In fact, such changes in the stock price may 
not only driven by the CSR but could be due to other positive corporate events that could 
happen in three years span. In most of those studies, there is no clear indication of how the 
authors have controlled for such events. Furthermore, prior studies have not taken into 
account the possibility of possible investment arbitrage opportunities created by CSR. 
Specifically, literature shows the impact of the announcement of CSR related disclosure to 
the abnormal share price return in the short-run (Zou et al., 2019; Park and Lee, 2018; Kappu 
and Oikonomou, 2016; Cheung, 2011; Doh et al., 2010). Studies have compared the 
performance prior and post of an event in both positive and negative CSR news. It is 
interesting to know whether the CSR-index addition and deletion announcement can create 
an arbitrage opportunity for investors in the equity markets over the long term. The impact 
of the social index effect on firms’ long-term stock returns across the countries is yet to be 
examined. My study fills the gap in the literature. 
Similarly, as discussed previously, studies on the index effect primarily focus on 
stock market returns. However, the examination of the CSR index effect (firms’ additions 
and deletions) on their operating performance is rather seldom. Prior studies that have 
examined the impact of CSR index addition and deletion on firms’ long term operating 
performance are mostly using limited samples (Kappu and Oikonomou, 2016; Beccheetti 
et al.,2008; Ziegler, 2012). Becchetti et al., (2008) report an increased net sales per 
employee but a reduction on the ROE after the addition of a firm in the DSI 400. Ziegler 
(2012) report an increased ROA after firms’ addition in the DJ Stoxx 600 index. Whereas, 
Kappu and Oikonomou (2016) do not document any material changes in earning per share 




(EPS) after the addition but show that EPS deteriorates after a firms’ deletion. The results 
of the aforementioned studies are mixed and primarily based on US data. Since operating 
performance is vital for firms as it plays a significant role in financial and especially 
investment decision-making, it is important to examine the impact of firms’ addition and 
deletion from an SRI (socially responsible index) to firms’ operating performance using 
a broader sample and by covering a wider geographical area.  
Prior studies demonstrate that CSR implementation varies across industry sectors 
(Hart, 1995; Brammer and Millington, 2003; Barnett, 2007; Sweeney and Coughlan, 
2008). Such studies investigate CSR-CFP link using an aggregate sample and tend to 
control for industry and year fixed effects (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Gregory, 
Whittaker and Yan, 2010; Qui et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2018; Hawn et al., 2018; Siueia et 
al., 2019). However, very limited studies have investigated CSR-CFP heterogeneity 
among the industry sectors (Hoepner and Yu, 2010; Omar and Zallom, 2016; Feng et al., 
2017). For example, Omar and Zallom (2016) investigate CSR-CFP among three 
different industries. Similarly, a most recent study by Feng et al., (2017) investigate the 
CSR-CFP relationship among ten different sectors and report a positive association 
between CSR and CFP in most but not all of them. Both studies are based on a single 
country data where the former uses 26 companies from Jordan, and the latter uses 1,877 
firms across 10 industry from the US. The results from these studies are inconsistent, 
forcing the authors to ask for an extension to their study that can cover more industries 
from different samples and from a wider geographical coverage. To that end, it is 
important to explore possible positive, negative and neutral relationships between CSR 
and CFP across different industries. 




Further, one of the issue CSR-CFP literature is the measurement of the CSR 
performance. Studies have used several measures of CSR; for example, Peloza (2009) 
reports 39 different types of CSR measures used in CSR-CFP studies over the years. 
Among them, 18% use pollution and environmental, 16% use health and safety measures, 
12% use awards and audit by a third party, 9% use the KLD index, and 9% use the Fortun 
magazine ranking. Similalry, Lu et al., (2014) review prior empirical papers on CSR-CFP 
relationship between 2002 and 2011 and found that around 17% use CSR disclosure, 41% 
use reputational rating, 10% use environmental and social audits reports performance, 
and rest use other defined measurements. In recent years, studies are using CSR index 
addition/deletion as a proxy of CSR performance and are mostly focusing on the US-
based indices.  
Studies from emerging markets have used either individually-constructed CSR 
indices or score or content analysis as these countries lack reporting requirement 
regulations and information intermediaries (Adams, 2004; Kelley et al., 2018; Siueia et 
al., 2019). Also, studies using such CSR measures possibly suffer from the researchers’ 
own bias and lack of experience in coding and marking relevant CSR performance. Also, 
incompatibility of alternative individually-constructed CSR indices is a major area of 
concern. To overcome such issues on CSR-CFP investigation for emerging markets, this 
study utilises a holistic approach using CSR ratings obtained from a single source, a 
specialised agency such as the FTSE.  
Further, companies from the emerging market have cross-listed in the foreign 
stock market. Cross-listed firms need to adapt/implement CSR to legitimise themselves 
with the capital market of the host country (Bell et al., 2012). Prior studies reported the 
positive impact of cross-listing on the CSR (Bell et al., 2012; Boubakri et al., 2016). For 




example, Del Bosco, and Misani (2015), who report firms’ ESG performance is improved 
significantly after firms are cross-listed. Boubakri et al. (2016) corroborate the finding of, 
Del Bosco, and Misani (2015), find a positive relationship between cross-listing improves 
firms CSR performance using 10,815 observation from 54 countries between 2002 and 
2011. Cross-listing in the foreign country stock market significantly improves firms CSR 
performance and therefore improve financial performance. However, to the best of my 
knowledge, the moderating impact of cross-listing on the CSR-CFP relationship is yet to 
be examined. My study fills this gap in the literature. 
Of the limitations in the CSR-CFP literature so far, the result of past studies is 
also found to be country-specific, resulting in a lack of generalizability across other 
markets, geographical areas or countries. Almost all of these studies are based on a single 
state (the USA) or a single market (Lurenco et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2011; Cheung, 
2011), and the result could be different in different region like other emerging and 
developing economies because the CSR differs from country to country (Moon, 2009). 
There is very limited research carried out using the FTSE4Good index mostly 
concentrating on market performance and within the UK domain (using FTSE4Good UK 
index). Hence, the investigation of the financial performance of companies listed in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index in this study allows better investigation of the CSR-CFP 
relationship since it includes a widely disperse universe of stocks across different 









Chapter 3. Research Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the approach and methods adopted in this 
study. It begins with a brief explanation of my underlying research philosophy, approach, 
methods and their rationale for choosing them in section 3.1. In section 3.2, I introduce 
the research design, which includes sample and data selection procedures as well as 
dependent, independent and control variables. The adopted theoretical framework is 
explained in section 3.3.  
 
3.1. Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is defined as the system of beliefs and assumptions in which 
researchers see the world in the process of developing knowledge (Saunders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill, 2016). In the current thesis, I view the relationships between social entities and 
business as real; these relationships are observable in the same way as a physical object 
or a natural phenomenon. Social entities are the group of individuals, organisations, and 
elements formed together for social reasons, while business is an organisation that 
produces good and services to fulfil the needs and demands of these social entities. As 
such, transactions exist between these entities, where one exchanges the goods and 
services against their value and so on. Consistent with the concept of stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984), one is affected by or affects another. Therefore, this current study 
assumes a causal relationship between these two elements, a social entity (as CSR) and 
business (as CFP). This relationship can be investigated objectively through the 
development of a hypothesis where I can expect a positive impact of CSR on firms’ 
financial performance. On this basis, I can argue that this study follows a positivist 
research philosophy. Positivism relates to the scientific belief that the world can be 




measured objectively by using appropriate methods (Thorpe et al., 2002, p28).  It 
indicates to ‘what is posited/given’ (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2016, p136.) or 
‘objective accounts of the real world can be given’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.27). It 
concentrates on the use of scientific methods where the result from the empirical analysis 
of data and information are objective and unbiased. Positivism is a philosophy that refers 
to the notion that knowledge is valid if it is measurable and observable. It also involves 
the quantitative aspect and uses surveys, experiments and statistical tools in order to 
examine or test the hypothesis using empirical data (Neuman, 2000). It, therefore, reflects 
the adoption of the ‘falsification’ approach introduced by Karl Proper (1959), which 
means the inherent possibility that the testability of any scientific hypothesis can be 
proved as false. Karl (1959, p.95) asserts that any statement to be a scientific hypothesis 
must be falsifiable and subject to critical investigation. Selecting the positivism approach 
does not aim to prove something is wrong/false; rather, it focuses on establishing the 
truth. In this study, selecting the aforementioned research philosophy appear to be most 
appropriate as I have the following conditions:  
-  The current research used the existing theory to develop a hypothesis and aimed 
to confirm either a part of it or as a whole. It is assumed that the CSR is a 
mechanism to improve/increase firm’s financial/operating performance, which is 
represented in the hypothesis that I am going to test, 
- assume the causal relationship between the CSR and CFP. 
- The researcher attempts to remain impartial and detached from the research and 
data, and 
- Utilise a methodology that is well structured and well-defined.  
 




Furthermore, one of the aims of my research is to create and contribute to the 
knowledge, especially in the field of CSR-CFP relationship, which is consistent with the 
epistemological standpoint.  Spender (1998) asserts that “epistemology is the division of 
philosophy that studies the origin and nature of knowledge” (p.1). It contains assumption 
related to the knowledge of a researcher; his/her methods of communication; and validity, 
acceptability or legitimate of the knowledge (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2016; 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979)4. On the basis of epistemological assumptions, I conduct the 
scientific investigation regarding the impact of CSR on the firm's financial and operating 
performance, where data and information are to be collected, sorted and analysed in order 
to answer the research questions and test the set hypotheses. Hence, I adopt a positivistic 
epistemological philosophy because I focus on finding measurable and observable results 
and try to generate knowledge that can be meaningful and credible. Further, all result and 
conclusions deriving from the use of a positivistic approach can be viewed more reliable 
and allow generalisation of the findings (Ryan, 2015; Babones 2016; Heckman, 2005; 
Collis and Hussey, 2003; Kuhn, 1977). Therefore, I use this approach to analyse firms’ 
commitment to CSR and the impact of the latter on their financial and operating 
performance. 
3.1.1. Deductive and Inductive research  
The literature has identified two widely used research approaches in the scientific 
study; deductive and inductive research approach. In the deductive approach, the 
 
4 Oxford dictionary defines epistemology as “The theory of knowledge, especially with 
regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief 
and opinion” (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/epistemology).  




conclusion is derived logically from a set of premises with the conclusion being true when 
all the premises are true (Saunders et al., 2016, p.144). All underlying 
assumptions/premises derive from existing academic theories and prior literature. 
According to figure 3.1, the deductive approach begins with reviewing the relevant 
academic literature and theories on the subject matter. Researcher develops the hypothesis 
on and expresses in the operational term. Subsequently, the researcher collects, sort, 
analyse and evaluate all relevant data and information from various sources leading to the 
test of these premises or hypotheses. Following the empirical examination, the researcher 
draws appropriate conclusions about the original premises. Hence, the deductive 
approach involves testing the existing theory and deriving conclusions that can either 
confirm or refute the set hypotheses (Bryman, 2004, p.8).  
 







The aforementioned approach is fundamentally opposed to that of the inductive 
which develops the theoretical propositions, often in the form of the conceptual 
framework (Saunders et al., 2016; Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). In this latter approach, 
the researcher tries to understand the nature of the problem and then collects data and 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where 
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information. On the basis of the data and empirical analysis, the general principles and 
theories on a specific subject are then developed (Saunders et al., 2016; Traford and 
Leshem, 2008). It is also commonly known as the ‘bottom-up approach’ as it begins with 
the observation of the specific data and leads to theory development. The validity of the 
result is high in inductive approach, but the reliability is very low because the overall 
interpretations are motivated from particular events (sample-specific) (Trafford and 
Leshem, 2008; Heckman, 2005). The main weakness of inductive research approach is 
that results might not be generalisable due to the lack of repeating the research on similar 
conditions (Heckman, 2005).  
As the primary aim of this study is to test the relationship between CSR and 
financial/operating performance of the firm, I am investigating the impact of CSR on the 
financial/operating performance of a company with the expectation of deriving a positive 
relationship between them. The research questions and the testable hypotheses of this 
study are already established theoretical propositions, e.g. the concept of stakeholder 
theory, stating that firms must fulfil their stakeholders’ demand and expectation since the 
latter play significant role in firms’ survival and growth (Arvidson, 2010; Freeman, 
1984). Addressing social/stakeholders’ issues through CSR initiatives help firms to 
remain competitive in the industry (Lau et al., 2016; Porter and Krammer, 2006; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997).  Corporate commitment 
towards social interest results in increased reputation that consequently leads to (i) 
improve sales through increased customer loyalty (Wan et al., 2016; Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2012); (ii) improved productivity and cost reduction through retaining or 
attracting highly skilled employee and improved innovation (Kang et al., 2016; Greening 
and Turban, 2002) and (iii) reduce the risk (Cassimaon et al., 2016; Kang et al., 2016; 




Godfrey et al., 2008; Barnett and Solomon, 2008). These benefits consequently lead to 
increased profitability overall. This is consistent with the argument of the instrumental 
stakeholder theory, where CSR is assumed to be an instrument used to improve the 
profitability of a firm (Jones, 1995).  Therefore, the choice of selecting a deductive 
approach is the most appropriate in this case.  
 
3.1.2. Research Methodology  
In order to attain research aims and objectives, there are two broad methodological 
choices available in scientific research under the deductive approach; i.e. qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative research is a method of gathering and analysing data 
and information using formal and informal techniques. Under this method, the researcher 
may not know the variables in advance but has a rough idea of the issues or problems. It 
involves exploration and interpretation of non-numerical data and information such as 
perceptions, opinions and behaviour of a sample of individuals (Cooper and Shindler, 
2003). This type of methodology facilitates the understandings of the problem 
investigated by focusing on exploring the depth of the values, behaviour, the attitude of 
individuals or phenomenon. It is, therefore, subjective as individual interpretations and 
perceptions regarding social reality might differ and may involve a high possibility of 
bias. In this method, data and information are presented in a non-numeric format and no 
use of statistical assessment tools. This means that the reliability of finding/result can be 
very low, although even if they can be highly valid. Similarly, this type of research 
methods is not repeatable due to the difficulty in setting the same research condition and 
environment, while the research problem may have reformulated during the study. Hence, 
result and conclusions from a study utilising qualitative research methods might not be 




able to be generalised. This is also supported by Bryman (2004), who asserts that 
qualitative research is inductive by nature since it focuses on the development of theories 
(p.20).  
By contrast, quantitative research methods involve the collection, analysis and 
exploration of numerical data and information to investigate the relationship between 
variables through statistical analysis tools (Denzin and Lincon, 2000). It is often 
considered an objective approach in which the researcher clearly defines the variables 
before collecting the data and analysing them. The research problems are deductively 
well-structured and do not change during the study. Moreover, structured and formal 
methods are used to gather the data and information from statistically representative 
samples of the target population (Cooper and Schindler, 2003). Also, researchers 
normally tend to remain objectively detached to the subject aiming to conduct the 
investigation in an unbiased manner. Hence, the conclusion derived from quantitative 
research could be highly significant in the statistical term. If research variables are 
identical and any focus of empirical testing is repeated/conducted under similar condition, 
then there should be the same findings and conclusions.  
Bryman (2004) states that the selection of the research methodology should be 
based on the suitability as regards the research questions (p.38). Also, the research 
paradigm tends to drive towards the choice of specific research methods. In the current 
research, I am adopting positivistic, which assumes that reality is an objective fact. The 
knowledge of reality is measurable and observable. Having adopted this philosophy, my 
study follows the deductive approach of research, empirically investigating the 
relationship between two variables, i.e. the CSR and financial performance. 




3.2. Research Design  
3.2.1. Sample and Data Selection  
This study examines the impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance. All 
financial measures are examined with regards to change in firms’ stock price and their 
operating performance. In order to select an appropriate sample of CSR companies, the 
author reviewed several alternatives social responsibility benchmarks; such as Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), Dow and Jones sustainability index (DJSI), Morgan Stanley 
Composite Global Socially Responsible Index (MSCI Global SRI), Calvert Social Index 
(CSI), Business in the Community (BITC) CSR index and of course the Financial Times 
socially responsible index (FTSE4Good index), etc.  
Prior studies have conducted the investigation using only a small sample from 
specific countries or markets such as those of Corderio and Tewari (2015); Oberndorfer 
et al., (2013), Robionson et al., (2012); Cheung (2011). In this study, I am focusing on 
covering as many companies as possible from a wider sample of cross country data. To 
do so, I contacted these indices and requested for the constituent list of their indices as 
the constituent lists are not currently publicly available. Once I gather the constituent list, 
I extracted the static information through Thomson Reuters DataStream database. After 
reviewing all data information, two alternatives were selected, which can cover a wide 
geographical area that is the MSCI Global CSR index and the FTSE4Good index. Among 
these two, FTSE4Good covers companies from a relatively wider geographical area. The 
final decision was not solely based on the geographical coverage, the author also 
considered carefully regarding the availability of further information such as membership 
criteria, methodology and most importantly the disclosure of changes in the index 
(addition and deletion). Fortunately, such information is publicly and easily available 




from FTSE4Good as they are released on their website. The rating scores of each 
company are not available and also not comparable due to recent amendment/changes in 
the FTSE methodology. Therefore, this study uses index membership changes (i.e. 
addition and deletion) as a proxy of the CSR performance. All data and information 
related to the FTSE4Good are extracted from FTSE, regulatory news service (RNS), and 
Investigate website.  
The FTSE4Good Global index consist of companies from 32 countries (Australia,  
Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark,Finland, France,  Germany, Greece, 
HongKong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA) added between 2001 and 2015. 
I have deleted Panama, Papua New Guinea, and Jersey. due to very limited data 
availability. Also, although FTSE4Good was established in July 2001, data are only 
available from March 2002 onwards.  Hence, my investigation covers the full period 
between March 2002 and December 2015. 
 
Table 3. 1 Initial sample description 
Countries 32
Industries Sectors 40
Total number of constituents in FTSE4Good Global
Index (as of 31 March 2016) 791
Total Inclusions 956
Total Exclusions 532
Number of benchmark companies 27167  
 
According to Table 3.1 presents the initial sample description, the total number of 
constituents in the FTSE4Good Global Index is 791 (at the end of trading on 31 March 




2016). Between March 2002 and December 2015, there are 956 additions and 532 deletions. 
The addition in the index reflects higher performance in CSR metrics and the firm’s 
increased focus towards its numerous stakeholders.  
To examine the impact of CSR on operating performance, this study used only 819 
additions form an initial total of 956 additions. This is because 137 companies were added 
multiple times within the three-year period. Similarly, some companies are deleted from the 
index primarily due to the lower score in CSR metrics. Among 532 deletions, I only use 462 
records as these deletions are only due to the inability of these firms to meet the CSR 
addition criteria (are valid CSR reason) or scoring/rating below the threshold point, which 
means the lower CSR performance. The rest of these records are deleted as these firms have 
been dropped from the index due to different reasons such as them been merged or acquired 
(M&As activities). I also remove those companies that have been deleted multiple times 
over the post-event measurement period (Kothari and Warner, 2008; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997; Fama and French, 1969).  Moreover, the total deleted sample also contains all 
firms that are already bankrupt/liquidated. The total number of companies that are dead 
(bankrupt/liquidated) and deleted between July 2001 and June 2018 are 127. Hence, in this 
study, there is neither look ahead bias nor survivorship bias, given that I have the entire 
statistical universe of stocks/firms that have been included in this index. Theoretically, my 
approach in data collection and data inclusion is in line with prior research which focuses in 
the elimination of possible survivorship bias (Gilbert and Strugnell, 2010; Carpenter and 
Lynch, 1999; Elton et al., 1996). 
Further, to compare the operating performance of CSR companies against non-CSR 
companies, the current study also uses benchmark companies portfolio (termed as non-
FTSE4Good companies) from 40 different industry sectors across 26 countries. The 




benchmark portfolio is based on the matching criteria such as (i) same industry, (ii) same 
momentum decile portfolio, (iii) same B/M decile portfolio, (iv) similar size decile portfolio, 
(v) industry and size (two dimensional), and industry and B/M (two dimensional). The 
details of the sample sizes are explained in individual empirical chapters later in this thesis. 
The initial list of companies added and deleted in the FTSE4Good Global index between 
the beginning of March 2002 and the end of December 2015 are presented in Table 3.2. 
All financial and accounting data for both the FTSE4Good and benchmark (non-
FTSE4Good) companies are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The selected data 
set covers the period between January 1995 and December 2015. To be added in the sample, 
both FTSE4Good and non-FTSE4Good, companies must have monthly data available for at 


















Table 3. 2 Initial addition to and deletion from the FTSE4Good Global index between 
March 2002 and December 2015. 
 
Year  Month Additions Deletions 
2015 December  48 36 
September  0 12 
June  34 0 
March  0 8 
2014 September  43 3 
March  7 9 
2013 September  29 2 
March  16 27 
2012 September  19 6 
March  24 12 
2011 December  0 4 
September  21 15 
March  68 5 
2010 December  0 1 
September  14 18 
March  20 6 
2009 December  0 4 
September  24 27 
March  12 17 
2008 December  0 8 
September  23 34 
March  37 16 
2007 December  0 3 
September  20 31 
March  15 16 
2006 December  0 2 
September  20 13 
March  31 22 
2005 December  0 3 
Oct-18 0 7 
Sep-22 0 2 
September  30 20 
March  70 22 
2004 December  0 3 
September  63 11 
March  62 29 
May 1 0 
2003 September  57 39 
June  0 5 
March  37 5 
2002 December  0 11 
September  50 14 
March  61 4 
  Total  956 532 
 
 




3.2.2. Proxies for Operating and Financial Performance  
Prior studies examining the CSR-CFP relationship are categorised into three broad 
categories on the basis of the measurement of firms’ performance: (i) the accounting 
approach, (ii) the market-based and (iii) the perceptual one (Ortilizky et al., 2003; Margolis 
et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). Market-based measurement is dominant in 
examining the impact of CSR on firms’ performance. The stock return is becoming a popular 
measure of firms’ financial performance due to a number of reasons such as information 
availability, reliability, comparability. This approach is based on the premise that the 
efficient market hypothesis holds; hence, any event can act as a signal in the market of future 
performance. Hence, if the market is efficient, the current price of stock should fully reflects 
all firms’ announcements instantly (Fama, 1969, Brown and Reilly, 2009), including CSR 
event/announcements (Doh et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2011; Cheung et al., 2011; Curran 
and Moran, 2011; Lyon and Shymshack, 2015; Corderio and Tewari, 2015). Similarly, 
membership on the FTSE4Good Global index can signal good CSR practices through 
regular participation and investment, leading to improved stakeholder confidence and 
improved financial performance for such firms.    
Since a market-based study only covers short-term changes in the share price, the 
use of accounting-based measures is also widely adopted. The most popular measures 
include return on assets (ROA) (Santoso and Felina, 2014; Barnett and Soloman, 2012; 
Ruangvist et al., 2014; Demetriades and Auret, 2014; Belu and Manescu, 2011), return on 
equity (ROE) (Sabbaghi and Xu, 2013; Chen, Feldmann and Tang, 2015; Gracia-Castro and 
Arino, 2014), net profit margin, and sales growth (Chen, Feldmann and Tang, 2015, 
Becchetti et al., 2009),etc. One of the key advantages of using accounting-based 
measurements is its ability to explore the possible long-term effects of CSR implementation. 




The third category, the perceptual metric, is the qualitative approach of measuring the 
financial performance using internal and external ranking such as the Fortune Magazine 
ranking, Newsweek Green ranking. In this study, I am not using the perceptual metric. 
Instead, I will examine the performance impact of the FTSE4Good index ranking score. 
Peloza (2009) reports that 70% of the studies are using accounting-based measures 
and 53% use market-based measure (p.1524). He also finds that 80% of past studies used a 
single measure of financial performance and recommended the use of multiple broad 
measures of firms’ performance in order to quantify the impact of CSR effectively. 
Following Peloza (2009), this study uses the multiple metrics of CFP such as cost-based, 
revenue-based, and integrative measures.  
Prior literature also suggests that several accounting-based indicators have been used 
to measure the performance of the companies (Margolis et al. et al., 2009; Peloza, 2009). 
Among them, most of the studies examining the CSR and CFP relationship focuses on 
financial metrics that includes tax, interest, and depreciation. However, since different 
countries have different accounting policies, account closure terms and financial structures, 
the computation of depreciation, income tax, and interest, etc. may vary and indeed, could 
affect/distort the actual effect of CSR on such performance (Powell and Stark, 2005; Carlin 
et al., 2009). Hence, in the current study, I use numerous operating performance metrics in 
order to investigate the actual effect of CSR on corporate performance. The operating 
performance metrics neither reflect tax nor interest nor depreciation. Also, the tax status, 
financial/capital structure of the firm and the accounting policy do not affect such measures 
(Carline et al., 2009). Moreover, the operating performance measures represent the 
economic benefit generated by the firm (McLaughlin et al., 1996, p.44) reflecting firms’ 
operational effectiveness, efficiency, and productivity. Further, I also use the short-term, 




long term stock return, Tobin’s Q, and ROA.  The selection of financial and operating 
measures are presented in Table 3.3;  
Table 3. 3 Proxies for operating and financial performance. 
Investigation  Financial Measures  Study Method 
Thesis 
Chapter 
Impact of CSR on the firms 
operating performance. 
1.      Operating Profit Margin Event Study 
4 
2.      Operating cash flow per sales 
(Barber and Lyon 
Model, 1997) 
3.      Current ratio 
 
4.      Working capital growth 
 
5.      Total debt to total capital 
 
6.      Return in invested capital    
Impact of CSR on the 
firms' stock return (short-
term and long-term). 








among the industry. 




10.  ROA 
All relevant accounting and financial data for sample firms are obtained from 
Thomson’s DataStream. The relevant World-scope database codes are presented as follows; 
• Stock return: It is an adjusted price of the stock on the relevant date and denoted by 
data type P in the DataStream. These prices are already adjusted for subsequent capital 
gains. 
The return on the share price is calculated as follows; 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 [
𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
]          (3.1) 
where ln is the logarithmic function, is the share price return of stock i at time t,  is the 
share price of stock i at time t,  is the dividend payment of stock i at time t and is the 
share price of stock i at time t-1.   
• The operating profit margin: Operating profit margin is defined as the operating profit 
(EBIT) relative to Net Sales reported by the company in a year. The operating profit 




is defined as the firm’s income before interest tax and depreciation (WC18191). 
Barber and Lyon (1996) argued that EBIT is a cleaner measure firms operating 
performance and represent economic benefit generated by as a company.  The addition 
of tax, interest and other special items in the measuring the performance can obscure 
the operating performance (McLaughlin et al., 1996).  
• Operating cash flow per sales:   The operating cash flow per sales is the ratio of 
operating cash divided by the net sales/revenue, which measures a firms’ liquidity 
position generated per sales. The operating cash flow is a measurement of cash 
received by a firm from its normal operating activities. It indicates firms’ ability to 
generate cash to continue its operation. 
• Current ratio: Current ratio is a measure of firms’ ability to meet their short term and 
long-term obligations. It is used to assess whether the firms’ have enough cash and 
cash equivalents and currents assets, or the ability to generate them to be able to pay 
their debts as they fall due. It is calculated as firms’ current assets divided by current 
liabilities. 
• Working capital growth: Working capital growth is the changes in the firms’ liquidity 
and solvency position over the year. Working capital is the difference between firms’ 
current assets and their current liabilities. If the current assets of firms do not exceed 
current liabilities, it reflects firms’ difficulty in paying their creditors, lenders and the 
possibility to become bankrupt. 
• Total debt to the total capital ratio: Total debt to total capital ratios, also known as 
gearing ratio that measures the financial leverage of a firm. It reflects a proportion of 
debt and owner’s equity used by a firm to fund its operation. Normally, high gearing 




ratio indicates high financial leverage, which does not necessarily mean the poor 
financial position of a firm.  
• Return on invested capital (ROIC): Return on invested capital is the measure of firms’ 
profitability and their ability to generate a profit from their capital. It indicates how 
effectively a firm is utilising its capital to generate a profit. It is calculated as net 
income after tax divided by the total capital. 
• Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is a ratio of the market value of a firm and the book value of its 
assets (the replacement cost of assets). It measures a firm’s assets in relation to the 
market value of its shares and total liabilities. The Tobin’s Q between 0 and 1 implies 
that the replacement cost of a firm’s assets is much higher than the market value of a 
company, and it is the indication that market value of a company’s stock is 
undervalued. On the other hand, Tobin’s Q above 1, indicates a firm’s stock is 
overvalued compared to its book of assets. 
• Return on Assets (ROA): ROA is a financial ratio which measures the proportion of 
profit a firm earns in relations to its resources (measured as total assets). The ROA is 
calculated as net income divided by total assets of a firm. 
 
3.2.3 CSR performance (Independent variable) 
As discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, studies in the past have used several measures 
of CSR performance. Margolis et al., (2009) argued that the corporate social performance 
could be measured as the multidimensional construct (economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary) (Carroll 1979; Wood, 1991) or a function of how companies’ treat their 
stakeholders (Clarkson 1995, Campbell, 2007). The corporate social responsibility is often 
termed as socially responsible behaviour or corporate social performance and often used as 




interchangeable in the empirical studies (Margolis et al., 2009, p.8). Although prior research 
is extensive, there is no unanimous agreement on the use of a single metric for capturing 
firms’ CSR performance. Moreover, the choice of CSR measurement depends on the 
underlying research discipline. A review of 159 studies between 1972 and 2008 by Peloza 
(2009) reveals 39 unique measures of CSR. Among them, 18% of studies use pollution 
control or output; 16% use environmental, health and safety investment; 12% used third-
party audit. The use of the KLD index and Fortune magazine ranking consist of 9%. These 
measurements are divided into two categories (Margolis et al., 2009), i.e. specific dimension 
and broad category. The former approach includes companies’ policies, their disclosures, 
corporate performance on environmental issues, firms’ philanthropic commitments and 
donations, and related misdeeds, offences etc. On the other hand, self-reported social 
performance, observers’ perceptions, third-party audit, and screened mutual funds are added 
in the latter category, i.e. broad categories. In this study, I use the so-called ‘third party audit’ 
approach, which involves the systematic investigation of the data and information of the 
companies in different CSR dimensions. Some popular ‘third-party audit’ includes data from 
sources like the Kinder Liebenberg Domini (KLD), Dow Jones Sustainability Index, 
FTSE4Good Index, Calvert social index, etc. These indices periodically include and exclude 
firms on the basis of changes in their rating and ranking obtained. 
 
3.2.3.1. The FTSE4Good Index Additions, Deletions and ESG rating as a proxy of CSR 
performance 
In this study, I empirically investigate the impact of addition and deletion from the 
FTSE4Good Global index on firms’ financial performance. Addition in the FTSE4Good 
Global Index is considered as a proxy for corporate commitment to the social agenda, and 




it is in line with prior studies in the field (Belghitar et al., 2014; Clacer & Hagendroff, 2012; 
Robinson et al., 2011; Cheung, 2011; Collison et al., 2008).  
 





















The FTSE4Good Global Index includes a list of global companies that demonstrate 
high environmental, social and governance practices and has been one of the leading indices 
in ESG criteria. It was established in 2001, with objectives of promoting higher corporate 
social responsibility practice among corporations, providing stakeholders (including 
investors) appropriate means of identifying firms that are highly committed in CSR issues 
(environmental, social and governance). Most importantly, it aims to provide a 
comprehensive tool for examining/tracking CSR investment and benchmarking portfolios. 
It initially consists of five sub-index such as FTSE4Good Europe index, FTSE4Good Japan 
index, FTSE4Good UK index, FTSE4Good US index, and FTSE4Good developed index 
(previously known as FTSE4Good Global index). FTSE recently expanded the FTSE4Good 
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index and introduced new series such as FTSE4Good Emerging index, FTSE4Good Bursa 
Malaysia Index, FTSE4Good ASEAN 5 Index, FTSE4Good Latin America Market index, 
FTSE4Good Australia 30 index, etc. The FTSE4Good index series are now covering the 
major geographical regions: UK, Europe, US and emerging market in Asia and Latin 
America (FTSE4, 2019).  
The FTSE4Good framework is aligned with the UN sustainable development goals 
(SDGs). In fact, FTSE helps in developing the UN Principle for Responsible Investment 
(PRI) and becomes a founding signatory (FTSE, 2016). The FTSE4Good policy committee 
initially work together with external parties that are specialised in the CSR performance 
management assessment such as Expert in Responsible Investment Solutions (EIRIS) and 
its network partners, including Fundacion Ecologia y Desarrollo (EcoDEs) Spain, Corporate 
Analysis Enhanced Responsibility (CAER) Australia, Institure fuer Markt-Umwelt-
Gesellschaft (imug) Germany, Ecovalores Mexico, Greeneye Israel, Korea CSR Research 
Service (KOSSR) Korea, Economistats sin Fronteras Spain. The FTSE4Good is committed 
to provide a comprehensive assessment and are aiming towards standard harmonization 
globally which are drawn from over 40 leading global frameworks such as Global Reporting 
Standard (GRI), the OECD Guidelines, Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), the Transparency 
International’s Business Principles for Countering Bribery, the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
Protocol (FTSE, 2016).  
In order to qualify for the index membership/addition, companies must be in either 
the FTSE All-World index or FTSE Developed Index (Global). In addition, companies must 
be working towards environmental sustainability, upholding supporting universal human 
rights, developing a positive relationship with stakeholders, ensuring excellent supply chain 
labour standards and countering bribery (FTSE, 2019).  However, companies that are 




operating wholly or partly in sectors that involve producing either tobacco, coal, weapons 
(including nuclear), investment trusts and even firms that are involving in the marketing of 
breastmilk substitute are screened out.  
Over the past decade, the FTSE4Good methodologies and additional criteria have 
been updated comprehensively. The most recent and updated model of FTSE ESG rating 
contains over 300 indicators and 14 different CSR themes under three pillars presented in 
Figure 3.2. The criteria include climate change, water use, biodiversity, pollution and 
resources, health and safety, labour standards, human rights and community, customer 
responsibility, supply chain, anti-corruption, tax transparency, risk management, and 
corporate governance (FTSE Russell, 2016).5  Due to continuous improvement in the 
addition criteria over the years, FTSE4Good have contested firms to invest significantly in 
CSR so that they can get listed, or risk of losing membership (FTSE, 2016).  
An independent committee of FTSE4Good examines the socially responsible 
practices of the company through data and information that are publicly available or 
collected through companies’ websites, annual report, questionnaire, and liaising with the 
managers from the companies. Further, to ensure accuracy in the information, they have 
extensive correspondence with the stakeholders/parties that are linked directly or indirectly 
with companies. Based on the above-mentioned information, they score and rate companies 
between 0 and 5, where 5 is the highest rating representing CSR compliance and 0 for the 
lowest performer or no disclosure. For the FTSE4Good global index, a company with an 
 
5 Please see the Index Addition Rules that were updated in September 2014. Source: 
Index Addition Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series v3.5, July 2019, 
www.ftserussell.com 
 




average FTSE ESG rating of 3.1 or above, is added to the FTSE4Good global index, subject 
to the additional requirement.6  On the contrary, any company rated below 3.1 is classified 
as “in the risk of deletion” from the FTSE4Good index (FTSE, 2019, p.12.). On the other 
hand, companies from emerging market require a rating score of 2.5 or above to get listed 
in the FTSE4Good emerging index and companies scoring below 2.5 are a risk of deletion 
(FTSE, 2019, p.12.). The FTSE4Good index reviews its constituents twice in a year and 
provides other information such as changes in the system and changes in the criteria for 
addition and deletion.  
In summary, in this study, I consider the FTSE4Good index series and its rating 
as the most appropriate CSR for several reasons. The CSR performance (rating or addition 
and deletion) are determined objectively on the basis of a wider range of criteria that are 
set externally. Firms are assessed for three main pillars (environmental, social and 
governance) and 14 different themes for corporate social responsibility dimensions 
independent of other firms’ characteristics. In addition to the publicly available 
information regarding firm’s corporate social investment and initiatives collected from 
several sources, FTSE4Good Index series also conduct the survey of the companies and 
process of consultation with companies managers (Clacer and Hogendroff, 2011). Such 
survey and consultation allow management to convey companies private CSR 
information which can be quantified and validated externally by FTSE4Good policy 
committee (FTSE, 2019). Further, the periodic assessment of firms CSR performance 
 
6 Company must also fulfil the additional requirements which are in section 4 of the 
Index Addition Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series v3.5, July 2019, which can be 
accessed on www.ftserussell.com 




over time allows the researcher to investigate any deviations in CSR performance. In this 
study, I use the changes’ announcement of FTSE4Good constituent the additions in the 
FTSE4Good index signalling companies’ increased commitment to social issues, while 
deletions are signalling the opposite. The ‘addition’ in the FTSE4Good Global index 
refers to the new companies added in the index and ‘deletion’ refers to those companies 
that have been deleted (eliminated) from the FTSE4Good Global Index series after they 
have been listed in the index series for a while. Hence,   
• The addition in the FTSE4Good Global Index is a proxy of firms’ robust CSR 
compliance.  
• The deletion from the FTSE4Good index is a proxy of firms’ weak CSR compliance 
weak CSR performance. 
• Furthermore, I also use the FTSE4Good ESG rating score (in chapter 6) as a proxy 
of firms’ CSR performance. 
 
3.2.4. Control Variables  
 Changes in the firms’ financial performance can reveal the impact of corporate 
social responsibility. In the current study, I argue that the companies added in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index experience increased share price returns and improved 
operating performance. I expect that companies’ share price and operating performance 
to increase (decrease) once they are added (deleted) in (from) the index. I also examine 
the impact of CSR performance (ESG rating) on Tobin’s Q and ROA. Furthermore, I 
compare the operating performance of FTSE4Good and non-FTSE4Good Companies; 
this is because the measurement of performance of the FTSE4Good Global Index 
companies can be biased if benchmark companies are ignored. The use of a performance 




benchmark increases the validity and reliability of the investigation since changes in the 
firms’ financial performance might not be solely due to the CSR reason but caused by 
exogenous industry/sector-wide events such as business/corporate strategies, 
management capability, potential investments, risks, any events which are beyond 
managerial control, etc. For example, a sample firm may have experienced superior 
(inferior) financial performance even before the event of CSR, caused by the investment 
in the profitable (loss-making) project/product/services. To avoid this bias, I measure 
abnormal stock market returns, impact on financial performances, and operating 
performance for CSR firms in the period pre- and post- their addition and deletion from 
the index and compare it to a matching/benchmark company. Benchmark companies that 
are of the non-FTSE4Good index added are selected on the basis of the industry, size, 
book to market, etc. In line with prior studies (Li et al., 2018; Kang et al., 2016; Attig et 
al., 2013; El Ghoul, 2011; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Manescu and Starica, 2007; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997), the current study use the following the controlling variables 
to control the relationship between CSR and CFP. 
• Industry: The level of CSR investment and the financial result both vary according to 
nature and the types of industry (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). For example, the CSR initiatives of a firm in the 
financial sector industry may differ from a firm involved in the manufacturing industry. 
On the other hand, regulations and legislation also vary accordingly and can have a direct 
impact on CSR involvement (Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 
find that companies in higher social and environmental impact tend to participate/invest 
more in CSR activities.  Similarly, a company may experience growth in financial 




performance if the industry that the company belongs to is experiencing unusual growth. 
As such, I use the industry as one of the criteria to select matching/benchmark companies.  
• Company Size: The size of the companies also affects the companies’ involvement in 
CSR initiatives. Larger firms are more exposed to public and stakeholder scrutiny and 
face a greater risk of litigation and are more likely to focus on social and environmental 
issues (Endrika et al., 2014; Clarkson et al., 2011). Generally, larger firms tend to invest 
more in the CSR activities than that of the small firms (Margolis et al., 2009, Orlitzky et 
al., 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Bigger size firms generally have the more surplus 
(slack) resource and are able to invest in the community and society (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997). Also, the accounting 
figures are also linked with the size as bigger firm generally generate more profits. In line 
with prior literature (El Ghoul et al.,2011; Waddock and Graves,1997; Orlitzky et al., 
2003; Wahab and Elsayed, 2015), I use firms’ total assets as a proxy for size. 
Furthermore, I use size as one of the criteria for selecting matching/benchmark firm to 
investigate the CSR-related abnormal operating performance after the event.  
• Leverage: Similar to size and industry, business leverage has a similar impact on CSR 
and financial performance. In line with previous studies (Qui et al., 2016; Du et al., 2017; 
Feng et al., 2017; Lourenco et al., 2012), I use total debt to total assets as a proxy of 
leverage. The leverage profile of a company linked with the CSR. Companies with lower 
leverage position are most likely to engage in the CSR and vice versa. For example, a 
company with a higher level of leverage position (debt to assets ratio) tend to have 
increased pressure from the creditor and vice versa (Barmmer and Pavelin, 2006). On the 
other hand, firms with low debt to assets ratio tend to enjoy easy access to additional 
funds. Firms with low-level leverage can raise funds for potential investment and also 




invest in CSR initiatives to support their existing investment. Furthermore, highly geared 
companies tend to have a higher probability of future bankruptcy risk.  Jensen and 
Mecklin (1976) argue that highly geared firms minimise their agency cost by investing 
in CSR initiatives. Consistent with prior studies (Li et al., 2018; Feng et al., 2017; Clacher 
and Hagendorff, 2012; El Ghoul et al.,2011),  I use leverage as a control variable to 
examine the impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance. 
• Book to the Market (B/M) value of equity: In this study, I use the book to the market 
value of equity as control variable which is the proxy of the firms’ growth (El Ghoul et 
al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2006). The B/M is a ratio used to find out the value of 
companies by comparing with book value with its market value. It is calculated by 
dividing the companies’ common shareholders’ equity by its market capitalisation value.   
A higher value implies firms’ strong financial health/profitability and the possibility of 
resources available for further potential opportunity/investments (Fama and French, 
2002). Firms with the strong financial resource are more likely to implement CSR 
practices. Prior literature suggests that past financial performance is directly linked to 
future CSR investment (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ortilizky et al., 2003).  Also, Bushee 
and Neo (2000) suggest a negative relationship between book to market value and share 
price volatility. A firm with a higher book to market value experience lower share price 
return volatility and vice versa. Firms with higher growth rate have the certainty of 
expected cash flow and high share price (Kothari et al., 2009). Barber and Lyon (1997) 
argue that higher book to market firm outperforms low book to market firms. In order to 
examine the operating performance of CSR firms, it is important to compare CSR firms’ 
operating performance against non-CSR companies with a similar book to market value.  
Hence, in line with previous studies (Groening and Kanuri, 2013; Ramachander et al., 




2012; Andrikopoulos, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009) I use the book to market value as a 
similar firm-matched control variable. 
• Profitability: Profitability is measured by the operating profit margin. Operating profit 
margin is defined as the operating profit (EBIT) relative to net sales reported by the 
company in a year. The firm’s better financial performance potentially provides 
additional resources to invest in the CSR. Firm’s profitability is a determinant of both 
CSR and CFP (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Waddock and Graves, 1997; McGuire et 
al., 1988). Since,  firm’s profitability can influence the relationshp between CSR and CFP 
and I use as control variable. 
• Growth: The growth is defined as the percentage changes in the yearly net revenue. 
Firms growth has a significant impact on both financial performance and the CSR of the 
firm (Clacher and Hagendorff ,2012; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Waddock and Graves, 
1997). Consistent with prior studies, I used the growth as a control variable as growth 
influence firms finanicial performance and investment in CSR (Clacher and Hagendorff, 
2012;, Feng et al., 2017; and Li et al., 2018). Also it predicts the cross-section more 
pronouncedly (Cooper et al., 2008).  
• Capital expenditure divided by sales (Capex): This study also uses the capital 
expenditure to sales ratio as a control variable. Capital expenditure to sales ratio is a 
measure of the firms’ slack resources. Firms with additional resources tend to invest in 
CSR initiatives (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Braymer and Pavalein, 2008; Preston and O’Bannon, 
1997). This ratio measures the level of firms’ investment into its future by comparing the 
capital expenditure with net revenue. This ratio represents the firm’s investment of its 
resources to capital expenditure subsequently may limit its ability to utilise its resources 




towards other alternatives such as CSR (Li et al., 2018; Cai et al., 2012; Simpson and 
Khoers, 2002).   
• Employee: The employee represents the number of employees. The employee size is 
recognised as a determinant of financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Surroca et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2017). In line with the prior studies (Feng et al., 2017; 
Surroca et al., 2010), I use the employee size as a control variable and calculated as a log 
of the total number of employees. 
 
3.3. Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical discussion of CSR evolved tremendously from the 1950s, since the 
seminal work of Bowen (1953). According to Bowen (1953) “Social responsibility is 
businessmen obligation to implement those practices, policies, decisions, and actions that 
are consistent with social objectives and values”. Davis (1960) firstly mentioned the possible 
link between CSR and firm’s economic return, but it was Johnson (1971) who explicitly 
expressed positive association by arguing that social programs are business managers’ 
conduct to add profit to their company. Nevertheless, the explanation of the relationship 
between CSR and firms’ financial performance from the theoretical concept is highly 
ambiguous (Santos, 2014; Clacer & Hagendroff, 2012; Ziegler, 2012; Waddock & Graves, 
1997) and empirically inconsistent (Orlitizky et al., 2003, Margoslih et al., 2009, 2004) 
because studies have used several theoretical frameworks in their investigation.  
The debate ‘for and against of CSR’ is paramount in literature and as well as in the 
corporate world during the 1950s. The critics of CSR, also known as the neo-classical 
approach (aligned with the shareholder value theory) argues that the CSR-CFP relationship 
is negative. This group of arguments emphasises that CSR is an additional expense for the 




business and can deteriorate firm's internal control system (Henderson, 2005; Jensen, 2000; 
Ulhmann, 1985; Friedman, 1970). Milton Friedman (1970), the most influential supporter 
of this view, argues that in a free economic system the social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profit, that is to use its resources and structure its operation in a way that 
maximizes corporate profit as long as the firm stays within the “rule of the game” (Friedman, 
1970, p.1).  He further asserts that corporate managers are obliged to act in the interest of 
their owners as they are agents of them and anything beyond the benefit of the shareholder 
is an act of dishonesty and should be deemed as unethical (Friedman, 1970). 
Moreover, the agency theory, with regards to the CSR, argues that that corporate 
managers allocate the firm’s resources to the socially responsible initiatives for their 
personal benefit, i.e. increase their reputation. Otherwise, their discretion to utilise the 
company’s resources to social events should be justified by the benefit (Jenson, 2000; 
Henderson, 2005). Hence, the higher degree of corporate involvement in socially 
responsible activities may lead to a reduction in competitiveness and profitability, decrease 
in the value of the firm (Nollet et al., 2016; Barnea and Rubin, 2010, 2006) and eventually 
create a competitive disadvantage for the firms (Aupperle et al., 1985).  
The recent environmental and social concerns, such as the increased threat of global 
warming, the global economic/financial crisis and corporate scandals have raised the debate 
and research on the business-society relationship. Prior studies argue that companies do 
incur additional costs (direct and the agency cost) in implementing CSR (Nollett et al., 2016; 
Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010) but they also benefit from these activities. Investors are 
seeking a more sustainable approach to investment and use CSR performance as criteria in 
decision making (Berthelot, Coulmont & Serret, 2012; Hubbard, 2009; Soppe, 2004; Barker, 
2003).  




The stakeholder theory integrates the social element in the business operation and 
by explaining the relationship between firms and their several stakeholder groups. Freeman 
(1984) asserts that a business must not only focus on the shareholder interest; rather, they 
should go beyond and address the need and expectation of several stakeholders. As such, 
stakeholders are group or individuals who are directly or indirectly linked to the organisation 
and can influence or be affected by the firms’ operation (Freeman, 1984). As stakeholders 
may have conflicting interest and demands, it is crucial for companies to address them 
effectively and efficiently. Their expectations and interests towards the organisation differ 
depending upon the individual stakeholder and the type of industry where the organisation 
is operating. For example, the demands and expectation of the customer vary to the 
expectation of employees and so on. Similarly, the expectation of stakeholders in the oil and 
gas industry may not be similar to the stakeholders of the financial sector. 
Donaldson and Preston’s (1995, p.71) suggests that corporate executives must 
induce constructive contributions for their stakeholders to attain their firm’s objectives. 
Stakeholders’ satisfaction, confidence, support, and participation, all determine the survival 
and continuity of a firm in the society (Freeman et al., 2010; Jensen, 2010; Agle et al., 2008; 
Deegan, 2006; Clarkson, 1995; Ullman, 1984). Stakeholders are a primary source of firms’ 
resources and hold a significant power that can influence the survival and growth of the firm 
(Deegan, 2009; McWilliam et al., 2006; Mitchell et al. 1997). Hence, companies should 
continuously involve in socially responsible activities that address the needs and interests of 
several stakeholders’; otherwise, they will lose all resources and support that is necessary 
for them. According to instrumental stakeholder theory, CSR activities are the mechanisms 
of maintaining the relationship among firms’ multiple stakeholders which in turn lead them 
to the better financial outcome (Wang et al., 2015; Wood, 2010; Margolis and Walse, 2007; 




Ortliziky et al., 2003; Berman et al., 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Jones, 1995; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Wood and Clarkson, 1995). Stakeholder management is one 
of the key success factors in a competitive business environment. Hence, there is a change 
that the primary objective (shareholders’ wealth maximisation) of a firm might not be met 
without considering its wider stakeholders (Jenson, 2010; Jamali, 2008, p.217). Firms’ 
stakeholder management through commitments to environmentally and socially responsible 
initiatives build a healthy relationship, improve loyalty and confidence, which consequently 
improve companies’ reputation. Firms good reputation among stakeholders enhance 
corporate internal and resource capability (the firm's know-how and organisational culture 
(Lourenco et al., 2012, p.419), which in turn leads to the competitive advantage over 
competitors (Porter and Krammar, 2006). Based on the above rationale, in the long term, 
firms should enjoy the improved financial performance as manifested by potential addition 
(deletion) to the SRI index. 
Similarly, studies in the past have examined the stock market reaction to several 
corporate events (including CSR events). These studies often use the efficient market 
hypothesis, signalling theory, and resource-based theory to explain stock price behaviour. 
Particularly in the CSR literature studies use the stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, 
resource-based, view etc. to explain the importance (value) of adopting the CSR 
strategies/initiatives and its impact on the stock market performance (Kang et al., 2016; Su 
et al., 2016; Nollet et al., 2016; Lyon Shimshack; 2015; Krüger, 2015; Becchetti et al., 2012; 
Cheung, 2011; Clacher and Hagendroff, 2012; Brammer and Millington, 2008). In this 
study, I focus on the firms’ stock price behaviour during CSR-related disclosures’ 
announcements on the basis of the signalling hypothesis. The latter one (signalling 
hypothesis) provides a unique, practical and empirically testable perspective on problems of 




social selection under conditions of asymmetric information (Connelly et al., 2011, p.63). 
The signalling hypothesis explains the behaviour of two parties or individuals when they 
have separate access to different information (Spence, 2002). According to this, one party 
sends a piece of a message (signal), and the other party receives and interpret the message. 
According to Spence (1973), the signalling hypothesis helps to understand how investors or 
decision-makers interpret and respond to a particular situation where information is 
asymmetrically provided and is also incomplete. The fundamental principle of the signalling 
hypothesis is the information asymmetry and its reduction. This occurs when different 
parties/individuals have unequal knowledge on the subject matter with one party being better 
informed than the other.  This creates an imbalance in power, adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems (Akerlof, 1970).  
Arguably, information plays a significant role in the investment decision-making 
process. An investor takes the investment decision after the careful consideration of 
publicly available information regarding the company. In order to reduce the risk of their 
stock portfolios, investors should be able to identify firms’ observable features (i.e. 
signal) and how these affect the conditional probability of firms performance. Signalling 
hypothesis provides a base for predicting how the stock of a firm should behave to a firm-
specific event.  
In this study, I examine how the firm’s share price reacts to the announcement of 
the firm’s CSR-related performance. Corporate engagement in the CSR initiatives and 
their reporting would most likely introduce aspects of information asymmetry affecting 
all stock market participants. This is because, the latter (e.g. investors, and other 
stakeholders) may not be able to internally process how firms involved in CSR are 
benefitting; hence, interpreting firms’ decision to implement CSR initiatives as a case of 




resource wastage. To this extent, there are important questions that need to be answered. 
For example, do shareholders care about firms’ CSR involvement and/or do firms’ 
additions, and deletions from the FTSE4Good Index lead to increased market 
performance?  
According to the signalling hypothesis, the stock market uses signals to value the 
CSR disclosure/ announcement, and its participants would search for the signals that 
differentiate the high CSR performing firms to low CSR performing ones. From the stock 
market perspective, firms’ disclosure of CSR-performance could trigger a vague of 
complementary effects. For instance, a positive CSR performance could create a positive 
‘halo’ effect that could provide a yardstick for subsequent investment decisions (Bergh 
and Gibbons, 2011; Lourenco et al., 2011). Also, companies with good CSR reputations 
are perceived as having strong internal resources and management capabilities so as to 
capitalise on potential investments and other corporate expansion opportunities that could 
arise from such positive CSR status. Based on this logic, CSR can then be interpreted as 
a signal of managerial optimism about the firms’ future. Complimentary with the 
resource-based theory (Barney, 2001, Barney, 1991; Russ and Fouts, 1997; Hart, 1995), 
the firms’ ability to retain/gain a competitive advantage depends on its retained resources. 
If these retained resources are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, then this 
firm will potently enjoy a significant competitive advantage within its industry (Barney, 
1986). The theory asserts that managers are considered as a key to developing new 
competitive capabilities that may lead to a reduction in operating and financing costs, 
subsequently leading to higher operating profits and market returns. The CSR literature 
often emphasises involvement in socially responsible initiatives as a form of competitive 
resource that helps to promote firms and allow them to enjoy a competitive advantage 




amongst their peers (Porter and Krammar, 2011). Hence, this leads to an improved stock 
market return because the stock market interprets the CSR as management optimism 
about the firm’s prospects (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011).  
Similarly, the disclosure of CSR-related information reduces the information 
asymmetry among the firms’ stakeholders (Corderio and Tewari, 2015; Ramachander et 
al., 2012) and improve the firms’ relationship with all interested parties. Hence, additions 
and/or deletions to the FTSE4Good index signal firms’ capability of being socially 
responsible regarding business operation and potential future performance. Consistent 
with the signalling hypothesis/theory, this disclosure of firms’ CSR-related performance 
conveys favourable information. For example, the addition in the FTSE4Good index 
signals the firm's regular and consistent commitment/investment in socially responsible 
initiatives and possible availability of necessary financial resources to accomplish that. 
Such availability of resources (for good CSR initiatives) could be a signal of good 
financial health at present and for the future (i.e. ability to invest further to positive-value 
generating CSR-related projects in the future. Firms’ participation in the socially 
responsible cause/initiatives in the future could lead to improvements in customer loyalty, 
employee productivity, reduction in potential charges and fines, improved supplier 
relationship etc. As a result, firms will improve the present value of their future cash 
flows, boost shareholders/investors’ confidence and ceteris paribus, maximise the 
corporate value.  
By contrast, deletion from the FTSE4Good index would contain exactly the 
opposite message to the market as this might reflect not only relatively low financial 
capabilities but also a possible challenging future for these firms with increased 
uncertainty in future cash flows and a loss in investors’ and shareholders’ confidence. To 




sum up, based on the signalling hypothesis, if investors believe that the firm's 
involvement in CSR is beneficial and could lead to improved financial performance, then 
firms added in the FTSE4Good Index should experience abnormal stock return in the 
































Chapter 4: An empirical investigation of the impact of CSR 
index additions and deletions on firms’ long-term operating 
performance. 
4.1. Introduction  
In light of the several corporate and environmental scandals in recent years, the 
impact of company’s operation on the environment, society and community have gained 
significant attention from several stakeholders, including practitioners, academics, 
policymakers, investor, and the public.7 This increased awareness has compelled 
companies to adopt socially responsible business practices so as to persuade relevant 
stakeholders that they are committed to making a positive impact on society and the 
environment. Hence, apart from the primary corporate objective of maximising 
shareholders’ wealth, companies in today's business environment are initiating several 
programmes to address the demand and expectations of their communities and the society 
at large including several primary and secondary stakeholders.  
According to Grant Thornton (2018), Corporate Social Responsibility8 has now 
become a necessity and not a choice. Corporate relationship with stakeholders is 
 
7 For example, the Volkswagen carbon emission, Lehman Brothers, WorldCom, Enron, 
and other. 
8 The corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an instrument of balancing the economic, 
environmental and social imperatives (UNIDO, 2016) by building and strengthening the 
 




becoming the cornerstone of the company’s overall success, and managers should 
develop objectives that stakeholders would support (Feng et al., 2017). The performance 
of businesses is becoming more dependent on how several stakeholders perceive and react 
on the way that companies operate in society. According to the Nielsen, global socially 
responsible consumer report (2015, p.2) consumers are not only willing to buy but also 
pay extra for products and services from companies that give back to society. This survey 
also reports that participants prefer to work and invest in the companies that implement a 
socially responsible business model. The conclusion of this report is consistent with the 
argument that the stakeholders’ expectation towards the company and social issues 
determines firms’ ability to sell their products and services (Freeman, 1984). 
On the other hand, USSIF (2018) reports that the sustainable, responsible, and 
impact investing has increased significantly from $2 trillion in 2013 to $10 trillion in 2018 
(p.1). Similarly, in Europe, it rose from €2.646 trillion in 2015 to €4.239 trillion euro in 
2017 (EUROSIF, 2018, p.16). The evidenced increase to the popularity in a sustainable 
and socially responsible investment over recent years indicates that investors are shifting 
their funds towards companies that focus on sustainable, and responsible investment.  
Hence, stakeholders are evaluating companies not only based on their financial 
position but also on their contribution they to make a positive impact on the environment, 
society and community. The CSR reputation or firms involved in such initiatives signal 
managerial optimism towards growth and long-term sustainable business success. For 
businesses, developing models that ensure and promotes business operations that are 
 
relationship between businesses and their several stakeholders by fulfilling social and 
communal expectations to make positive changes. 
 




socially responsible and sustainable entities is becoming the mainstream of corporate 
agenda so as to maintain their corporate goodwill. However, the question of whether or 
not implementing a CSR-friendly business model ensure profitability for such companies 
is still important.  
 According to CSR literature, there are two sides of the argument on CSR-CFP 
relationship. The advocates of stakeholder theory perceive CSR as an instrument of good 
financial performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Waddock and Graves, 
1997).9 The primary objectives of a firm are not attainable without consideration of its 
stakeholders because stakeholders hold key resources that a business requires to survive 
and grow in the current dynamic environment. In contrast, proponents of shareholder 
theory argue that CSR is a cost for companies and consequently destroys the primary 
objective of maximising shareholders’ wealth (Friedman, 1970; Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004; Smith, 2003). Hence, managers should not invest in CSR unless it provides a 
positive economic outcome to the shareholders; otherwise, CSR is a signal for a potential 
agency problem within the business (Friedman, 1970).10  
 In an effort to explain the relationship between the CSR and financial 
performance, several studies have been conducted but produced mixed conclusions 
(Feng, Xiaodan, and Kreuze, 2017; Wang, Dou, Jia, 2015; Margolis et al., 2009; Peloza, 
 
9 Implementing CSR initiatives lead to the reputational advantage, cost reduction,risk 
minimization, competitive advantage and reduction in impact of negative events Shane 
and Spicer, 1983; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Turban and 
Greening, 2001; Porter and Krammar, 2006). 
10 The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit (Friedman, 1970). 




2009; Orlitzky et al., 2003). The inconsistencies in the result could be due to the 
methodological and conceptual differences adopted in alternative CSR measurements 
used in these studies (Wartrick and Cochran, 1985; Lee et al., 2009; Alikaj et al. 2016). 
For instance, comparing the performance of CSR versus non-CSR firms and ignoring the 
firms’ specific factors could lead to inconsistency in the findings. Also, the CSR 
participation varies across firms because of their individual micro-characteristics such as 
industry, size, growth and resources availability. The CSR-CFP literature can further be 
extended by taking all of these factors to consider during the empirical examination. Prior 
studies demonstrate that control variables such as industry, size, growth (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Margolis et 
al., Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009, Orlitzky et al., 2003; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2006) can help explaining the impact of CSR on the financial performance.  
 In a recent study (Feng et al., 2017) report a heterogeneous association between 
the overall CSR activities and financial performance across industry arguing that CSR 
and its impact on financial performance vary across industries. Nevertheless, up to this 
point, no study has comprehensively documented the potential variation in the 
relationship between CSR and firms’ operating performance using company-specific 
characteristics and a matching portfolio approach. Shen and Chang (2009) attempted to 
examine the CSR-CFP relationship in a sample of 80 companies from Taiwan using the 
propensity score as a matching methodology (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) instead of firm-
specific micro-characteristics. This study reported a mixed conclusion and consistent with 
the rest of the literature results.  The authors have laid the foundation for further research 
using multi-country sample data using matching criteria.  




 Following the earlier argument on the link of CSR involvement and managerial 
optimism towards the future and growth, prior studies have examined the impact CSR 
related news, ranking, and index membership to market performance (Cordeiro and 
Tewari, 2015; Lurenco et al., 2014; Becchetti et al., 2012; Deng et al., 2013; Jiao, 2010). 
In line with the signalling hypothesis, Curran and Moran (2007) and Robinson et al., 
(2011) examine the impact of CSR index membership to stock returns. For instance, 
Robinson et al., (2011) document that favourable CSR performance news can have a 
significant impact on the firms’ stock returns. Authors concluded that positive CSR news 
is viewed as a credible signal and rewarded positively by the market. Also, if firms’ 
involvement in CSR signals the managerial commitment and vision for the future, then it 
should be reflected in the operating performance. With regards to the latter to the best of 
my knowledge, only one study examines the impact of CSR index membership on the 
firms’ operating performance, measured by earning per share (EPS) (Kappou and 
Oikonomou, 2016). The authors examine changes in EPS and report deterioration in the 
operating performance after deletion from the CSR index (p.533).  However, the impact 
of CSR on firms operating performance using firms multi-factor/multi-dimensional 
matching approach based on firms micro-characteristics is still unexplored. This gap in 
the literature is addressed in this study. It is also important to investigate the impact of 
index variations on a different aspect of operating performance as such changes can have 
a significant impact on stakeholders’ perception towards the firm and could lead to 
changes in operating performance. 
 Using a sample of companies from 26 countries, that have been added to and 
deleted from FTSE4Good global index between 2002 and 2016, I adopt an event study 




methodology (Barber and Lyn, 1996)11  to estimate the abnormal operating performance 
as the difference between the operating performance of FTSE4Good Global companies 
and their matching portfolios based on four key micro-characteristics, namely industry, 
size, PTBV and momentum. I find that the differential performance is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level in most cases for the ratios of cash flow per sales, 
operating margin, total debt to total capital and return on invested capital (ROIC) when 
compared to all matched benchmark criteria. Secondly, using the signalling theory, I 
investigate possible changes in the abnormal operating performance after the firm’s 
additions and deletions from the FTSE4Good index. The results suggest a positive and 
statistically significant ‘index addition’ effect on the firms’ operating margin, operating 
cash flow-per-sales, the current ratio and the debt-to-capital ratio. I also report a 
significant improvement in the firms’ liquidity position after the addition in the CSR 
index and providing new insight/evidence in the CSR-CFP literature. Also, the result 
report that this abnormal operating performance deteriorates significantly after the 
deletion from the FTSE4Food index, as well as that this performance difference varies 
across the firm matching benchmark used.  
 I make several contributions to the CSR-CFP literature. First, prior studies mainly 
focus on comparing the performance of CSR and non-CSR companies have paid less 
attention to the matching approach using firm-specific characteristic. I extend this line of 
enquiry by examining abnormal operating performance using firm-matching procedure 
portfolios and further examining the effect of index addition on the abnormal operating 
 
11 This method is widely used in finance when examining the effect on firms’ long term 
operating performance. For further reading; Barber, B.M., and Lyon, J.D., (1996). 




performance. In this study, I also respond to Shen and Cheng’s (2009, p.149) call for 
additional examination using large sample size and a longer period of data and extend 
Kappou and Oikonomou’s (2016) study on the impact of firm’s addition to social index 
on firms’ operating performance. Second, this study reports for the first time in the 
literature that the firms’ liquidity position improves significantly after the addition in the 
CSR index. Finally, compared to all prior studies that are country-specific, I examine 26 
countries allowing to extend the generalisability of the economic impact of CSR. 
 This rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature on the CSR-CFP relationship. Section 3 presents the theoretical perspective and 
introduces the testable hypotheses. While data and methodology are presented in section 
4. Section 5 discusses the main findings. Finally, section 6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
 Balancing the expectations of stakeholders is one of the most significant 
challenges for any organisations that require regular commitment and management 
efforts. In a nutshell, the manager should aim to address stakeholders according to their 
interest, power, urgency and salience characteristics (Mitchell et al., 1997) since they 
actively monitor corporate behaviour and events irrespective of whether it is related to 
finance, environmental or any other social agenda. Any changes in the relationship 
between stakeholders and corporation may hurt the firm’s performance. Therefore, firms 
should implement CSR initiatives as a way to respond to stakeholders’ expectation and 
hence maintain healthy the relationship between the two parties. 
 Prior literature on the CSR-CFP relationship produced the mixed results. 
Although the majority of studies suggest a positive association (Van Beurden and 




Gossling, 2008), there are a few also indicating a negative and/or neutral relationship 
(Orlitizky et al., 2003; Margolish et al., 2009). For example, Peloza (2009)  reports that 
among 128 studies examining the association between CSR and CFP,  59% suggest a 
positive, 27% report a neutral and 14% to suggest the negative correlation between them. 
 This study outlined several benefits to firms of implementing CSR. One of the 
key advantages of investing in CSR initiatives is to build a strong relationship with 
stakeholders and improve firm’s reputation (Bear et al., 2010, Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990, Stanaland et al. 2011). Furthermore, implementing 
CSR initiatives can lead to a reduction of cost through the efficient use of resources, 
improved efficiency, reduced risk and less influence impact of negative events. These 
have a direct and indirect impact on the financial and operational performance of 
companies (Isaksson et al., 2014; Tarabella and Burchi, 2013; Lourenco et al., 2012; 
Robinson et al., 2011; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Crane et al., 2009). 
 Improved stakeholder management is an indicator of excellent corporate 
management practices (Lourenco et al., 2012; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001. Barone et al. (2007, p.444). It asserts that the firm's image and brand name 
differentiate businesses from their counterparts leading to competitive advantage (Porter 
and Krammar, 2006). This is because better CSR reputation can improve stakeholders’ 
trust, confidence, support and participation to company’s operations, consequently 
creating valuable goodwill (Godfrey et al., 2005; Brammer and Millington, 2005). 
Furthermore, certain stakeholders, such as customer, suppliers, and employees, are found 
to be very sensitive to environmental and social issues. These stakeholders want to be 
associated with companies that implement favourable environmental and socially-
friendly business practices because they enjoy the social image and brand name that 




comes out of it (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Carmeli et al., 2006; Brammer and 
Millington, 2004; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Pava and Krusz, 1996; Preston and O’Bannon, 
1978). Addressing stakeholders’ expectation and demands through socially responsible 
practices leads to a positive impact on consumers’ trust, loyalty on firm’s products and 
improved overall perception towards the firms (Pino et al., 2016; Becker-Olsen et al., 
2005; McWilliams et al., 2006; Folkes and Kammins, 1990; Murray and Vogel, 1997; 
Fomburn and Shanely, 1990). 
 Sen and Bhattacharya (2001, p.225) examine the relationship between CSR and 
consumer attitude regarding perception towards the firm’s products and services and 
report a positive association between these two. They suggest that companies’ 
irresponsible and unethical activities may negatively impact customer’s trust and loyalty, 
subsequently leading to decreased corporate revenues since consumers appear to punish 
socially irresponsible companies by boycotting their products and services. This is also 
corroborated by Austin et al. (2006). On the other hand, firms with better CSR practice 
in their operation increase sales through increased consumer loyalty (Pivateol et al., 2008; 
Bhattacharya, Korschun and Sen, 2009) as customers are willing to pay the premium price 
for the products and services produced by socially responsible businesses (Du, 
Bhattacharya, and Sen, 2010; Austin et al., 2006, Smith, 2003). The demand for Fairtrade 
products in the UK is an excellent example of consumers’ changing attitude and 
preferences to socially responsible business goods and services. A study by Smith (2003) 
on consumers’ buying behaviour of free-range eggs in the UK suggests that although the 
price of the free-range eggs is much higher, its sales consist 35% of overall egg market. 
Similarly, subsequent studies also provide evidence that firms’ participation on charitable 
donation increases their following year sales revenue and abnormal stock returns (Lev et 




al., 2010; Godfrey et al., 2009; Brammer and Millington, 2008). Similarly, Kaspereit 
(2016) argues that firms with high CSR practices are less likely to encounter revenue 
losses due to the loss of organisational legitimacy. Therefore, companies’ participation in 
socially responsible initiatives improves financial performance (Ortlizky et al., 2003, 
Robert and Dowling, 2002; Waddock and Graves, 1997) as it can also reduce corporate 
costs through improved operational efficiencies. For example, Laczniak and Murphy 
(1991) show that companies implementing socially responsible and ethical business 
practices would lessen the probability of incurring a high social cost such as fines leading 
to improved performance. For example, developing proactive strategies towards 
environmental and social compliance could prevent firms from possible fines and other 
cost related to damages (Hart, 2005; Berman et al., 1999; Shane and Spicer, 1983). On 
the other hand, a firm could save cost through the efficient use of energy and materials, 
waste reduction and minimisation of insurance claims (Ambecand Laoie, 2008; Miles and 
Covin, 2000; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Similarly, firms may benefit from lower 
tax schemes and financial assistance from the government to implement environmental 
and social responsible operating practices (Berman et al., 1999). Investment in employee 
welfare programs like training and development, health and safety, rewards and work 
environment improve efficiency through increased employee productivity, turnover, 
efficiency, lower absenteeism and innovation-related behaviour that strengthen firms’ 
capabilities (Costa, 2015; Turker, 2015; Turban and Greening, 1996). Prior studies 
suggest that companies with high CSR engagement can attract the highly-skilled 
employee and become more desirable employers (Martin, 2006; Backhaus et al., 2002; 
Turban and Greening, 2001). CSR also promote existing staff morale and goodwill 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hart, 1995; McGuire et al., 1988). In a recent study, Sun 




and Yu (2015) document a positive relationship between CSR and employee 
performance. They suggest that employees in socially responsible companies are more 
innovative and productive, consequently leading to better operating performance 
compared to non-CSR firms (Sun and Yu, 2015, p. 262) because of reduction in costs 
associated with injuries/accidents and lower risk of workers’ health and safety (Aldana, 
2011; Cochran, 2007; Turban and Greening, 1996). 
 The third benefit of implementing CSR is the reduction in the impact of adverse 
events on corporate performance. According to Shane and Spicer (1983), the firm’s 
commitment to CSR and its disclosure affects the general stakeholders’ perceptions of 
the company’s compliances to socially responsible issues. Moreover, CSR initiatives 
provide a way of reducing downside business risk and are an essential element of the risk 
management function of a firm (Husted, 2005, p.176). To that end, CSR practices (e.g. 
philanthropies) are found to improve information transparency, and business 
accountability, corporate strategy (Jensen and Mecklin, 1976) as well as reduce the 
impact of adverse events which may affect firms’ profitability (Heal, 2005). Any violation 
of the environmental and social system could destroy the reputational image of the firm 
and can lead to a decline in revenues12 (Wei et al. 2013; William and Barrett, 2000). Using 
 
12 Most recently, Volkswagen was fined with $10 billion (Reuter, 2016 Viewed on 
27/06/2016) suffering a significant drop in the sales revenue for 2015 by 4.8% to 5.82 
million from 6.82 million cars year-on-year (BBC, 2016, viewed on 02/02/2016) due to 
the carbon emission scandal. Similarly, the Deepwater Horizon’s oil spill costs BP Plc a 
total of $18.8 billion (WSJ, 2015 Viewed on 02/03/2016) consisting mostly of fines and 
the bill to clean up the oil spill. 




accident data for 119 Chinese listed firms between 2005 and 2012, Wei et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of corporate disasters, media coverage on stock market return. 
Their results suggest a significant adverse effect of such events on stock market 
performance. Therefore, implementing CSR strategies motivate managers towards a 
proactive (forward-looking) culture and act as a contingency to such possible negative 
events in the future (Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
 Prior literature also suggests that CSR firms enjoy the benefit of improved credit 
rating because credit agencies also tend to consider social performance when evaluating 
companies’ creditworthiness (Jiraporn et al., 2014; Attig et al., 2013; Spicer, 1978). 
Therefore, firms with good CSR practices are benefitting from a reduced cost of capital 
(Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011, Goss and 
Roberts, 2011; Chava, 2010). Based on the above discussion, a firm can then achieve 
superior operating performance as a result of the perceived benefits of investing in CSR. 
Any CSR-related corporate events, behaviours, and actions convey management’s 
capability and strength to run a business. While positive changes in CSR, improve 
stakeholders’ confidence towards firms’ management and vice versa. Hence, to retain the 
stakeholders’ support and trust, it is necessary that a company should communicate their 
CSR commitment and performance on a regular basis.  
 
Prior studies on the impact of index changes on Operating Performance 
One of the most efficient and widely used means of communicating the socially 
responsible commitment to stakeholders is the announcement of company’s membership 
in socially responsible organisations or socially responsible stock indices (SRI thereafter) 
such as FTSE4Good, DJSI, Calvert Social Index. Socially responsible indices are a series 




of Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) dimensions.  Since the first introduction 
of an SRI by Kinder, Liebenberg and Domini (KLD) in 1990, e.g. Domini 400 Social 
Index, the attraction of investors towards these socially responsible indices has increased 
significantly. Companies are evaluated, ranked and listed according to their performance 
and commitment to the environment and society. Because of the growing popularity of 
socially responsible investments in recent times, new SRIs have been introduced such as 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (1999), Calvert Social Index (2000), the FTSE4Good 
Index Series (2001), and most recently the MSCI ESG index (2014). These indices are 
demonstrating companies’ level of commitment and investments towards ESG criteria 
(Belghitar et al., 2014; Slager and Chaopple, 2015; Becchitti et at., 2008; McWilliam and 
Siegel, 2002). SR index membership becomes an essential measure for investors to make 
financial decisions based on the company's ability to integrate relevant nonfinancial 
information for CSR performance (Elliot et al., 2014; Lopez et al., 2007). A firm can 
obtain such membership only after meeting a certain level of socially-responsible 
performance over a period, while, any variation in the index configuration means a 
significant change in the firm’s social performance. Prior studies suggest that an 
announcement regarding the changes in index configuration can reduce information 
asymmetry (Dhaliwal et al. 2014; Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer, 2013; Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
It further affects the trust and confidence of the general public or other stakeholders (i.e. 
employees, customer, supplier, creditors, governments) which might have a direct and or 
indirect impact on the firms’ operating performance. 
Prior literature has examined the CSR-CFP relationship using a wide range of 
accounting-based operating performance measures such as return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), sales growth, net income and profit-before-tax 




(Dam and Scholtens, 2015; Galleo-Alvarez et al., 2013; Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Lee and 
Jhang, 2008; Ruf et al., 2001; Berman et al., 1999; Judge and Douglas, 1998; Waddock 
and Graves, 1997; Simerly, 1994; Dooley and Lerner, 1994; Cochran and Wood, 1984). 
Among these, limited studies have focused on examining the impact of SRI on operating 
performance. One of the seminal studies by Cochran and Wood (1984) documents a 
positive relationship between the ratio of earnings-to-sales and operating-to-assets ratios 
with SRI rankings. Lee and Jhang (2008) support Cochran and Wood (1994) by 
documenting a similar relationship using the accounting rate of return (ARR) as a proxy 
for operating performance. 
Shen and Chang (2008) used a firm-matching approach to examine the impact of 
CSR on firms’ performance. They compare the performance of CSR performance against 
the performance of non-CSR companies using propensity score matching (PSM) and 
suggest that the pre-tax income to sales and profit margin of CSR companies is 
significantly higher than that of non-CSR companies. However, they limit their 
investigation to single country data (Taiwan) and minimal sample size (80 CSR and 2,480 
non-CSR companies). Also, they primarily focused on the comparison between two 
matching groups. Similarly, Lopez et al., (2007) compare the performance of CSR 
businesses, listed in DJSI (Dow Jones Sustainable Index) with non-CSR firms listed in 
DJGI (Dow Jones Global Index) for the period between 1998 and 2004. The authors 
suggest no difference between the two groups of firms, in terms of total assets, capital 
and revenues but a statistically significant difference in the profitability of the former 
group of firms. As the authors argue, the DJSI firms experience only a temporary negative 
impact on the profitability which may be due to the costs associated with the index 
membership (Lopez et al., 2007, p.298). However, a recent study by Demetriades and 




Auret (2014) produced mixed results by reporting that the ROCE of DJSI companies is 
11.18% higher than the non-CSR companies, but the ROA of DJSI firms is 1.82% lower 
than that of the traditional companies (Demetriades and Auret, 2014). This corroborates 
earlier findings by Beccheetti et al., (2008) who examine the effect of Domini Social 
Index 400 (DSI 400) affiliation on the firms’ performance using a sample of US firms 
between 1990 and 2004. After controlling for size, industry and business cycle, the study 
shows that companies’ affiliation with the DSI significantly reduces firms’ returns on 
equity. Interestingly it reveals the existence of a positive and statistically significant effect 
on the net sales per employee indicating employees of CSR firms are highly productive 
and efficient in utilising companies’ resources. Similarly, the exit from the index produces 
substantially adverse effects on the total sales per employee, return on equity and return 
on investment/capital employed. These findings are directly opposed to those reported by 
Ziegler (2012) for the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 index, which shows a positive impact of 
firms’ addition in the SRI in terms of returns on assets. However, the impact on Tobin’s 
Q was insignificant in statistical terms. Hence their study suggests a significantly positive 
impact on ROA for continental European firms but not for the Anglo-Saxon European 
companies. Further, Kappu and Oikonomou (2016) examined the “index effect” on 
operating performance measured by the earning per share (EPS). They reported that the 
EPS increased by 5.96% after the addition and decreased by 6.54% after the deletion from 
the index. However, differential means are not statistically significant.  
From the above review, I can conclude that the impact of SRI additions/deletions 
on firms’ financial performance is rather mixed. This inconsistency in the results could 
be due to the methodological and conceptual differences adopted by the various studies 
(Lee et al., 2009; Wartick and Cochran, 1985). The majority of these studies have used 




relatively small samples and typically investigate the profitability in the short-term. 
Similarly, most studies comparing the performance of CSR and non-CSR firms have 
typically ignored the various micro-characteristics of those firms such as companies’ size, 
industry sectors, the value effect and possible momentum in the benchmark selection 
process although these factors could have a significant impact on the firm-matching 
procedure. For example, firms’ size may convey the ability to afford the CSR initiatives. 
Normally, large companies have more resources available to invest in CSR projects that 
may reduce the risk of potential fines and cost, which consequently leads to improved 
profitability (Clacher and Hagendoff, 2012). Therefore, consideration of such factors in 
the benchmark firms’ selection could improve the reliability of the results. 
On the other hand, the result of past studies is found to be country-specific, leading 
to a lack of generalizability across other markets, and geographical areas. Almost all of 
these studies are based on a single country/market (USA, UK, or other European 
countries). The result could be different in a different region like other emerging and 
developing economies because the CSR differs from country to country (Moon, 2004). 
There is insufficient research carried out using the FTSE4Good index, mostly 
concentrating on market performance and within the UK domain. Hence, the 
investigation of the accounting-based performance of companies listed in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index in this study allows better examination of the CSR-CFP 
relationship since it includes a widely disperse universe of stocks across different 
industries and geographical locations. 
 




4.3. Theoretical Framework and development of hypotheses 
The stakeholder theory, along with resource-based theory, is been used widely in 
the literature as a basis for exploring the CSR-CFP relationship. In this study, I use the 
stakeholder theory alongside the signalling hypothesis to propose the theoretical 
framework and the development of the testable hypotheses. Stakeholder theory has been 
used to explain the firms’ involvement in socially responsible business practices. It 
integrates social element in the business operation and explains the relationship between 
companies and their several groups/stakeholders. Freeman (1984) asserts that a business 
must not only focus on the shareholder interest, rather they should go beyond and to the 
need and expectation of several stakeholders. As such, stakeholders are group or 
individuals who are directly or indirectly linked to the organisation and can influence or 
be affected by the firms’ operation (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders may have conflicting 
interest and demands, and it is crucial for companies to address them effectively and 
efficiently. Their expectations and interests towards a firm differ depending upon the 
individual stakeholder and the type of industry that a company operates. For example, the 
demands and expectations of the customer vary to the expectation of employees and so 
on. Similarly, the expectation of stakeholders in the oil and gas industry may not be 
similar to the stakeholders of a firm in the financial sector. 
 Donaldson and Preston (1995, p.71) suggest that corporate executives must induce 
constructive contributions for their stakeholders to attain their firm’s objectives. The 
stakeholders’ satisfaction, confidence, support, and participation determine the survival 
and continuity of a firm in the society (Freeman et al., 2010; Jensen, 2010; Agle et al., 
2008; Deegan, 2006; Clarkson, 1995; Ullman, 1984). Stakeholders are a primary source 
of firms’ resources and hold a significant power that can influence the survival and growth 




of the company (Deegan, 2009; McWilliam et al., 2006; Mitchell et al. 1997). Hence, 
companies should continuously involve in socially responsible activities that address the 
needs and interests of several stakeholders; otherwise, they will lose all resources and 
support that is necessary for their operation.  
 Stakeholder management is one of the key success factors in a competitive 
business environment. The primary objectives (shareholders’ wealth maximisation) of a 
firm cannot be met without considering its stakeholders (Jenson, 2010; Jamali, 2008, 
p.217). They are the key drivers that lead to change and could intervene in management 
decisions and plans if their needs are not satisfied. Firms’ commitments to 
environmentally and socially responsible initiatives improve companies’ reputation 
among their stakeholders (employee, customer, suppliers, financiers, government) and 
build a healthy relationship. Firms good reputation among stakeholders enhance 
corporate internal and resource capability (the firm's know-how and organisational 
culture (Lourenco et al., 2012, p.419)), which in turn leads to the competitive advantage 
over competitors (Porter and Krammar, 2006). According to instrumental stakeholder 
theory, CSR activities are the mechanisms of maintaining the relationship among firms’ 
multiple interested parties and lead them to a better financial outcome ( Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Wood and Clarkson, 1995). 
Based on the above rationale, firms added in SRI indices should enjoy the superior 
operating performance as compared to their non-SRI added counterparts. The testable 
hypothesis is: 
H1: There is a positive difference in the operating performance of companies associated 
with the FTSE4Good index and those of matched companies that are not added in the 
FTSE4Good. 




As the disclosure of CSR-related information reduces information asymmetry 
among the firms’ stakeholders and improves the firms’ relationship with all interested 
parties, the association with the FTSE4Good index signals companies’ capability of being 
socially responsible in their business operations and potential future out-performance. 
Also, the FTSE4Good announcement is a source of quality information that stakeholders 
could get freely regarding firms’ CSR performance.  
Hence, consistent with the signalling hypothesis/theory, the disclosure of 
companies’ CSR-related performance not only conveys the quality of information but 
also influence stakeholders. For example, the addition to the FTSE4Good Global index 
signals the possibility that a firm will consistently commit adequate resources in socially 
responsible initiatives/leadership. This potential availability of resources for CSR 
initiatives could also be a signal of managerial optimism towards the firm’s future growth 
and investment opportunities (through sustainable and responsible business operations). 
This signal, per se, could lead to improvements in customer loyalty, employee 
productivity, relationship with business partners, and a reduction in potential charges and 
fines. For example, according to the Nielson global survey (2012, p.3) consumers prefer 
to buy goods and services and even if they pay a premium price from those companies 
that initiate/make a positive impact in the world. This could lead firms to improve the 
present value of their future cash flow, boost shareholders/investors’ confidence in 
improving operating performance.  
 By contrast, deletion from the FTSE4Good index signals exactly the opposite 
message to the stakeholders regarding firms’ CSR commitment and could lead to an 
opposite outcome on the firms’ performance. It can act as a negative signal reflecting not 
only relatively low financial capabilities but also a possible challenging future for these 




companies with increased uncertainty in future cash flows and a reduction in stakeholders’ 
confidence. 
 To sum up, based on the signalling theory, stakeholders’ awareness of the firm's 
involvement in CSR is beneficial and act as a signal of improved future operating 
performance. Addition in (deletion from) the FTSE4Good Index should then result in a 
positive (negative) abnormal operating performance in the immediate period after the 
event. That is, 
H2: The operating performance of companies added in the FTSE4Good Index improves 
significantly in the period after the event. 
H3: The operating performance of companies deleted by the FTSE4Good Index 
deteriorates significantly after the event. 
 
4.4. Data and methodology 
 Prior studies examining the CSR-CFP relationship have mostly used single-
country data, most frequently from the US. This study uses the ‘FTSE4Good Global 
Index’, a popular SRI index that includes a list of companies from all over the world, 
that demonstrate high environmental, social and governance practices. It was established 
in 2001 and consist of five sub-index such as the FTSE4Good Europe Index, the 
FTSE4Good Japan Index, the FTSE4Good UK Index, the FTSE4Good US index, and the 
FTSE4Good Global Index that covering four major geographical regions those of UK, 
Europe, US and the Asian emerging market (FTSE4Good, 2015). As of 31st March 2016, 
the total number of constituents in the FTSE4Good Global Index is 791. The most recent 
and updated model of FTSE4Good ESG rating contains over 300 indicators and 14 
different CSR themes under these three pillars. The criteria include anti-corruption, 




biodiversity, climate change, corporate governance, customer responsibility, health and 
safety, human rights and community, labour standards, risk management, supply chain, 
transparency, and water use, pollution and resources (FTSE Russell, 2016).13 
Furthermore, all companies operating in sectors such as Tobacco, Weapons, and Nuclear 
Power are deleted from the index.  
 An independent committee (include experts and senior practitioners, FTSE 
clients, the investment community, academia, the business community, unions, and 
NGOs, etc.) assess the socially responsible practices of the company through the 
information that is publicly available and collected via corporate websites, annual report, 
questionnaire, etc.  Based on this information, they rate companies between 0 and 5, 
where 5 is the highest rating and 0 for the lowest performer or no disclosure. Any 
company with an average FTSE ESG rating of 3.2 (or above) is added to the FTSE4Good 
Index, subject to a certain additional requirement.14  On the contrary, any company rated 
below 3.2 is classified as in risk of deletion from the FTSE4Good index (FTSE Russell, 
2016, p.5). The FTSE4Good index reviews its constituents twice a year (i.e. semi-annual 
review) and provides other information such as changes in the system and criteria for 
addition and deletion, etc.  
 
13 Please see the Index Addition Rules that were updated in September 2014. Source: 
Index Addition Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series v1.7, January 2006, 
www.ftserussell.com 
14 Company must also fulfil the additional requirements which are in section 4 of the 
Index Addition Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series v1.7, January 2006, which can 
be accessed on www.ftserussell.com 




 In this study, I use the FTSE4Good index semi-annual review and relevant 
modifications (addition and/or deletion) as a proxy of the CSR performance. Companies 
which are added (deleted) in the index are high (low) CSR performers with an increased 
(reduced) focus towards their various stakeholders. The examination of this study covers 
the period from March 2002 to December 2015. During this period, there are 956 
companies added and 532 deleted from the FTSE4Good global index. Among the 956 
additions, I only use 819 companies as 137 companies are added and deleted multiple 
times within the three years. 
Similarly, companies are deleted from the index primarily due to a lower score in 
CSR metrics. Among 532 deletions, I only use 462 records as these deletions are purely 
due to the inability of those firms to meet the strict CSR addition criteria (a valid CSR 
reason) or their scoring/rating is below the threshold point, meaning the lower CSR 
performance. The rest of these records firms are dropped from the index due to different 
reasons such as been acquired (M&As activities) and other non-CSR related reasons. I 
also remove all those firms that have been deleted multiple times over the post-event 
measurement period in line with previous event study literature (Kothari and Warner, 
2008; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Fama and French, 1969). The final sample of this 
study also contains firms that are already liquidated or bankrupt. Further, my data 
collection procedure is in line with the prior studies (Gilbert and Strugnell, 2010; 
Carpenter and Lynch, 1999; Elton et al., 1996) that focus on the elimination of the 
possible survivorship bias.  The data cover companies from 26 countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 




Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States). 
 To examine the operating performance of those firms after added in (deleted from) 
the FTSE4Good Global Index, I adopt Barber and Lyon’s (1996) approach of using 
‘level’ and ‘change’ models to estimate the abnormal operating performance. Barber and 
Lyon (1996) have introduced three important steps in conducting an event study with the 
purpose of examining operating performance, and these are i) selection of the 
measurement of operating performance, ii) determining a benchmark against which to 
measure actual performance (developing a model of expected performance and iii) 
selection of appropriate statistical tools. 
According to Table 4.1 (Appendix A) the first four indicators of operating 
performance, cash flow per sales, current ratio, and working capital growth are used to 
explain the firms’ efficiency and their ability to manage/generate their liquidity. 
Similarly, operating margin and ROIC are used to explain the company’s profitability. 
The debt to capital ratio is used to measure the company’s financial leverage. This study 
uses annual operating performances obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
In this study, I compare the operating performance of the FTSE4Good companies 
against non-FTSE4Good benchmark companies using firm-specific characteristics 
matching principle. Prior studies have compared the financial performance of CSR 
against non-CSR benchmarks in several ways. For instance, Lopez et al., (2007) 
compared the financial performance of CSR company (sample Dow Jones Sustainable 
Index) against non-CSR (companies from Dow Jones Global index), whereas 
Demetriades and Aruet (2014) also compared the performance of DJSI against the non-




DJSI firms. Similarly, Belighitar et al., (2014) compared the FTSE4Good index return 
against the FTSE All share and FTSE-100 index. The major weakness of the 
aforementioned studies is that they suffer from the confounding effect as they do not take 
into account of other corporate events when analysing the CSR-CFP relationship. The 
confounding effects occur when the effect or association between the outcome and 
exposure is distorted by the existence of an additional variable (Austin, 2011; 
D’Agostino,1998). Hence, the confounding effect in CSR-CFP relationship occurs when 
the impact of CSR on firm’s financial performance is distorted by the presence of other 
variables such as non-CSR related corporate events such as mergers and acquisition, 
expansion or business. Also, CSR-CFP relationship is often influenced by subject-
specific characteristics when analysing CSR-CFP relationship (Becchetti et al.,2012; 
Cheung, 2011;  Oberndorfer et al., 2013). Very limited studies have used standardised 
matching principle in CSR-CFP literature to examine the CSR-CFP relationship such as 
Shen and Chang (2009) used propensity score matching methodology (PSM) to compare 
the financial performance of CSR companies against non-CSR firms. The PSM 
methodology reduces the effect of confounding in an observational study (Austin, 2011), 
but it does not provide the closest matching to the firm’s specific characteristics. The 
CSR-CFP relationship is greatly affected by the firm’s micro-characteristics (Kang et al., 
2016; Lee and Grewal, 2004). For example, the firm’s investment in CSR and its financial 
performance depends on the nature industry it is operating, the availability of finance or 
its size, its growth (value) (Hart, 1995; Brammer and Millington, 2003; Barnett, 2007; 
Sweeney and Coughlan, 2008). The accounting and finance literature extensively used 
firm-specific characteristics as a benchmark matching criteria as this increase the validity 
and reliability of investigation especially in comparing the performance with benchmark 




portfolio (Ritter, 1991; Barber and Lyon, 1996; Jegadeesh, 2000; Ngatuni et al., 2007; 
Andrikopoulos, 2009; Gregory et al., 2010). The use of firm-specific characteristics as 
matching criteria in CSR-CFP investigation will also increase the reliability of 
comparison between CSR and non-CSR companies. Hence, in this study I follow the 
matching criteria based on i) same-industry, ii) same-momentum decile portfolio 
performance, iii) same-B/M decile portfolio performance, iii) same-size decile portfolio 
performance, iv) industry and size (two dimensional), and v) industry and B/M (two 
dimensional). 
In order to investigate whether the FTSE4Good Global companies (after addition 
and deletion) are performing better or worse, it is important to indicate what performance 
is expected in the absence of that event (Barber and Lyon, 1996). Hence, in line with prior 
literature (Andrikopoulos, 2009) the abnormal operating performance is calculated as the 
difference between the operating performance of the sample company and the median 
operating performance of the matched benchmark companies. 
In detail, if I assume that the expected performance of an FTSE4Good Global 
company i at time t is denoted as  while the performance of a non-FTSE4Good Global 
company i at time t in the benchmark portfolio j (size, industry), etc. then, the operating 
performance for a ‘level’ type model is calculated as follows: 
𝐸(𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
      (4.1) 
where, E(..) is the expectation operator, and the superscript j is the comparison group 
=1,2,3,4,5,6 (1=size, 2=industry, 3=momentum, and 4=book to market value, 5=industry-
size, 6=industry-book to market).  




The abnormal operating performance is the difference between the level of performance 
of the FTSE4Good Global companies (addition/deletion) and the performance of the 
benchmark portfolio algebraically illustrated as; 
𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
     (4.2) 
where,   is the abnormal operating performance for firm i at time t is the level of 
performance of FTSE4Good Global firm i at time t, and,  is the operating performance of 
benchmark companies i at time t. 
 Similarly, for a ‘change’-type model, the abnormal operating performance can be 
calculated as the difference between the annual changes in the operating performance of 












𝑗     (4.3) 
𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
      (4.4) 
where the abnormal operating performance for the firm i at time t under change type 
model is 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 . The performance of FTSE4Good firm i at time t and t-1 are denoted 
by 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1respectively. 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 is the performance of the benchmark 
portfolio for firm i at time t and 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
 is the performance at time t-1. In line with 
prior literature (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Andrikopoulos, 2009), the models of 
calculating abnormal operating performance comprise of a series of both level and change 
models.  
[Insert Table4.2 about here] 
Table 4.2 presents the models of the firms expected differential operating 
performance. Following Barber and Lyon’s (1996) ‘level’ and ‘change’ type model, I 
calculate the expected differential operating performance between the FTSE4Good firms 




and their corresponding non-FTSE4Good benchmark firm portfolio. According to Table 
4.2, models 1 to 6 examines the differential operating performance using ‘type’ model. 
The ‘type’ model consists of the items such as operating profit margin, cash flow per 
sales, total debt to total capital ratio and ROIC.  Similarly, models 7 to 12 are used to 
calculate the differential operating performance under ‘change’ model. I use working 
capital growth in ‘change’ model to calculate differential operating performance, where 
the differential operating performance is the difference between yearly operating 
performance change of FTSE4Good firms and annual operating performance change of 
benchmark portfolio. 
In the case where the abnormal operating performance of a firm i at t under both 
models is equal to zero, this indicates no difference in changes in operating performance 
between the FTSE4Good firm and the benchmark portfolio. To test the null hypothesis, 
that the average abnormal operating performance of FTSE4Goood-added firm is equal to 
zero, I use a parametric test statistic. Assuming that the sample data are normally 
distributed, then Z-statistics or  
𝑍 =
𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎(𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖𝑡)/√𝑛
     (4.5) 
where n is the sample size,  is the mean abnormal operating performance of sample firms,  
is the standard deviation of cross-sectional abnormal performance of sample n. Due to the 
problem of positive skewness in accounting measures, I use median operating 
performance, and the testable hypotheses are:  
𝐻𝑜: 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 0 and 
𝐻1: 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0.  




The abnormal operating performance equal to the difference between the operating 
performance of FTSE4Good and non-FTSE4Good companies. To test this hypothesis, I 




      (4.6) 
The Wilcoxon T value calculated as the ratio of the smaller value of the sum of 
ranks with a positive difference and the sum of ranks of with negative difference; is the 
mean, calculated as, n is the number of matched pair added in the investigation, and  is 
the standard deviation, calculated as,  
   𝑆𝑇 = √
𝑛(𝑛+1)(2𝑛+1)
24
     (4.7) 
 In this study, I assume that there is a 95% level of significance, and if the Z-score 
lies between -1.96 and +1.9615, I do not reject the null hypothesis. However, I expect to 
reject the null hypothesis, meaning the operating performance for FTSE4Good Global 
companies is higher than that of the median operating performance of similar benchmark 
non-FTSE4Good companies.  
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of corporate social responsibility on firms’ 
operating performance. All tables with my results are presented in appendix A of this 
chapter. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the summary of descriptive statistics for all indicators 
 
15 for a two-tailed test with 95% confidence level, the critical value lies between -1.96 
and +1.96 




used to evaluate the operating performance of the sample firms. Due to the existence of 
outliers in our sample, I adopt a 5% winsorisation. These tables report means, median, 
standard deviation, maximum, minimum of each measure in each benchmark criteria 
alongside data normality indicators. For example, according to Table 4.3 in case of the 
FTSE4Good added companies, both mean and median values are positive and higher than 
those of the matched benchmark of non-FTSE4Goodcompanies in all the performance 
measures except for the case of the current ratio and the working capital ratio. On the other 
hand, Table 4.4 reports a positive median for deleted companies but mostly lower than their 
benchmark portfolio. For example, according to Table 4.3, the median cash flow per sales 
of the FTSE4Good companies (11.470) is lower than that of size-matched benchmark 
portfolio (13.565). Similarly, the median of an operating margin of FTSE4Good (8.755) is 
also lower than that of the median of size-matched benchmark portfolio (11.130).  In all 
cases, standard deviations for each performance measures under all benchmark portfolio is 
indifferent near to zero, suggesting that the distribution of the performance returns are highly 
dispersed. Also, both Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 report high values for Kurtosis across all 
performance measures and under all benchmark criteria for both addition and deletion 
companies. This suggests that the sample of our study is not normally distributed. 
On average, the descriptive statistics reveal a positive skewness suggesting data are 
not symmetrical. Our Jarque Bera test results reveal a statistically significant finding (p-
values<0.05) in all cases with positive skewness and a positive kurtosis for the data set. 
Hence, the use of the Wilcoxon sign rank test for our hypothesis testing is justified by the 
non-normality of the sample data even though the sample size is relatively large. The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric test normally use to compare the matched, 
related, paired samples. It is used to compare the median or mean of paired samples and 




examine the significant differences. Since I am comparing the median of two matched 
samples (FTSE4Good versus a firm-matched benchmark of non-FTSE4Good), the 
Wilcoxon Test fits best to compare the difference of our sample. 
[Insert Tables 4.3 and 4.4 about here] 
The result on the performance differences between FTSE4Good and non-
FTSE4Good firm, one sample test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are reported in Tables 
4.5 and 4.6 for the one-dimensional matching and Tables 4.7 and 4.8 for two-dimensional 
matching procedures respectively. 
 
4.5.2. Operating performance 
Tables 4.5 presents the results of the average difference in performance, for each of 
the measures using single-dimensional benchmark criteria for the period between t=0 and 
t+36 months after the addition events. According to Table 4.5, there is a positive difference 
in the operating performance between FTSE4Good and non-FTSE4Good firms in terms of 
operating profit margin, cash flow per sales, total debt to capital, and ROIC indicates that 
FTSE4Good firms perform better than the non-FTSE4Good firms. In most of the 
comparison criteria, the differential operating performance was significant at 1% level. For 
example, according to Table 4.5, the differential operating profit margin while compared 
with similar-industry portfolio are 9.65, 9.544, 7.644 and 7.685 at t=0, t+12, t+24 and t+36 
months, respectively. 
 On the other hand, the result of the current ratio and working capital growth both 
were mixed. The differential current ratio is negative for the entire study period under the 
matched industry. According to Table 4.5, the differential current ratio when compared with 
matched industry at t=0, t+12, t+24 and t+36 are -0.059 (z value of -3.338), -0.029 (z value 




of -2.530), -0.046 (z value of -3.044) and -0.018 (z value of -2.720) respectively.  Also, 
similar performance is noticed in the year of addition (t=0) when compared with the matched 
momentum and the matched PTBV benchmarks.  For the rest of the one-dimensional 
approach, the difference in the current ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In the case of working capital growth, the differential working capital growth is 
positive under matched industry and mostly negative compared with the rest of the 
benchmark portfolio. The results are statistically significant at 1% level under industry 
match benchmark. The results are consistent with Demetriades and Auret (2014)  and Lopez 
(2009), report that the operating performance of CSR firms is higher than non-CSR firms 
measured ROCE and profitability, respectively. Also, our result corroborates Shen and 
Chang (2009), who concluded that CSR companies perform significantly better than that of 
non-CSR companies in terms of income to sales ratio, current ratio and profit margin.  
I also examine the firms’ operating performance after the addition in the FTSE4Good 
index. According to Table 4.5, the excess operating margin for the entire benchmark criteria 
and sustains positive throughout the study period. Also, the post addition difference in 
operating margins decreased immediately after the addition. This decline in the operating 
margin is due to firms additional spending in CSR initiatives and programmes at the 
beginning of the addition period. The post addition differential is operating margin rise from 
t+24 in most of the cases. For example, according to Table 4.5, the post differential operating 
margin reaches to a maximum 9.886 (t value 11.003 and z-value -14.69) at t+24 under PTBV 
matched decile portfolio and 2.607 (t value 6.10 and z value -4.90) at t+36 compared with 
size-matched portfolio decile. Both the values are statistically significant at the 1% level for 
the one-sample t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. A similar trend is also reported 
when comparing to the rest of the benchmark portfolios. The increase in the operating 




margin in subsequent years might be due to cost-saving, improved efficiency, efficient use 
of resources, reduction in the cost of negative events, increased employee productivity 
(Aldana, 2011; Laczniak and Murphy, 1991; Turban and Greening, 1997), all possibly 
facilitated by the adoption of CSR programmes. The result of the excess operating profit 
margin supports the conclusion of Brik et al., (2011); Fombrun and Shanley (1990) that CSR 
has a positive impact on operating profit margin in the longer term. 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
Similar to the operating margin, Table 4.5 presents the excess abnormal cash flow 
per sale for the FTSE4Good companies. The differential cash flow per sales remains 
positive compared to all matched portfolios for the entire year, suggesting FTSE4Good 
companies perform better than the non-FTSE4Good companies. The cash flow per sales 
decreased in the first year and then increased in t+24. Theoretically, cash flow per sales 
increases as net sales increases; if not, it could be either the changes in the selling term or 
the bad management of the debtors. However, the decline in the operating cash flow could 
be due to firms spending operating activities such as employee welfare, health and safety 
programs, training and development (also known as CSR activities).  
According to Table 4.5, the post addition differential cash flow per sales increased 
significantly at t+24 on both when compared with the matched industry and matched PTBV 
portfolio. However, while compared with size-matched and momentum matched decile 
portfolio, the excess cash flow per sales significantly increased immediately after the 
addition and up to t+24 and deteriorated afterwards. According to Table 4.5, the post-
addition excess performance reached a maximum of 9.035 (t-value 9.7270) at t+24 under 
the matched industry. Similarly, compared with remaining matching portfolio, the 
maximum differential cash flow per sales reached at t+24  with 7.0446 (t-value 11.818), 




2.8226 (t-value 6.1016) and 9.6402 (t-value 11.041) under, momentum decile, size-matched 
and PTBV matched decile portfolio respectively. These increments are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Although the post-addition differential cash flow per sales remain 
positive for the entire period, the worst performance is reported at t=0 under the size-
matched portfolio of 2.0436 (t-value 4.7635). 
The result for the current ratio in Table 4.5 shows the lowest differential current 
ratio is at t=0 under all benchmark portfolio. This suggests that companies have relatively 
low cash and cash equivalent on their account as they have invested heavily in CSR 
initiatives. The post-event differential current ratio for the companies added in the 
FTSE4Good is negative for the entire event period under industry-matched portfolio and 
positive under remaining benchmark portfolio. Predominantly, the abnormal current ratio is 
increasing under all matching benchmark portfolios reaching a maximum at t+36 under all 
matched portfolio except the case of the matched-momentum where a supreme of 0.0339 
(z-value -2.532) reached at t+24.  
 According to Table 4.5, the abnormal performance reached to a high of 0.1630 (z 
value -1.863) at t+36 under the size decile portfolio and 0.0207 (z-value -2.845) at t+36 
under PTBV matched decile portfolio. Compared with matched industry, the FTSE4Good 
underperform than the matched benchmark portfolio where the differential current ratios at 
t=0, t+12, t+24 and t+36 are -0.059 (z-value -3.338), -0.029 (z-value -2.530), -0.047 (z-value 
-3.044), and -0.018 (z-value -2.743) respectively. However, the underperformance is 
improving and reaching a minimum of -0.018(z-value -2.720) at t+36, suggesting the 
improvement after the addition. The improved sign of the current ratio after the addition 
means CSR companies tend to manage cash and cash equivalent after they are added in the 
index. The improvement in the current ratio reflects the improved resource utilisation, and 




internal management capability (good debtor and creditor management) is the result of good 
CSR practice (Costa, 2015; Turker, 2015, Turban and Greening, 1997). 
 The results for the case of the working capital growth show a mixed picture. For 
example, according to Table 4.5, when compared to their industry-matched peers, the 
working capital growth is positive but negative when compared to the rest of the matched 
benchmark portfolios. A negative but statistically insignificant difference in the working 
capital growth is reported until t+12 under the matched momentum, size and PTBV portfolio 
of -0.092 (z-value -0.363) , -0.17 (z-value -0.672) and -0.096 (z-value -0.378) respectively. 
Table 4.5 also shows that at t+24 FTSE4Good companies have experienced positive excess 
working capital growth under all benchmark criteria (0.15 for size-match, 0.066 for 
momentum-match, 0.063 for size-match and 0.065 for PTBV-match). However, compared 
to the median of the industry-matched companies, CSR firms perform better with positive 
excess working capital growth immediately after the event i.e. 0.365 (z-value -4.854) at t=0, 
0.260 (z-value -2.840) at t+12, 0.150 (z-value -1.227) at t+24 and 0.135 (z-value -2.743) at 
t+36. Under matched industry median benchmark criteria, the abnormal working capital 
growth is ranging from a maximum of 0.3656 (t-value 3.080 significant at the 1% level) at 
t=0 and a minimum of 0.1354 (t-value 1.408) at t+36. The worst post abnormal working 
capital is reported under the matched industry-size of -0.170 (z-value -0.672) at t+12. 
 In terms of gearing, the post addition differential total debt to total equity ratio is 
positive under all matching benchmark criteria. According to Table 4.5, the post-addition 
excess performance is a maximum 9.6978 (t-statistics 9.777 and z value -8.575) at t+12 
when compared with the median of matched PTBV decile portfolio. A minimum of 
0.0109 (z-value -1.145) differential total debt to total capital is reported at t+24 under 
matched industry portfolio, but it is not statistically significant. Also, the post-addition 




maximum differential total debt to total capital under momentum decile and Size matched 
decile is reported as 9.0086 (t-value is 9.8019) at t+12 and 2.1740 (t-value is 2.4207) at 
t+12 respectively. It implies that CSR companies are heavily debt-funded. It does not 
mean that they are risky companies, instead can be categorised as less risky from a lender 
point of view. The reason behind the positive abnormal total debt to total capital ratios is 
that CSR companies are less risky (Porter and Kramer, 2006, 2011; Godfrey, 2009) and 
with improved credit-worthiness (Attig et al., 2013).  
 Further, CSR initiative tends to improve the relationship with financiers (Spicer, 
1978) and they enjoy the additional source of finance with a lower cost of capital (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2012) compared with their non-CSR counterparts.  The 
increase in post-addition sales, improved current ratio, and total assets growth contribute 
to the decline in the gearing ratio as a company have used their fund to repay. Hence, the 
declining in total differential debt to the total capital after the addition in the FTSE4Good 
suggests that the company is managed better and have managed to pay their debt and 
loans. 
 Consistent with Demetriades and Auret (2014), Beccheeti et al., (2008) and Brik et 
al., (2011), the result of this study suggests that the CSR has a positive impact on ROIC. 
Table 4.5 suggests that FTSE4Good companies experience a higher return on invested 
capital (ROIC) compared to the non-CSR companies by reporting positive excess ROIC 
compared with all benchmark categories. The excess ROCI is the result of implementing the 
good CSR practices which improve the internal resources and management capability 
(Barnett, 2007; Bansal and Roth, 2000) that enhance firm’s ability to utilise the capital in 
profit-generating investments. Compared with all benchmark portfolio, the differential 
ROIC is positive for the entire study period. Our result suggests that companies tend to 




experience higher/improved ROIC performance compared to their non-CSR, which is 
confirmed by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and significant at the 1% level in most cases. 
Further, it supports the result of Salama et al., (2011, p.199) that firms involved in the social 
responsibility experience positive/higher ROIC.  According to Table 4.5, the post addition 
excess ROIC reaches to a maximum of 4.637 at t+24 compared with industry median 
portfolio and a minimum of 2.801 (t-value 7.214 and z-value -7.747) compared with 
matched PTBV decile portfolio. Although the difference in ROIC is positive, it declined at 
t+12 month and increased afterwards under all the matched benchmark criteria. One of the 
main reasons for the declining ROIC is the decline in the post addition operating profit and 
the increase in the debt for the CSR firms. The post addition differential ROIC reaches to a 
maximum at t+24 when compared with all benchmark criteria. For example, Table 4.5 
shows a maximum differential ROIC of 4.636 (t-value 10.390 and z-value -10.430) under 
industry-matched, 3.254 (t-value 10.338 and z-value -11.092) under momentum-matched, 
0.954 (t-value 3.018 and z-value -3.358) under size-matched and 3.304 (t-value 8.809 and 
z-value -8.988) under PTBV-matched benchmark portfolio. 
I further examine the performance using the two-dimensional model to confirm the 
result from one-dimensional benchmark comparison. Consistent with single-dimensional 
analysis, FTSE4Good companies also outperform non-FTSE4Good counterpart under both 
benchmark criteria (matched industry-size and matched industry-PTBV) of two-
dimensional analysis. According to Table 4.6, a positive operating profit margin for the 
entire period when compared with the non-FTSE4Good benchmarks. The differential 
operating margin reached a maximum of 145.35% (t-value 2.207) statistically significant at 
the 1% level at t+12 when compared with matched industry-PTBV. Also, a maximum of 
3.2339 (t value 1.9682) at t+12 under matched industry- size.  




[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
The differential cash flow per sale of companies added in the FTSE4Good remains 
the positive under all benchmark criteria for entire years. Compared to the matched industry-
size, the cash flow per sales deteriorates on the year of addition with an excess of 1.4103 at 
t=0 from an excess of 2.8084 at t=-12. According to Table 4.6, although improvement is 
noticeable to 2.8930 (z value of -2.064) in the first year of addition, then has declined in 
subsequent years. The post-event performance is improved when compared to the matched 
industry-PTBV benchmark. Table 4.6 reports that the post-addition excess cash flow per 
sales under matched industry-PTBV benchmark reached to a maximum of 78.337 (t value 
2.363 and z-value -7.522) at t+12 and a minimum 16.747 (t-value 3.126 and z-value -6.759) 
at t+24. In both cases, the result is statically significant at the 1% level under the Wilcoxon 
sign rank test. Table 4.6 also reports the worst excess performance of added companies when 
compared with the matched industry-size benchmark of 0.8055 (t value 1.055) at t+32 but 
is not statistically significant.  
The differential current ratio for the companies added in the FTSE4Good is negative 
for the entire event period under all the matching criteria under two-dimensional analysis. 
This means that regarding current ratio, CSR firms do not perform better than that of their 
non-CSR counterpart. Compared with matched industry-size and industry-PTBV, the 
differential current ratio deteriorates significantly (at 1% level) from t-36 to t=0. Although 
the differential current ratio is negative in the period between t=0 and t+36, the result report 
improvement in the underperformance. On average, the post-addition underperformance of 
current ratio is ranging from a minimum -0.088 (t-value -1.63) at t+36 to a maximum -0.118 
(t-value -2.307 and z-value -1.734) at t+12 under matched industry-size. Similarly, when 
compared with matched industry-PTBVE, the underperformance ranges from a minimum 




of -0.499 (t-value -5.043, z-value -4.293) at t+12 to a maximum of -1.098 (t-value -4.79) at 
t=0. Table 4.6 suggests the improvement in the current ratio; the result is significant at 5 % 
at t+12 and t+24 compared with the matched industry-size. 
Moreover, results are statistically significant at 1% level at all point compared 
against the matched industry-PTBV benchmark. The results of the two-dimensional 
matching criteria support the conclusion of Shen and Chang (2009, p.145) who report that 
the mean differential performance regarding current ratio is negative when CSR companies 
are just compared to non-CSR companies. So, the two-dimensional analysis is consistent 
with Shen and Chang (2009) and conclude that CSR firms tend to underperform than that 
of non-CSR companies regarding current ratio. This indicates that CSR companies invest 
their cash reserve to the CSR initiatives, which may consequently leave less cash and cash 
equivalent in their account. The improvement of the current ratio after the addition means 
they tend to manage cash and cash equivalent after they are added in the index.  
The result of the working capital growth shows the mixed result for the post-event 
differential performance under two-dimensional analysis. The result reports mean excess 
working capital growth compared with matched industry size benchmark is positive before 
addition in the FTSE4Good index and deteriorate/underperform immediately afterwards. 
The FTSE4Good added companies underperform regarding working capital growth and 
consistent with the current ratio compared to the matched industry-size and industry-PTBV 
benchmark criteria. Table 4.6 shows that at t+24 FTSE4Good companies have experienced 
positive excess working capital growth of 0.272 (t-value 1.639 and z-value -1.057) at t+24 
under matched industry-size and 0.113 (t-value 0.902 and z-value -0.200) at t+24 under 
matched industry-PTBV. The two-dimensional comparison results for working capital 
growth are not statistically significant in either of these benchmark criteria.  




Consistent with one-dimensional benchmark results, Table 4.6 reports that the 
post addition differential total debt to total capital ratio is positive under all two-
dimensional analysis except at t+24 when compared to matched industry-size. The post-
addition performance is a maximum 1.98 (t-value 0.660 and z-value -0.5550) at t+36 
when compared with matched industry-size. Table 4.6 reports a maximum of 4.412 (t-
value 3.045 and z-value -3.073) at t+36 when compared with matched industry-PTBV. 
This result is consistent with Salama et al., (2011) and Wang and Qian (2011), who 
suggest that the gearing ratio is positively associated with CSR. The improvement in 
gearing ratio is due to the funds available in reduced rates for CSR firms compared to 
non-CSR counterparts (El Ghoul, 2011; Dhaliwali et al., 2012). 
According to Table 4.6, the post-addition differential ROIC is positive under both 
matched benchmark but only statistically significant when compared with the matched 
industry-PTBV. The two-dimensional analysis corroborates the results one-dimensional 
analysis that the FTSE4Good firms perform superior to their matched non-FTSE4Good 
counterparts.  Table 4.6 reports that differential ROIC increased significantly and reached a 
maximum of 5.529 (t-value 4.902 and z-value -3.075) at t+12. Although, a maximum of 
0.503 differential ROIC is reported at t+24 when compared with matched industry-size but 
not statistically significant.  Hence, from the above, the post-addition result is consistent 
with Kappu and Oikonomou (2016) and Ziegler (2012), who report increased EPS and ROA 
respectively after the addition in the SRI index. 
I also analysed the operating performance of firms after they are deleted from the 
FTSE4Good index. According to Table 4.7, the differential operating margin for the firms 
deleted from the FTSE4Good index is positive when compared with all matching benchmark 
in the entire period except matched size decile portfolio. Compared with the matched size 




decile portfolio, the post deletion differential operating margin is negative. According to 
Table 4.7, the minimum differential operating margin reached to -1.962 (t value -3.045 and 
z value -2.935) at t+12 under marched size decile portfolio. Table 4.7 shows that differential 
operating margin is deteriorating significantly at t+12 in case of all the benchmark criteria, 
implying that firms suffer declining in the operating profit immediately after the deletion 
from the index. The biggest drop in differential operating margin is from 6.727 to 5.312 (t-
value 9.370 and z-value -9.895) at t+12 when compared with the momentum-matched 
portfolio. Similarly, at t+12, under industry-matched, size-matched and PTBV-matched 
portfolios the differential operation margin is reduced to 4.351 (t-value 5.197 and z-value -
8.375), -1.962 (t-value -3.045 and z-value -2.935) and 4.707 (t-value 5.598 and z-value -
7.233) respectively. 
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
According to Table 4.7, the post-event excess cash flow per sales for companies 
deleted from the FTSE4Good index also remain positive in all the benchmark criteria. The 
differential cash flow per sales is also deteriorating immediately after the deletion under all 
matching portfolio except size-matched portfolio. Table 4.7 shows the biggest drop in 
differential cash flow per sales from 6.879 to 5.595 (t-value 3.970 and z-value -6.461) at 
t+12 when compared with the industry-matched portfolio. The similar trend is evidenced 
under momentum-matched and PTBV-matched portfolio, the differential cash flow per sales 
is reduced to 5.514 (t-value 6.705 and z-value -9.024) and 4.620 (t-value 5.202 and z-value 
-6.911) respectively. However, Table 4.7 also shows that the abnormal cash flow per sales 
is increased significantly at year t+12 under the size-matched portfolio. This increase in the 
differential cash flow can be due to the number of reasons such as increased cash collection 
from debtors/increased working capital. However, the most significantly the decline in the 




cash flow per sales is due to a significant decline in sales revenue as firms manifested by 
low CSR publicity (firms deletion from the SRI index). It is also worth to note that 
companies have performed better than the benchmark under all benchmark portfolios but in 
a declining trend.  
The differential current ratio is also negative for the entire event period for 
FTSE4Good deleted companies when compared with PTBV-matched portfolio but positive 
while compared with the rest of the benchmark portfolios. According to Table 4.7, the 
differential current ratio is deteriorated immediately after the deletion under industry-
matched, size-matched and PTBV-matched portfolio. Table 4.7 shows that the difference in 
the current ratio is declining from t+24 and reaches a minimum of -0.064 (z-value -2.270) 
at t+36. Similarly, a minimum differential current ratio of -0.025 (z value -2.526), 0.0585 
and -0.094 (z value -3.730) all at t+24 under momentum, size and PTBV matched portfolios 
respectively.  
In the case of working capital growth, Table 4.6 shows the negative differences in 
working capital growth in most of the benchmark cases, implying that deleted companies 
are underperforming compared to their benchmark portfolios. However, the differential 
performance in increasing after the event. This means after the deletion; firms are not 
spending their cash and cash equivalents (resources) on the CSR programmes, that 
consequently shows higher liquidity after the event. Table 4.7 shows that the post deletion 
excess performance reached a maximum of 0.0455 and 0.0310 at t+24 when compared to 
momentum- matched and PTBV- matched portfolio respectively, but both are not 
statistically significant. Compared with an industry- matched portfolio, companies have 
experienced underperformance after the deletion for the entire event period and a maximum 
underperformance of -0.978 at t+36.  




The differential total debt to total capital ratio is deteriorating significantly at 1% 
under all benchmark criteria and even negative differential ratio compared with the 
median of the matched industry benchmark. Table 4.7 shows the declining in post deletion 
ratio after t+12 under all the benchmark criteria. The difference in total debt to total 
capital ratio reached to a minimum of -0.065, 13.029, 4.7998, and 13.342 when compared 
with the median of matched industry, momentum, matched the size and matched PTBV 
portfolio respectively. All these values are statistically significant at the 1% level. It can 
be noticed that the declining trend of the differential gearing ratio is more statistically 
significant after the deletion. Such a significant reduction in the excess debt to capital 
ratio may be due to the loss of the lender confidence and increased risk when companies 
are deleted from the CSR index.    
According to Table 4.7, the post-event abnormal ROIC is negative for the entire 
period when compared with size-matched decile portfolio but are positive when 
compared with the rest benchmark criteria. The differential ROIC decreased significantly 
at t+12 under industry-matched and PTBV-matched benchmark portfolios. However, the 
improvement is noticed afterwards in both cases and reached to a maximum of 3.0015 (t-
value 4.4534 and z-value -5.229) and 1.906 (t-value 3.059 and z-value -4173) at t+36 
when under industry-matched and PTBV-matched portfolio respectively. Similarly, 
Table 4.7 reports that the post deletion differential ROIC is also improving significantly 
under momentum and size-matched portfolios. Such improvement in the differential 
ROCI could be due to the reduced finance cost and significantly declining in company 
borrowings.  
I further examine the operating performance using the two-dimensional model to 
confirm the result from one-dimensional benchmark comparison. Table 4.8 presents the 




results of the average difference in performance, for each of the measures using two-
dimensional benchmark criteria for the period between t=0 and t+36 months after the 
deletion events. According to Table 4.8, the difference in operating profit margin is 
negative throughout the study period but only statistically significant at t=0.  Although, 
table 4.8 reports improvement in operating performance and reached to -1.815 (t-value -
1.872 and z-value -1.999) at t+12, for the rest, no significant changes after the deletion 
event under the matched industry-size benchmark. On contrary, although the differential 
operating margin is positive when compared with industry-PTBV matched benchmarks, 
Table 4.8 reports a significant decline in differential operating margin from 38.470 to 
20.355 (t-value 3.264 and z-value -5.200) at t+12 months after the deletion event and 
reached to a minimum of 18.430 (t-value 2.443 and z-value -4.468) at t+36 months.  
Like operating margin, Table 4.8 presents negative differential cash flow per sales 
under industry-size matched benchmark but reports positive differential cash flow per 
sales when compared with industry-PTBV matched counterparts. According to Table 4.8, 
the difference in cash flow per sales deteriorating significantly after the event at t+12 
months under both benchmark criteria. For example, difference in cash flow per sales 
declines from -1.143 to -2.320 (t-value -2.306 and z-value -2.606) under matched 
industry-size and from 33.769 to 6.102 (t-value 2.105 and z-value -3.729) under industry-
PTBV matched benchmarks. 
In the case of current ratio, Table 4.8 reports the negative difference in current 
ratio under both benchmark criteria. Under matched industry-PTBV, the difference in 
current ratio declined significantly from -0.432 to -0.529 (t-value -4.243 and z-value -
3.101) at t+12 months. Same pattern is evidence under matched industry-size at t+24 
months where difference in current ratio declined to -0.269 (t-value -3.580 and z-value -




2.497). Consistent with the current ratio, the difference in working capital growth is also 
negative under both benchmarks. Under matched industry-PTBV, the post-event 
difference in working capital growth declined significantly from -0.443 to -0.919 (t-value 
-2.121 and z-value -2.060) at t+12 and no significant changes afterwards. However, under 
matched industry-size, Table 4.8 reports no significant changes after the deletion from 
the FTSE4Good index. 
According to Table 4.8, the difference in total debt to total capital is positive under 
both benchmark criteria. Table 4.8, reports that post-event gearing ratio is declining 
significantly throughout the study period and reaches to a minimum of 4.024 (t-value 
2.158 and z-value -2.599) at t+24 and 6.126 (t-value 2.589 and z-value -2.542) under 
matched industry-size and matched industry-PTBV benchmark criteria respectively.  
Table 4.8 reports the negative difference in ROIC under matched industry-size 
and positive under matched industry-PTBV. However, the difference in ROIC is 
declining significantly at both benchmark criteria. For example, according to table 4.8, at 
t+12 months the difference in ROIC reduced from -2.953 to -3.043 (t-value -4.415 and z-
value -3.376) under matched industry-size and from 2.926 to 2.842 (t-value 2.312 and z-
value -2.682) under matched industry-PTBV. The post-event operating performance 
under the two-dimensional analysis corroborates the result of one-dimensional. Overall, 




In this study, I examine the impact of CSR index membership on the firms’ 
operating performance, using several accounting measures such as operating margin, 




cash flow per sales, current ratio, working capital, total debt to total capital and ROIC. 
The overall result suggests the FTSE4Good companies perform significantly higher in 
most cases when they are compared with their non-FTSE4Good-matched counterparts. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report post-addition differential performance is positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level in most cases for cash flow per sales, operating 
margin, ROIC, and total debt to total capital when compared to all matched benchmark 
criteria. Therefore, the first null hypothesis (H1) is accepted.  Alternatively, the operating 
performance of companies added in the FTSE4Good index is higher than that of matched 
firms that are not listed in the FTSE4Good index. Our results are consistent with Shen 
and Chang (2009) who test the performance of CSR companies with a matched 
benchmark of non-CSR companies and suggest that CSR firms perform better regarding 
all ROA, ROE, operating profit margin and gross margin indicators. Unlike Lopez et al., 
(2007) and Demetraides and Auret (2014) this study confirms that CSR firms outperform 
their non-CSR benchmarks regarding operating margin, ROCI, gearing and cash flow per 
sales indicators. 
 In Tables 4.5 and 4.6, I also report the negative difference in the performance 
between CSR and non-CSR firms regarding current ratio, working capital growth. In our 
views, this underperformance can be due to the significant commitment of resources and 
investment needed to pursue the CSR related programs. Although the difference in the 
current ratio and working capital growth are all negative, they tend to increase after the 
addition in the FTSE4Good index. The most significant improvement in the post-addition 
operating performance for CSR firms is reported up to t+24 and decline afterwards. In a 
few occasions, the performance difference was increasing during the entire period of 36 
months. Particularly, the operating performance of the cash flow per sales, current ratio, 




sales growth, operating margin, assets growth and Debt to capital indicators has 
increased significantly for the first year after the CSR index additions. The analysis of 
liquidity position (current ratio, cash flow per sales, working capital) provides new 
insight into the CSR-CFP relationship. I find that the liquidity ratios have improved 
significantly after the addition in the CSR index. For example, the post-addition 
differential cash flow per sales and the current ratio under the one-dimensional 
comparison are all positive. Table 4.5 reports that the incremental cash flow per sales 
reached a maximum of 9.6402, and a difference in the current ratio reaches a maximum 
of 0.1630 when compared to their matched PTBV decile portfolio and size decile 
portfolio respectively. Both these values were statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Similar results are also reported for differential cash flow per sales under the two-
dimensional approach. However, FTSE4Good companies tend to underperform in all 
cases when compared with their two-dimensional benchmark. An improvement in the 
differential current ratio is also reported after addition. Also, the working capital growth 
is increasing after the addition in the FTSE4Good index. The improvement in working 
capital growth is not statistically significant.  The current study also reveals that post 
addition differential total debt to total capital ratio is positive in all benchmark criteria. 
The result of this analysis suggests that FTSE4Good companies tend to enjoy an 
additional source of capital for their investment needs. It is possible that the significant 
difference in the debt to capital ratio is the result of stakeholders’ (lender, financier, 
investor) confidence towards CSR companies documented in prior literature (Spicer, 
1978; Weber and Gladstone, 2014; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006).  
 On the other hand, especially with regards to the index membership, studies in the 
past have not examined the impact of CSR index deletion on firms’ operating 




performance. The result Tables 4.7 and 4.8 report a significant deterioration on the 
performance after the deletion from the FTSE4Food index which is consistent with 
Beccheeti et al., (2008) who suggest that the exit from the social index could produce a 
substantially adverse effect on ROE and ROIC. Hence, the confirmation of the third 
hypothesis (H3) means the operating performance of companies deleted by the 
FTSE4Good index deteriorates after the event. Deleted firms still perform better than that 
of their matched counterparts even after the deletion from the FTSE4Good index. Hence, 
even though the companies are deleted because of not maintaining CSR level, the 
existence of a positive difference in performance for them can be manifested to the long-
term effect of CSR on the firms’ performance.   
 The analysis of this study is consistent with the instrumental stakeholder theory, 
which asserts that companies’ participation in the CSR related initiatives can lead to 
improved financial performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995). Especially, 
Jones (1995) argues that firms control their agency and transaction costs by improving 
stakeholder relationships. For the stakeholders, news such as any corporate 
announcement or changes in the index is a key source for evaluating the firms’ 
performance. Stakeholders tend to react to the related information as it can have a 
significant impact on firms’ long-term performance. The positive difference in the 
operating performance of the FTSE4Good companies may be perceived as a way to 
improve stakeholder confidence.  
 Our results are consistent with previous studies (Demetriades and Auret, 2014; 
Shen and Chang, 2009; Lopez, 2007) that examine the performance of CSR and non-CSR 
companies, and suggests that the CSR firm performs better than the non-CSR firms. 
Compared to prior studies (Demetriades and Auret, 2014; Lopez, 2007), I use more robust 




comparison approach of firm’s specific/micro-characteristics for selecting the matching 
benchmarks to ensure the sterilisation of CSR effect. By doing so, I control the sample to 
improve the reliability of the analysis of the CSR impact. For example, comparing the 
performance of the FTSE4Good company with companies from the same industry, size, 
etc. I provide a more robust analysis. Shen and Chang (2009) used sales, assets, income 
factors and management abilities as a matching criterion. However, not all these factors 
necessarily reflect firms’ intensity of implementing CSR. For example, companies with 
similar sales, income and similar management structure/abilities do not necessarily 
determine the level of CSR strategies. On the contrary, CSR intensity can vary by factors 
such as a type of industry they are operating, the company size and growth (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998; Brammer and Millington, 2008;). I do not 
also limit our analysis to CSR against non-CSR firms, but I further extend our analysis in 
the examination of both cases of addition/deletion from the CSR index. Compared to 
Becchetti et al., (2008), the current study not only examines the long-term effect of CSR 
deletions but also compare the performance of CSR-deletion to their matched benchmark. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This study extends the current literature on the link between the CSR-CFP by 
examining the impact of CSR on firms’ long-term operating performance. I use the 
FTSE4Good index’s additions and deletions as a proxy for CSR performance, where 
addition in the index can reflect high CSR performance and vice versa. Firms’ association 
with a socially responsible index (SRI) is a strong indication of their commitment, 
dedication and investment to the environment, society and community. Hence, consistent 
with the instrument stakeholder theory, I argue that the operating performance of 




companies added in the FTSE4Good index is higher than that of the matched firms that 
are not listed in the FTSE4Good index. By utilising a large cross-country data sample, 
our result concludes that the CSR firms perform better than their non-CSR counterparts. 
Regarding the addition effect, I find the mixed result (some indicators increase 
significantly, but others are not). However, in the case of deletions, this event can have a 
detrimental effect on the operating performance of the firm as the performance difference 
appears to deteriorate significantly in the period after the deletion from the socially 
responsible index. In my view, this decline in operating performance is attributed to 
stakeholders potentially penalising companies on negative CSR performance through; the 
consumer is boycotting their products and services, employees leaving jobs, investor 
withdrawing their funds, suppliers stop supplies, regulatory bodies imposing huge fines, 
etc.  
 The results of this study have important implication for several interested parties 
and organisations. Prior literature suggests that stakeholders tend to follow CSR related 
information very carefully and react accordingly. Hence, positive changes will be 
welcomed (rewarded), and any unfavourable changes in CSR-performance will be 
punished heavily. The results of this study report, for example, a positive change in the 
liquidity and efficiency for the CSR firms. Such variations in firms’ liquidity performance 
can lead to increased confidence in their suppliers and finance providers. From an 
investors’ point of view, information regarding changes in the CSR index membership 
not only affects current performance but can also affect future performance and prospect 
of such firms. 
On the contrary, the significant decline in the operating performance following 
the deletions from the CSR index can adversely affect the stakeholders’ trust, confidence 




and the firms’ overall reputation. Hence, one of the most valuable lessons for corporate 
executives is that consistency in the CSR engagement/investment is vital. Firms’ 
engagement in CSR-related initiatives and investment should be viewed as a cornerstone 
of long-term business success. 





Table 4. 1 Accounting measures of Operating Performance 
Accounting indicators Description  
Operating Profit Margin Operating profit margin is the percentage of a firm’s EBIT relative to net sales reported by 
company i at year t, calculated as; 
 
Operating Cash Flow per 
Sales 
Operating cash flow per sale is the ratio of operating cash flow divided by the net sales of a 
company i at year t and calculated as: 
 
Current Ratio The current ratio is the ratio of current assets divided by the current liabilities of a company i 
at year t and calculated as  
 




Total Debt Total Capital Total debt to total capital is the percentage of a firm’s total debt relative to total capital 
reported by company i at year t, calculated as;  
 
Return on Invested Capital The Return on Invested Capital is the percentage of firms’ operating profit (EBIT) to total 








Table 4. 2 Models of calculating abnormal operating performance 
Model Abnormal operating performance Description/comparison group  
1 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
1  Level of difference to matching industry 
median. 
2 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
2  Level of difference to matching industry-size. 
3 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
3  Level of difference to matching industry-B/M. 
4 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
4  The level of difference to matching size decile 
portfolio. 
5 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
5  The level of difference to matching B/M decile 
portfolio. 
6 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
6  The level of difference to matching 
Momentum decile portfolio. 
7 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
1  The difference between yearly operating 
performance change of sample firm and annual 
operating performance change of matching 
industry median.  
8 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
2  The difference between yearly operating 
performance change of sample firm and annual 
operating performance change of matching 
industry-size. 
9 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
3  The difference between yearly operating 
performance change of sample firm and annual 
operating performance change of matching 
industry-B/M. 
10 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
4  The difference between yearly operating 
performance change of sample firm and annual 
operating performance change of size decile 
portfolio. 
11 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
5  The difference between yearly operating 
performance change of sample firm and annual 
operating performance change of B/M decile 
portfolio. 
12 𝐴𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = Δ𝑃𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑃𝑁𝐹4𝐺𝑖,𝑡
6  The difference between yearly operating 
performance change of sample firm and annual 
operating performance change of Momentum 
decile portfolio. 




Table 4. 3 Descriptive statistics of FTSE4Good index companies and their non-FTSE4Good benchmark at the year of addition. 
  Size-matched Industry-matched Momentum-matched PTBV-matched Industry & Size matched  Industry & PTBV 
matched  
  FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH 
Cash Flow Per Sales 
 Mean 14.14 12.43 14.16 7.42 14.12 8.07 14.00 6.52 13.71 13.74 13.98 -7.16 
 Median 12.41 11.71 12.19 6.51 12.34 7.09 12.27 7.27 11.57 11.47 11.67 9.01 
 Std. Dev. 12.07 4.01 17.03 10.89 16.80 6.00 16.61 10.04 14.53 13.90 15.51 153.53 
 
Skewness 
0.49 0.75 -2.06 -7.99 -2.10 -0.74 -2.23 -5.84 -1.16 0.50 -1.90 -10.43 
 Kurtosis 5.49 3.49 33.87 118.81 34.14 28.80 35.32 47.88 31.50 12.96 43.29 119.41 
Jarque-
Bera 
179.61*** 63.04*** 23554.44*** 332012.2*** 25010.93*** 16914.54*** 26965.21*** 54481.4*** 16489.53*** 2019.76*** 28735.66*** 245362.4*** 
n 605 605 583 583 608 608 608 608 484 484 421 421 
Current Ratio 
 Mean 1.55 1.42 1.59 1.56 1.60 1.55 1.61 1.61 1.54 1.78 1.54 2.68 
 Median 1.36 1.43 1.37 1.54 1.36 1.49 1.36 1.49 1.38 1.39 1.37 1.51 
 Std. Dev. 0.77 0.21 0.84 0.46 0.90 0.28 0.92 0.46 0.75 1.26 0.75 6.15 
 
Skewness 
1.33 -0.16 1.48 0.57 1.78 0.51 1.84 1.70 1.20 2.17 1.23 8.71 
 Kurtosis 5.31 3.37 5.79 3.60 7.20 3.89 7.51 8.69 4.69 8.29 5.01 90.50 
Jarque-
Bera 
264.38*** 4.92*** 337.01*** 33.70*** 650.06*** 38.76*** 727.88*** 941.41*** 149.27*** 810.19*** 157.77*** 124031.9*** 
n 511 511 489 489 515 515 514 514 416 416 374 374 
Tot l Debt to Total Capital 
 Mean 38.01 34.94 38.34 27.62 38.27 29.34 38.26 29.21 37.45 37.84 37.28 32.60 
 Median 37.25 35.43 37.46 27.01 37.25 28.03 37.23 28.93 36.98 34.31 37.09 30.81 
 Std. Dev. 25.64 8.97 25.88 16.95 26.08 11.20 26.11 13.34 25.36 29.50 25.84 26.44 
 
Skewness 
0.26 0.49 0.26 0.71 0.33 0.65 0.33 0.31 0.30 1.86 0.29 0.52 
 Kurtosis 2.24 4.38 2.25 3.83 2.47 4.55 2.46 3.71 2.37 13.12 2.23 2.52 
Jarque-
Bera 
21.23*** 72.52*** 19.35*** 61.72*** 18.33*** 102.34*** 18.38*** 22.33*** 15.44*** 2332.46*** 16.62*** 23.65*** 
n 603 603 550 550 605 605 604 604 482 482 433 433 
Operating Margin 
 Mean 11.89 10.03 12.14 3.22 12.02 5.56 12.00 3.29 11.71 11.43 11.61 -13.43 
 Median 9.76 9.08 9.68 4.79 9.73 5.28 9.71 5.81 9.42 9.50 9.34 7.03 
 Std. Dev. 10.63 3.70 12.04 19.51 12.27 6.50 12.27 15.37 11.31 11.45 11.06 187.37 
 
Skewness 
1.05 0.52 1.09 -9.17 1.27 -3.64 1.27 -6.91 1.14 -1.85 1.05 -11.47 
 Kurtosis 5.84 2.56 7.27 98.84 10.08 46.95 10.09 56.86 7.66 30.32 7.61 144.33 
Jarque-
Bera 
313.73*** 32.52*** 562.05*** 232495.1*** 1429.66*** 50192.61*** 1436.99*** 78203.29*** 545.02*** 15356.67*** 454.45*** 363848.3*** 
n 604 604 586 586 607 607 607 607 485 485 426 426 
 






  Size-matched Industry-matched Momentum-matched PTBV-matched Industry & Size matched  Industry & PTBV 
matched  
  FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH 
ROIC 
 Mean 7.67 6.96 7.51 3.78 7.65 4.62 7.65 4.29 7.98 7.78 7.73 5.64 
 Median 6.32 6.05 6.06 4.24 6.28 4.46 6.30 5.14 6.13 6.10 5.91 6.18 
 Std. Dev. 14.16 3.07 14.41 5.08 14.14 4.16 14.16 7.20 13.37 8.33 11.89 15.87 
 Skewness -0.71 0.58 -0.71 -2.10 -0.70 -2.03 -0.70 -2.81 1.24 0.91 3.89 -2.35 
 Kurtosis 42.11 2.69 41.74 10.34 42.13 14.85 42.07 14.97 43.37 7.56 39.21 20.60 
Jarque-Bera 37708.43*** 35.30*** 34681.61*** 1653.02*** 37880.63*** 3877.37*** 37693.08*** 4313.09*** 30736.39*** 453.99*** 22341.39*** 5405.54*** 
n 591 591 554 554 593 593 592 592 451 451 391 391 
Working Capital Growth 
 Mean -0.23 0.02 -0.15 0.01 -0.20 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.17 -0.08 -0.18 -0.31 
 Median 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 Std. Dev. 1.79 0.10 1.55 1.83 1.68 0.11 1.79 0.17 1.48 1.44 1.69 4.05 
 Skewness -3.80 -1.26 -2.84 -2.44 -3.53 -1.72 -3.79 7.07 -1.83 -0.44 -2.84 -6.00 
 Kurtosis 32.70 11.72 29.08 66.34 33.23 9.99 32.66 108.77 21.73 15.67 26.94 70.45 
Jarque-Bera 19769.95*** 1735.28*** 14067.04*** 79694.01*** 20438.33*** 1285.26*** 19797.77*** 240536.5*** 6085.72*** 2696.51*** 8879.87*** 68836.54*** 
n 505 505 474 474 509 509 507 507 401 401 352 352 
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 4. 4 Descriptive statistics of FTSE4Good index companies and their non-FTSE4Good benchmark at the year of deletion. 
  Size-matched Industry-matched Momentum-matched PTBV-matched Industry & Size 
matched  
Industry & PTBV 
matched  
  FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH 
Cash Flow Per Sales 
 Mean 13.46 13.218 12.856 6.67 13.258 6.965 13.214 6.9 12.639 14.007 13.076 -10.527 
 Median 11.47 13.565 10.79 6.41 11.56 7.47 11.47 8.35 10.31 11.78 10.52 8.43 
 Std. Dev. 16.446 4.255 17.144 12.763 16.862 8.049 16.866 11.658 15.169 12.939 15.068 144.19 
 Skewness 3.225 0.461 2.692 -4.239 2.636 -2.306 2.641 -5.844 3.289 -0.435 4.459 -8.326 
 Kurtosis 35.063 3.754 32.156 34.177 32.456 12.5 32.449 46.572 40.552 10.784 44.429 73.935 
Jarque-Bera 13503.65*** 17.9*** 10841.96*** 12874.71*** 11603.21*** 1445.16*** 11599.81*** 26372.49*** 13989.49*** 590.5*** 14965.82*** 44241.85*** 
n 303 303 296 296 311 311 311 311 231 231 200 200 
Current Ratio 
 Mean 1.679 1.526 1.639 1.566 1.673 1.596 1.674 1.738 1.626 1.832 1.619 2.144 
 Median 1.455 1.53 1.445 1.54 1.455 1.6 1.45 1.66 1.435 1.51 1.46 1.71 
 Std. Dev. 0.895 0.244 0.797 0.45 0.888 0.268 0.887 0.483 0.75 1.134 0.722 1.678 
 Skewness 1.559 0.56 1.381 0.67 1.588 0.038 1.588 0.49 1.128 1.715 1.213 2.329 
 Kurtosis 6.157 4.168 5.35 4.299 6.284 3.3 6.298 6.559 4.238 6.252 4.673 9.618 
Jarque-Bera 216.56*** 28.81*** 140.22*** 37.13*** 233.05*** 1.07 234.97*** 152.7*** 55.17*** 186.21*** 64.81*** 488.44*** 
n 264 264 256 256 268 268 269 269 200 200 179 179 
Total Debt to Total Capital 
 Mean 40.402 33.551 40.901 23.448 39.779 26.36 39.867 25.084 39.663 35.776 39.279 31.163 
 Median 39.58 33.77 39.82 25.13 39.742 25.93 39.75 24.81 39.22 33.18 39.16 26.365 
 Std. Dev. 26.327 7.942 26.58 13 23.899 10.922 23.807 12.515 25.029 27.027 23.797 28.904 
 Skewness 1.203 0.498 1.215 0.238 0.196 0.544 0.201 0.406 0.823 0.611 0.196 0.619 
 Kurtosis 8.126 4.742 8.092 3.301 2.412 4.222 2.424 4.066 5.898 2.719 2.452 2.799 
Jarque-Bera 410.14*** 51.47*** 389.94*** 3.88 6.52** 34.9*** 6.43*** 23.42*** 107.4*** 15.21*** 3.94 13.61*** 
n 307 307 294 294 313 313 313 313 232 232 208 208 
Operating Margin 
 Mean 9.082 10.634 8.605 3.57 9.254 3.33 9.202 3.55 9.214 11.266 8.536 -9.531 
 Median 8.755 11.13 8.32 4.235 8.875 4.828 8.845 5.86 8.32 8.5 8.12 5.52 
 Std. Dev. 13.406 3.787 13.975 11.631 11.922 10.361 11.917 14.172 11.304 10.479 11.72 138.46 
 Skewness -2.922 -0.086 -2.829 -4.841 -1.069 -3.148 -1.06 -6.464 -0.199 1.314 -1.585 -9.84 
 Kurtosis 28.801 2.379 25.706 41.187 11.71 14.656 11.714 51.127 7.476 5.267 14.093 101.404 
Jarque-Bera 8864.5*** 5.26* 6730.54*** 19076.6*** 1038.97*** 2266.91*** 1038.73*** 32076.76*** 191.02*** 113.91*** 1103.58*** 83502.92*** 
n 304 304 295 295 310 310 310 310 227 227 199 199 
 




Table 4.4 (cont.) 
  Size-matched Industry-matched Momentum-matched PTBV-matched Industry & Size matched  Industry & PTBV 
matched  
  FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH FTSE4G BENCH 
ROIC             
 Mean 4.689 7.828 4.425 3.561 4.631 3.295 4.603 3.898 5.523 8.41 4.292 2.15 
 Median 5.63 8.3 5.38 4.72 5.585 4.195 5.49 5.363 5.82 7.34 5.115 5.15 
 Std. Dev. 11.819 3.303 12.013 5.769 16.421 5.684 16.414 7.971 10.455 9.64 10.39 19.308 
 
Skewness 
-1.288 0.068 -1.229 -1.924 0.311 -2.051 0.316 -3.504 -0.627 0.548 -1.792 -4.58 
 Kurtosis 8.132 2.434 7.733 7.623 37.389 8.236 37.455 19.059 6.654 5.078 9.52 33.468 
Jarque-
Bera 
399.69*** 4.11 337.8*** 429.65*** 14688.62*** 549.23*** 14745.06*** 3811.63*** 133.69*** 49.46*** 415.15*** 7591.33*** 
n 291 291 285 285 298 298 298 298 215 215 180 180 
Working Capital 
Growth 
       
    
 Mean -0.244 0.034 -0.23 0.133 -0.262 -0.031 -0.262 -0.001 -0.273 0.167 -0.149 0.128 
 Median -0.027 0.048 -0.021 -0.009 -0.032 0.009 -0.032 0.022 -0.021 0.044 -0.034 0.024 
 Std. Dev. 3.067 0.091 3.104 5.945 3.052 0.135 3.052 0.152 3.491 1.579 2.622 0.939 
 
Skewness 
-4.524 -0.163 -4.507 3.125 -4.509 -1.505 -4.509 2.904 -4.099 0.482 0.042 2.674 
 Kurtosis 60.44 12.055 59.544 79.654 60.626 6.666 60.626 39.794 48.359 19.433 28.443 24.725 
Jarque-
Bera 
36347.84*** 882.51*** 34151.47*** 61613.77*** 37139.15*** 245.62*** 37139.46*** 15147.5*** 16997.37*** 2167.71*** 4504.33*** 3483.1*** 
n 258 258 250 250 262 262 262 262 192 192 167 167 
 









Table 4. 5 One dimensional mean differential operating performance of companies added in the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
Time Industry Median-matched Momentum-matched Size-matched PTBV-matched 
µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test 
Operating Margin 
t=0 9.650 11.390*** -16.899*** 6.941 14.167*** -15.787*** 2.029 5.506*** -2.831*** 9.336 12.836*** -15.777*** 
t+12 9.544 8.548*** -15.730*** 6.878 12.920*** -14.963*** 1.732 4.345*** -2.299*   9.163 11.555*** -14.836*** 
t+24 7.644 13.176*** -15.346*** 6.467 14.824*** -14.817*** 2.465 6.037*** -4.453*** 9.886 11.003*** -14.688*** 
t+36 7.685 11.158*** -14.499*** 6.163 11.431*** -13.508*** 2.607 6.103*** -4.902*** 8.466 10.338*** -13.501*** 
Cash Flow Per sales  
t=0 10.614 8.241*** -15.854*** 6.609 11.825*** -14.850*** 2.043 4.763*** -3.362*** 8.459 12.645*** -15.542*** 
t+12 8.82 9.407*** -15.391*** 6.767 12.760*** -15.110*** 2.389 6.101*** -4.296*** 8.208 12.235*** -14.856*** 
t+24 9.039 9.727*** -14.326*** 7.044 11.818*** -14.346*** 2.822 6.444*** -4.947*** 9.64 11.041*** -14.418*** 
t+36 8.949 6.312*** -13.142*** 6.513 6.984*** -13.731*** 2.63 5.022*** -4.254*** 8.126 7.766*** -13.488*** 
Current Ratio 
t=0 -0.059 -1.949** -3.338*** -0.003 -0.102 -3.550*** 0.108 3.820*** -1.109 -0.068 -1.851 -4.541*** 
t+12 -0.029 -0.822 -2.530**   0.014 0.425 -2.395**   0.156 4.851*** -1.928 -0.02 -0.577 -3.230*** 
t+24 -0.047 -1.26 -3.044*** 0.033 0.949 -2.532**   0.151 4.555*** -1.980*   0.002 0.052 -2.720*** 
t+36 -0.018 -0.508 -2.720*** 0.015 0.407 -2.800*** 0.163 4.650*** -1.863 0.02 0.503 -2.485*   
Working Capital Growth 
t=0 0.365 3.080*** -4.854*** -0.18 -2.442**   -2.350**   -0.228 -2.990*** -3.823*** -0.201 -2.661*** -2.293**   
t+12 0.26 1.63 -2.840*** -0.092 -0.86 -0.363 -0.17 -1.304 -0.672 -0.096 -0.89 -0.378 
t+24 0.15 0.797 -1.227 0.066 0.764 -0.100 0.063 0.719 -0.091 0.065 0.744 -0.029 
t+36 0.135 1.408 -2.743*** -0.074 -1.066 -1.452 -0.078 -1.122 -1.295 -0.081 -1.158 -1.648 
Total Debt to Total Capital 
t=0 -0.001 -0.04 -0.82 9.587 10.800*** -9.425*** 2.59 3.040*** -2.292*   10.251 10.635*** -9.606*** 
t+12 0.014 1.164 -0.88 9.008 9.801*** -8.399*** 2.174 2.420**   -1.413 9.697 9.776*** -8.575*** 
t+24 0.01 0.745 -1.145 8.062 8.487*** -7.289*** 1.364 1.471 -0.641 8.686 8.696*** -7.561*** 
t+36 0.027 2.368**   -3.449*** 8.176 8.224*** -6.768*** 1.435 1.497 -0.639 8.671 8.341*** -7.184*** 
ROIC             
t=0 5.055 9.636*** -11.179*** 3.039 7.073*** -10.872*** 0.444 0.982 -1.045 3.568 6.693*** -8.222*** 
t+12 4.342 11.984*** -12.011*** 2.971 10.662*** -11.152*** 0.791 2.841*** -2.515**   3.023 8.545*** -8.134*** 
t+24 4.636 10.390*** -10.439*** 3.254 10.338*** -11.092*** 0.954 3.081*** -3.358*** 3.204 8.809*** -8.988*** 
t+36 4.482 9.206*** -9.974*** 2.994 8.803*** -9.501*** 0.876 2.957*** -3.059*** 2.809 7.213*** -7.471*** 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
















      
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Time Matched industry and size Matched industry and PTBV 
µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test 
Operating Margin 
t=0 1.351 2.129**   -1.642 33.494 4.503*** -8.306*** 
t+12 3.233 1.968**   -1.294 145.352 2.207**   -6.736*** 
t+24 1.33 1.423 -1.887* 20.283 3.481*** -6.049*** 
t+36 1.091 1.348 -1.229 49.945 2.038**   -6.488*** 
Cash Flow Per sales  
t=0 1.41 1.96* -1.877 26.233 3.840*** -8.100*** 
t+12 2.893 1.906* -2.064**   78.337 2.363**   -7.522*** 
t+24 1.431 1.553 -1.139 16.747 3.126*** -6.759*** 
t+36 0.805 1.055 -0.863 37.884 2.216**   -7.051*** 
Current Ratio 
t=0 -0.274 -5.141*** -3.355*** -1.098 -4.799*** -5.484*** 
t+12 -0.101 -2.176**   -1.528 -0.499 -5.043*** -4.293*** 
t+24 -0.118 -2.307**  -1.734 -0.666 -4.707*** -4.246*** 
t+36 -0.088 -1.634 -1.295 -0.543 -5.259*** -4.116*** 
Working Capital Growth 
t=0 -0.094 -1.097 -1.85* 0.124 0.713 -1.17 
t+12 -0.114 -0.904 -0.587 -0.109 -0.764 -1.408 
t+24 0.113 0.902 -0.2 0.272 1.639 -1.057 
t+36 -0.206 -1.454 -1.486 -0.037 -0.356 -1.015 
Total Debt to Total Capital 
t=0 1.189 1.019 -1.78 5.358 4.478*** -4.770*** 
t+12 1.537 1.309 -1.504 5.243 3.941*** -4.117*** 
t+24 -0.642 -0.504 -0.048 3.619 2.499**   -3.166*** 
t+36 1.984 0.66 -0.55 4.412 3.045*** -3.073*** 
ROIC 
t=0 -0.027 -0.055 -0.049 5.477 5.632*** -3.067*** 
t+12 0.216 0.572 -0.162 5.529 4.902*** -3.075*** 
t+24 0.503 1.253 -1.51 5.461 4.521*** -2.673*** 
t+36 0.037 0.094 -0.575 2.769 3.955*** -3.195*** 




Table 4. 7 One dimensional mean differential operating performance of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
Time Industry Median-matched Momentum-matched Size-matched PTBV-matched 
µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test µ-diff. t-value Sign Z test 
Operating Margin 
t=0 5.160 4.961*** -9.358*** 6.727 10.297*** -11.203*** -1.296 -1.854 -2.523**   6.395 6.516*** -8.323*** 
t+12 4.351 5.197*** -8.375*** 5.312 9.370*** -9.895*** -1.962 -3.045*** -2.935*** 4.707 5.598*** -7.233*** 
t+24 5.269 5.605*** -8.658*** 5.748 10.501*** -9.930*** -1.056 -1.737 -1.777 6.186 6.734*** -7.829*** 
t+36 5.188 5.008*** -7.965*** 4.475 5.532*** -8.520*** -1.137 -1.476 -0.795 4.777 4.717*** -7.214*** 
Cash Flow Per sales  
t=0 6.879 3.224*** -8.899*** 5.732 4.391*** -9.977*** -0.654 -0.511 -0.921 5.733 3.900*** -8.117*** 
t+12 5.595 3.970*** -6.461*** 5.154 6.705*** -9.024*** 4.163 0.885 -1.180 4.620 5.202*** -6.911*** 
t+24 14.125 2.077**   -7.986*** 4.995 6.844*** -9.434*** 0.066 0.093 -0.273 5.206 5.504*** -7.750*** 
t+36 6.861 2.526**   -7.808*** 9.873 1.639 -8.026*** 5.196 0.847 -0.315 9.835 1.605 -6.665*** 
Current Ratio 
t=0 0.001 -0.007 -1.167 0.061 1.281 -1.884 0.152 3.023*** -0.129 -0.080 -1.603 -4.052*** 
t+12 0.013 0.288 -0.640 0.044 0.871 -1.283 0.117 2.329**   -0.164 -0.036 -0.697 -2.910*** 
t+24 -0.028 -0.654 -2.190**   -0.025 -0.538 -2.526**   0.058 1.264 -0.517 -0.094 -1.882 -3.730*** 
t+36 -0.064 -0.378 -2.270**   -0.020 -0.369 -2.827*** 0.162 2.630*** -0.087 -0.055 -0.98 -3.125*** 
Working Capital Growth 
t=0 -0.402 -1.292 -2.359**   -0.253 -1.808 -1.542 -0.305 -2.161**   -3.614*** -0.281 -2.001**  -2.612*** 
t+12 -0.264 -1.686 -2.707*** -0.088 -0.608 -0.495 -0.114 -1.442 -1.579 -0.116 -0.796 -1.552 
t+24 -0.218 -1.756 -2.489**   0.045 0.574 -1.091 -0.008 -0.186 -0.011 0.031 0.391 -0.553 
t+36 -0.978 -0.859 -1.465 0.011 0.075 -0.816 -0.081 -0.970 -0.672 -0.079 -0.606 -0.040 
Total Debt to Total Capital 
t=0 -0.047 -3.658*** -4.255*** 14.811 11.899*** -10.223*** 8.577 6.337*** -5.493*** 15.712 12.287*** -10.495*** 
t+12 -0.032 -1.868 -3.639*** 15.916 11.487*** -9.823*** 8.157 5.996*** -5.159*** 16.137 11.526*** -9.759*** 
t+24 -0.047 -3.655*** -3.473*** 14.705 10.275*** -8.914*** 6.559 4.748*** -3.963*** 14.796 10.239*** -8.682*** 
t+36 -0.065 -3.765*** -4.733*** 13.029 8.839*** -7.722*** 4.799 3.265*** -2.449**   13.342 9.002*** -7.628*** 
ROIC 
t=0 2.413 3.700*** -3.981*** 2.012 2.670*** -5.436*** -2.646 -4.564*** -5.016*** 1.327 1.454 -2.316**   
t+12 1.686 2.467**   -4.249*** 2.432 5.342*** -5.983*** -2.103 -4.099*** -3.583*** 1.279 2.331**   -2.765*** 
t+24 2.898 4.955*** -5.184*** 2.501 5.097*** -6.470*** -1.218 -2.494**   -1.480 1.600 2.954*** -4.062*** 
t+36 3.001 4.453*** -5.229*** 2.599 4.528*** -6.006*** -0.793 -1.332 -0.502 1.906 3.059*** -4.173*** 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 4. 8 Two-dimensional mean differential operating performance of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
Time Matched industry and size Matched industry and PTBV 
m-diff. t-value Sign Z test m-diff. t-value Sign Z test 
Operating Margin 
t=0 -2.300 -2.771*** -3.108*** 38.470 3.109*** -4.533*** 
t+12 -1.815 -1.872* -1.999**   20.355 3.264*** -5.200*** 
t+24 -1.062 -0.790 -0.769 40.698 2.182**   -5.610*** 
t+36 -1.139 -1.107 -0.319 18.430 2.443*   -4.468*** 
Cash Flow Per sales  
t=0 -1.143 -1.098 -1.744 33.769 3.325*** -5.447*** 
t+12 -2.320 -2.306**   -2.606*** 6.102 2.105**   -3.729*** 
t+24 -1.401 -0.878 -0.603 38.693 1.863 -5.264*** 
t+36 -3.432 -1.899 -1.105 27.077 2.455**   -4.577*** 
Current Ratio 
t=0 -0.201 -2.817*** -2.814*** -0.432 -4.244*** -3.155*** 
t+12 -0.142 -1.937* -1.063 -0.529 -4.243*** -3.101*** 
t+24 -0.269 -3.580*** -2.497**   -0.503 -4.779*** -3.496*** 
t+36 -0.136 -1.787 -1.259 -1.080 -3.255*** -3.300*** 
Working Capital Growth 
t=0 -0.466 -2.506**   -2.232*   -0.443 -2.383**   -2.519**   
t+12 -0.137 -1.146 -1.676 -0.919 -2.121**   -2.060**   
t+24 -0.112 -1.367 -0.470 0.015 0.172 -0.013 
t+36 0.168 1.320 -1.983**   0.163 1.345 -2.206**   
Total Debt to Total Capital 
t=0 7.427 4.504*** -4.725*** 9.795 4.965*** -5.429*** 
t+12 5.562 3.145*** -3.587*** 8.659 4.370*** -4.326*** 
t+24 4.024 2.158**   -2.599*** 7.039 3.518*** -3.312*** 
t+36 2.735 1.446 -1.421 6.126 2.589**   -2.542**   
ROIC 
t=0 -2.953 -4.415*** -3.813*** 2.926 1.945 -1.190 
t+12 -3.043 -4.004*** -3.376*** 2.842 2.312**   -2.682*** 
t+24 -1.316 -1.848 -1.253 3.945 3.617*** -3.553*** 
t+36 -1.204 -1.699 -1.019 3.822 2.666*** -2.215**   
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Chapter 5: The impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
stock return: evidence from FTSE4Good Global index. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, companies are putting 
significant resources and effort into issues like corporate governance, social responsibility 
and sustainability. Firms engagement in these issues is influencing corporate success 
because they improve firms’ intangible assets, such as their reputation and goodwill. Non-
financial performance, such as that on corporate social responsibility issues, is one of the 
key ways to maintain and improve corporate reputation (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). The 
primary objective of CSR is to satisfy organisational stakeholders by addressing their 
needs and expectations. It is imperative for all companies to set their objectives consistent 
with stakeholders’ expectations and maintain a strong relationship with them in order to 
improve their corporate reputation in the community and society.   
Since corporate reputation is vital for success, companies communicate their CSR 
commitments, investment and performance to win stakeholders’ confidence and loyalty 
to ensure success. In recent years, companies are keen to be associated with and become 
listed in one of the socially responsible indexes such as the FTSE4Good, DJSI, MSCI, 
etc. Socially responsible indices (SRI thereafter) are becoming popular among 
stakeholders as they reflect the socially responsible performance of firms through ranking 
and rating. Company’s addition in such a social index is assumed to be a good CSR 
indicator of commitment and performance. Being added (or even the announcement 
regarding firms’ potential membership within a social index) signals strong CSR 
performance (Flower and Hope, 2007) and it is the most convenient source of firm’s 




performance on related social issues (Corderio and Tewari, 2015). Social indices’ 
information also reduces possible information asymmetry regarding firms CSR 
performance (Du et al., 2017; Corderio and Tewari, 2015). To this extent, the 
announcement of possible index changes further signals the managerial vision toward the 
firm’s future and could lead to changes in the investors' perception towards those firms.  
In the past, studies have examined the impact of CSR events (including index 
addition) on the firm’s financial performance. Extant studies have examined the impact 
of firms’ addition and deletion on short-term market return and have reported a mixed 
conclusion (Becchetti et al.,2012; Lurenco et al., 2012; Cheung, 2012; Doh et al.,2010; 
Curran and Moran, 2007)16. A limited number of studies also focuses on the UK setting 
(Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Curran and Moran, 2007), Germany (Obrendorfer et 
al.,2013), and rest of the world (Park and Lee, 2018; Nakai et al.,2013) with most of these 
studies short-term stock performance consequent upon social index changes. To the best 
of my knowledge, there are limited studies that have examined long-term stock 
performance after social index changes. For example, Robinson et al. (2011) report a 
positive cumulative stock return in 60 days after the addition in DJSI. The finding of 
Robinson et al., (2011) is corroborated by Park and Lee, (2018), who reported the 
significant positive return of 33.8% in 36 months from addition in SRI Korea. On the 
contrary, according to Kappu and Oikonomou (2016), there are no significant changes in 
the stock price in 15 days and 125 days subsequent addition of firms in the MSCI KLD 
400 index. In the case of deletions, the authors report a significant negative return up to 
 
16 These studies are within the index configuration and are country specific using 
primarily US data. 




14% in 125 days after the deletion announcement and corroborated by Park and Lee 
(2018), who report significant negative stock return in 6 months and 30 months after the 
deletion forms the index. Such variance in the result could be due to the number of factors 
considered in the individual study. One of the notable differences between Robinson et 
al. (2011) and Kappu and Oikonomou (2016) is the estimated window adopted. Kappu 
and Oikonomou (2016) use estimation period between t+125 days and T+375 days as an 
estimation window, whereas Robinson et al., (2011) use period between t-60 days and t-
1 days. Also, both studies use the cumulative average abnormal return to calculate the 
long-term return.  
Studies examining the impact of SRI index addition and deletion on firms’ 
performance have a primary focus on the short-term stock return with limited attention to 
long-term stock performances. Also, most of the previous studies are focused on the US 
with limited use of the data outside the US. Still, there are numbers of issues remain 
unexamined, for example, do investors enjoy an additional premium in long-term for 
investing in the companies branded as good CSR performers? Do investors’ reaction to 
CSR performance varies across the region/countries? These issues need to examine 
comprehensively using a holistic approach since the awareness and popularity of social 
and responsible business practice is spreading rapidly all over the world and the degree 
of companies’ involvement in CSR can vary depending on the countries/region of 
operation (Moon, 2004). 
In this study, I extended the investigation of short-term reaction to the long-term 
impact of the CSR index on stock return. This is because companies’ investment in CSR 
gives them a competitive advantage in the long term (Porter and Kramer, 2011) and 
enhances long-term shareholder value by minimising potential corporate risk and costs 




(Waddock, 2002; Smith, 2005).  To do so, I utilise an event study methodology firstly 
examining a short term impact of SRI addition-deletion announcements using the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) model. I further extend my analysis on long 
term stock return using buy-hold abnormal return (BHAR) to examine the possible SRI 
addition hedge. To do so, I collect a dataset of the events/changes announcement from 
the FTSE4Good Global Index, which consists of companies from 26 countries that 
demonstrate strong ESG/CSR compliance in their business practices. The sample consists 
of companies from the Asia Pacific, Europe, and North America. I analyse short-term 
CAAR before and after the event and calculate post-event buy and hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) for up to 240 working days for addition and 210 days in case of deleted 
companies. The short-term stock return investigation reports statistically significant 
negative abnormal return immediately after the addition announcement (during T+3 
days). The cross-country analysis reveals short-term stock performance, for the firms, 
especially in the UK, USA, Germany, Australia and the rest of Europe, results which are 
statistically significant at 5% level. In the short term, investors tend to penalise the firm’s 
association/addition to the social index. In the case of the SRI deleted companies, no 
definite pattern emerged from the cross-country analysis. However, in the case of the 
companies form the UK and Japan, the results report a negative and statistically 
significant CAARs after the deletion from the SRI index.  
This study also confirms that the short-term negative return for added companies 
is temporary. My examination on the impact of addition on firms’ long-term stock return 
reports a positive and statistically significant BHARs for the period up to 240 days. Hence 
an investor could enjoy a premium up to a maximum of 4.41% within 240 trading days 
after the firms’ addition in the social index. Similarly, a minimum of 1.39% abnormal 




return is reported for the first 90 trading days. On the other hand, in the case of the firms 
deleted from the social index tend to experience negative return up to 30 trading day from 
the event day but positive return afterwards. However, the positive returns are not 
statistically significant except for the first 150 trading days.  
This study makes the following contributions to CSR-CFP relationship literature. 
First, prior studies examining the stock performance associated with the changes in the 
socially responsible index composition mainly focused on the short-term stock returns. I 
am among the first studies to reveal significant positive long-run stock returns after the 
addition in the CSR index. The result of this study confirms that firms’ initiatives in the 
CSR pay off in the long-term. I also extend the current CSR-CFP literature by examining 
cross-country data and revealing investor reaction to the CSR announcement in the short 
term and as well as long term across all geographical locations.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In following section 5.2, I discuss 
the relevant literature within the social index configuration. The   theoretical perspective, 
as well as the hypotheses, are introduced in section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the data and 
methodologies. Section 5.5 presents the main findings, and finally, Section 5.6 discusses 
and concludes this chapter.  
 
5.2. Literature Review  
Although CSR is voluntary, broader criticisms of companies’ irresponsible and 
unethical acts have led firms to publish their policies, commitment, participation and 
performance regarding several social, ethical and environmental and/or expenditure . The 
CSR disclosure trend is increasing significantly in the recent years (KPMG, 2016, 2013) 
as stakeholders are explicitly demanding the transparency of policies, investment, and 




commitments made by the companies towards ensuring a positive impact on the society. 
Companies are using several methods of reporting CSR, including annual reports, website 
and sustainability reports which they make available to the public. The introduction of 
CSR reporting guidelines such as Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) and the United 
Nation Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) has made a significant 
contribution to standardising CSR disclosure. However, CSR reporting quality and 
credibility is still a much-debated topic in CSR literature due to the complex measurement 
process that requires high skill, expert knowledge and high cost. 
Stakeholders are out of reach to the quality and reliable CSR performance report. 
They must rely on either companies’ report17  or through third-party assessment. In the 
past, only investment portfolio managers, investment companies or investment analyst 
used to undertake firms’ CSR performance evaluation and are not available to the public. 
Due to increasing awareness among stakeholder regarding the impact of the business 
operation on the environment, and society, CSR reporting is becoming compulsory and 
no longer a choice (Thornton, 2018). Hence, several organisations and agencies 
(including not for profit) are conducting companies CSR performance measurement and 
evaluation.  
Since the introduction of Kinder Liebenberg Domini (KLD), CSR performance 
ranking, rating and social index membership have gained significant popularity in recent 
years. Especially, the Dow and Jones sustainability index (DJSI), Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Global Socially Responsible Index (MSCI Global SRI), Calvert Social 
Index (CSI), and Financial Times socially responsible index (FTSE4Good index) are 
widely regarded for their comprehensive methodologies and process in evaluating firms 
 
17 Annual financial report, compnay website and sustainability report. 




CSR. These social indices evaluate companies on the basis of firms’ commitment to 
several environmental, social and governance issues. The firm gets a membership (or get 
listing) in social index continuously if they implement strong CSR initiatives consistently. 
In contrast, any unfavourable changes in the CSR commitment consequently lead to the 
termination of membership. For example, the FTSE4Good index added companies that 
are widely recognised as being responsible globally due to their high commitment to the 
environment, society and governance issues. The FTSE4Good index has a comprehensive 
assessment methodology that examines firms CSR performance under 3 main pillars 
(environmental, social and governance) covering 14 CSR themes18. These themes are 
evaluated using over 300 indicators19. Further, these SRI indices release information 
regarding any changes in the index membership (i.e. addition and deletion). If a firm 
meets the addition criteria lead to the addition in the SRI index and vice versa.  
The information regarding any changes in index composition are publicly 
available and may have a significant impact on the perception, confidence and reaction 
of several stakeholders towards firms. The release of third-party assessment on firms’ 
socially responsible practices and commitments reduces the information asymmetry on 
 
18 climate change, water use, biodiversity, pollution and resources, supply chain, health 
and safety, labour standards, human rights and community, customer responsibility, 
supply chain, anti-corruption, tax transparency, risk management, and corporate 
governance (FTSE Russell, 2016). 
19 Please see the Index Addition Rules that were updated in September 2014. Source: 
Index Addition Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series v1.7, January 2006, 
www.ftserussell.com 




CSR performance (Doh et al., 2010).  The positive changes (i.e. addition) signals firms 
improved CSR performance, meaning the increased commitment on issues related to the 
social, environmental and other governance issues. Hence, firms’ addition in the CSR 
index improves firms’ reputation towards stakeholders, which consequently improve the 
firm’s performance. Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that the resulting higher CSR 
performance (CSR index addition) lead to competitive advantage as it helps companies 
differentiate themselves from companies which don not engage in environmental and 
social activities. For example, Nielsen (2012) reports that consumers prefer to purchase 
and willing to pay a premium price for the products and services offered by companies 
that give back to society for positive change (p.3). The study also reports an increased 
willingness of the public to work and invest in the companies that have strong CSR brand. 
Hence, engaging in CSR practices increases customer trust, loyalty and satisfaction on 
product/services (Sen et al., 2016, Du et al., 2017), and retain and improve skilled 
employee through improved CSR reputation (Turban and Greening, 1997; Martin, 2006; 
Costa, 2015; Turker, 2015).   
Further, firms’ participation in socially and environmental practices acts as an 
insurance-like policy which minimises the impact of negative events and crises (Godfrey 
et al., 2009). For example, news/disclosure of firms’ improved commitment to CSR 
offsets the past corporate irresponsibility and also reduces the possibility of further 
negative impact (Kang et al., 2016). The announcement of changes in social index 
composition signals firms’ future cash flow. For example, firms’ addition in the social 
index could reveal better cash flow at present and commitment to improving in the future 
and vice versa. The better cash flow is the rationale from several factors related to CSR, 
such as managerial commitments to satisfy their stakeholders with the aim of future 




growth and forward-looking vision. Also, firms’ investment in improving CSR 
contributes to a reduction in the cost of capital required for the future projects/investments 
(El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The firm’s addition in the socially 
responsible index signals the management capability and their long-term vision towards 
firms’ growth and financial sustainability.  
 
5.2.1 Previous work on CSR index and market performance 
Prior studies examining the relationship between CSR and firms’ financial 
performance report mixed results (Orlitizky et al., 2003; Margolish et al., 2009). 
Especially, within the changes in socially responsible index composition, studies 
investigate the impact of index addition and deletion announcement on stock returns using 
sample of specific country/market (Park and Lee, 2018; Kappu and Oikonomou, 2016; 
Obrendorfer et al., 2013; Nakai et al., 2013; Becchetti et al., 2012; Lurenco et al., 2012; 
Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Cheung, 2011; Doh et al., 2010; Curran and Moran, 2007). 
For example, Doh et al., (2010) examine the impact of addition and deletion from Calvert 
social index to short returns. They reported no significant changes to stock returns after 
the addition, but companies experience a significant negative abnormal return of 1.2% at 
T+1 day after deletion announcement. Such a difference in the market reaction is due to 
the imbalance of information regarding the addition and deletion (Doh et al., 2010 
p.1478). The author argues that a firm with a positive/improved CSR performance is less 
of a surprise for the market, as investor anticipated firms to be added in the index as the 
managers tend to share their CSR improvement before the announcement. However, in 
case of negative CSR performance, managers tend to underreport poor CSR performance, 




meaning that investor is kept in the dark with elicits market’s significant negative reaction 
to CSR event (Doh et al., 2010).  
Using the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, hereinafter, DJSI index, Cheung 
(2011) finds that addition (deletion) in the DJSI leads to a significant increase (decline) 
in stock returns on the day of the announcement. The author also asserts that such changes 
in the stock return are temporary, until the day of effective implementation of the DJSI 
changes. Using signalling sustainability leadership theme, Robinson et al., (2011) 
examine the impact of firms’ addition and deletion from the DJSI index on short-term 
stock returns. Authors report an increase in share price for up to the 10 days after the 
announcement. This result is also corroborated by Nakai et al., (2013). In contrast, 
Oberndorfer et al., (2013) reported 2% negative and statistically significant (at 5% level) 
average cumulative abnormal return for six days event window (0-5) after the addition in 
the DJSI World index. The result of Obrendorfer et al., (2013) is corroborated by Park 
and Lee (2018), who report a significantly negative cumulative average abnormal returns 
of 0.4% (t-value -2.260) on the day of the announcement (p.1127). This implies that firms 
addition in SRI index is not rewarded by investors in the short-term.  
Further, Kappu and Oikonomou (2016) and Park and Lee (2018) analyse the 
social index effect to stock returns over the short term and long term. Kappu and 
Oikonomou (2016) report no material changes in stock returns after the addition to the 
MSCI KLD 400 index. However, they find the negative and statistically significant 
abnormal return of -0.69% on the day of deletion. Also, Kappu and Oikonomou (2016) 
extend their investigation to long-term by investigating the CAAR for the event window 
between T+1 and T+125 days. They report no material changes in stock returns for their 
sample companies added in the MSCI KLD 400 index, but in the case of deleted firms, 




they find a negative and statistically significant cumulative average abnormal return of -
14% for the post-event window between event day (t) and t+125 days. In contrast, 
Robinson et al., (2011) report a significantly positive CAAR of 2.096% for the first 60 
days post-event period for added firms and no material changes for the deleted companies 
for the same event period. This is corroborated by Park and Lee (2018), who examine the 
long-term stock return using a sample from South Korea. The authors report significantly 
positive abnormal returns of 0.338 for 36 months from addition in SRI index but report 
significantly negative abnormal returns of -0.072 for six months when companies deleted 
from the index. 
From the above review, it is clear that the impact of changes in social index 
composition to stock returns is rather mixed. The mixed results could be the 
methodological issues among studies. For example, studies have adopted different and 
shorter event window period, which may not capture the significant impact of the 
particular window. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) assert that the event window should 
be long enough to capture the significant impact of an event on the price movement. 
Studies also have used different estimation window, which could lead to the inconsistency 
in the result. For example, compared to Robinson et al., (2011), Kappu and Oikonomou 
(2016) used different estimation window (i.e. t+125 to T+375), which could lead to 
different results in calculating the CAARs. 
On the other hand, studies examining long-term stock returns used CAAR to 
calculate the long-term abnormal return. CAAR methodology may not be effective for 
long-term due to several biases such as skewness, new listing, and measurement (Ritter 
1991, Lyon et al., 1999; Kothari and Warner, 2008) and according to Barber and Lyon 
(1997), buy and hold abnormal returns (BAHR) methodology is more powerful in 




detecting the long term stock returns. Although Park and Lee (2018) use BHAR method, 
their study is based on a single country with a very small sample size (44 additions and 
32 deletions). Secondly, they report significant positive abnormal returns of 33.80% for 
36 months for added firms. Such significant changes in the stock returns cannot be only 
because of CSR additions. In fact, in the long term, firms may have other corporate events 
that contribute to a positive change in stock returns. 
Also, a handful of studies focused on the UK context. For example, using the 
FTSE4Good Index, Curran and Moran (2007) and Clacher and Hogendrorr (2011) 
examine the changes in the stock prices. The former used the companies added between 
2001 and 2002, while the latter used companies added between 2001 and 2008. Both 
studies did not find significant changes in the stock price with companies added in the 
FTSE4Good index. From my review, I found that studies have used relatively small 
sample size (Curran and Moran, 2007; Clacher and Hogendrorr, 2011; Doh et al., 2010) 
and confounding events issues (Becchetti et al., 2012, 2009; Cheung, 2011;  Oberndorfer 
et al., 2013) which could lead to the wrong conclusion. 
Further, most of the studies within social index re-composition focus on the US, 
and very limited have examined in the UK and other countries context. Such a limited 
focus on the country-specific sample may be conceptually deficient, especially in 
generalising the results and findings which may not be relevant to the wider geographical 
area. Hence, the need for a holistic approach to examining the SRI index affect stock 
returns is immense, especially using the cross-country setting covering the wider 
geographical coverage. Further, studies in CSR index configuration, primarily have 
concentrated on the investor's reaction in the short term and paid less attention to the fact 
that CSR has long term impact on the firm. They have also discounted cross-analysis 




studies that could highlight the effect of other confounding factors. Hence, the impact of 
the social index effect on firms’ long-term stock returns and on comparative countries is 
yet to be examined. 
 
5.3. Theoretical Framework 
Prior studies examining the impact of CSR on stock returns have used stakeholder 
theory, shareholder value theory, legitimacy theory, resource-based, view etc. (Kang et 
al., 2016; Su et al., 2016; Nollet et al., 2016; Lyon Shimshack; 2015; Krüger, 2015; 
Becchetti et al., 2012; Cheung, 2011; Clacher and Hagendroff, 2012; Brammer and 
Millington, 2008). In this study, I focus on the firms’ stock price behaviour during CSR-
related disclosures/announcements using the signalling hypothesis. This perspective 
(signalling hypothesis) provides a unique, practical and empirically testable perspective 
on problems of social selection under conditions of imperfect information (Connelly et 
al., 2011, p.63). 
The signalling hypothesis explains the behaviour of two parties or individuals 
when they have separate access to different information (Spence, 2002; Kirmani & Rao, 
2000; Riley, 2001). According to this, one party sends a piece of a message (signal), and 
another party receives and interpret the message. According to Spence (1973, 1974), the 
signalling hypothesis helps to understand how investors or decision-makers interpret and 
respond to a particular situation where information is asymmetrically provided and is also 
incomplete. The fundamental principle of the signalling hypothesis is about information 
asymmetry and its reduction. The information asymmetry occurs when different 
parties/individuals have unequal knowledge of a subject matter, with one party being 
better informed than the other which creates an imbalance of power, adverse selection 




and moral hazard problems (Akerlof, 1970; Ndofor and Levitas, 2004; Bird and Smith, 
2005).  
Arguably, information plays a significant role in the investment decision-making 
process. An investor takes his/her investment decision after careful consideration of 
publicly available information regarding firms. To mitigate the risk of their stock 
portfolios, investors must be able to identify firms’ observable and alterable features (i.e. 
signal) that affects the conditional probability of firms’ performance (Bergh and Gibbons, 
2011). The signalling hypothesis provides a base for predicting how the stock of a firm 
would behave to a firm-specific event (Spence, 2004; Bergh and Gibbons, 2011).  
Since the availability of new information affects the stock price behaviour, I 
investigate how the firm’s share price reacts to the announcement of the firm’s CSR-related 
performance. Corporate engagement in CSR initiatives and their reporting can be important 
information or signal that can affect the decision of stock market participants. This is 
because investors and other stakeholders may not be able to observe how firms involved in 
CSR benefits the organisation. Hence, they may take the firms’ decision to implement CSR 
initiative as a case of resource mismanagement. Also, prior literature reports that studies 
have primarily focused on the short-term stock return and gave lesser attention to the long-
term impact on the share price. To this extent, there are important questions that need to be 
answered. For example, do shareholders care about firms’ CSR involvement and do firms’ 
additions and deletions from the SRI Index lead to any material changes to stock returns in 
the long-term?  
On the basis of the signalling hypothesis, stock market uses signals to value the CSR 
disclosure/ announcement, and its participants would search for these signals that 
differentiate high and low CSR performers. From a stock market perspective, the firms’ 




CSR performance-related disclosure could likely trigger a few complimentary effects. For 
instance, a positive CSR performance could create a positive ‘halo’ effect that could provide 
a yardstick for subsequent investment decisions (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011; Lourenco et al., 
2011). Also, companies with good CSR reputations are perceived as having strong internal 
resources and management capabilities to capitalise on potential investments and other 
corporate expansion opportunities that could arise from such positive CSR status (Costa, 
2015; Turker, 2015). Based on this logic, CSR can then be interpreted as a signal of 
managerial optimism about the firms’ future. Complimentary with the resource-based view 
(Barney, 2001, Barney, 1991; Russ and Fouts, 1997; Hart, 1995), the firms’ ability to 
retain/gain a competitive advantage depends on its retained resources. If these resources are 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, then this firm will potentially enjoy a 
significant competitive advantage in the industry (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993; Peteraf 
and Barney, 2003; Newbert, 2007). The theory asserts that managers are considered as 
key in developing new competitive capabilities, which may lead to a reduction in operating 
and financing costs, which subsequently leads to higher cash flow and profit. Firms’ 
opportunity of earning high cash flow and profit subsequently lead to a significant increase 
in the stock returns. The CSR literature often emphasises that firms’ involvement in socially 
responsible initiatives enhance their competitive resource and capability that helps to 
promote them to gain a competitive advantage amongst their peers (Porter and Krammar, 
2011). This also leads to an improved stock return because the stock market interprets CSR 
activities as firms’ management optimism (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011).  
Similarly, the disclosure of CSR-related information reduces information 
asymmetry among firms’ stakeholders (Corderio and Tewari, 2015; Ramachander et al., 
2012) and improve the firms’ relationship with all interested parties. Hence, additions and 




deletions from FTSE4Good index signal firms’ capability of being socially responsible 
regarding business operation and potential future performance. Consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis/theory, this disclosure of firms’ CSR-related performance conveys 
favourable information. For example, the addition in the FTSE4Good index signals the 
firm's regular and consistent commitment/investment in socially responsible initiatives 
and possible availability of necessary financial resources. Such availability of resources 
(for good CSR initiatives) could be a signal of good financial health at present with 
potential (i.e. ability to invest further in positive-value generating projects) for the future 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). Firms’ participation in the socially responsible 
cause/initiatives in the future could lead to improvements in customer loyalty, employee 
productivity, reduction in potential charges and fines and improved supplier relationship 
(Shiu, and Yang, 2017; Sen et al., 2016; Turban, 2001). As a result, firms will improve 
the present value of their future cash flows, boost shareholders/investors’ confidence and 
maximise the corporate value. By contrast, deletion from the FTSE4Good index would 
contain exactly the opposite message to the market as this might reflect not only relatively 
low financial capabilities but also a possible challenging future for these firms with 
increased uncertainty in future cash flows as well as a loss in investors’ and stakeholders’ 
confidence. 
Hence, the positive changes in the social index are the increase in the quality and 
importance of the CSR performance information (Du et al., 2017). The increase in the 
quality and salience of CSR performance may contain the value relevance signals. If 
market investors believe that the firm's involvement in CSR is beneficial and could lead 
to an improved future financial performance, then firms added in the FTSE4Good Index 
can experience a positive abnormal stock return in the long-run after the event. By 




contrast, the deletion from the FTSE4Good index leads to a negative return in the long-
run. Hence, the testable hypotheses are as following: 
H1: The stock returns of companies added in the FTSE4Good Index improves 
significantly in the long-term.  
H2: The stock returns of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Index deteriorates 
significantly in the long-term. 
 
5.4. Data and Methodology 
5.4.1. Sample selection  
This study examines the impact of CSR (as firms’ addition and deletion from the 
FTSE4Good index) on firms’ long term stock return. I use the FTSE4Good’s announcement 
regarding the changes to index composition as an independent event and examine how the 
stock market responds after the announcement. There are several reasons for selecting the 
FTSE4Good index as a proxy of CSR performance. The first reason is that the FTSE4Good 
index consists of companies demonstrating consistent and strong, socially responsible 
compliance in their operation. It has the most rigorous methodology in examining CSR 
compliance and are conducted by independent experts from industry professionals. Also, 
the information regarding FTSE4Good index changes is publicly available. Additionally, it 
consists of companies covering wider geographical regions. Most importantly, the 
FTSE4Good index sends a credible and valuable signal to stakeholders and market regarding 
firms’ CSR compliance. 




All information regarding FTSE4Good Global index changes is available from the FTSE 
database20. The FTSE database contains all official news and information from FTSE, 
including corporate changes and news or any other confounding events. Regarding 
FTSE4Good these include the announcement date, effective date, a list of companies added 
in and deleted from, the reason for deletion (if any), country of the company21. In this study, 
I define the event as follows: 
- FTSE4Good Global Index addition announcement. 
- FTSE4Good Global Index Deletion announcement.   
The data of each of the above events are collected from FTSE database. The FTSE4Good 
index releases its review semi-annually (June and December). In this study, and consistent 
with the prior studies (Lourenco et al., 2011; Cheung, 2011; Kappou and Oikonomou, 2016) 
I adopt a multi-window period covering the pre-event period, announcement day and 
implementation date.  
[Insert Table 5.1 about here] 
 
Having defined an event (i.e. companies’ addition and deletion from the FTSE4Good 
global index), the samples of this study are extracted from the FTSE4Good global index. 
Although there are 878 additions as of 5th June 2018, for short-term event examination I 
only include 725 additions and 577 deletions. However, for the long-term study, the sample 
period is July 2001 and December 2016 because, at the time of writing this study, the post-
 
20 FTSE4Good Index started from 10 July 2001. Any announcement regarding the 
FTSE4Good Index is available at http://www.ftse.com/products/index-
notices/home/getnotices/?id=FTSE4GOOD 
21 Please see the appendix for the real sample of FTSE4Good changes announcement. 




event (up to 240 days) financial data were not available for the companies that are added 
and deleted after June 2016. To examine the impact of CSR on long term stock return, I use 
596 additions and 410 deletions. All daily equity price for the selected sample firms were 
obtained from Thomson’s DataStream using their identifiers such as international security 
identification number (ISIN) and name for cross-matching purposes. 
 
5.4.2. Empirical Model: short-term abnormal stock return   
A short-term stock return methodology was firstly introduced by Brown and Warner 
(1985) and then widely adopted in the finance and accounting literature (Petmezas, 2009; 
Fuller et al., 2002). Short-term stock returns typically utilise a short event window covering 
a few days around the relevant event (e.g. 5 prior and 5 days post). In this study, I examine 
stock returns around FTSE4Good global firm additions and deletions' announcements. The 
main event window for this study is the period between 10 days prior and 15 days after the 
announcement. The estimation event period is the event window covers the period between 
200 trading days prior and 11 trading days before the announcement22. I use two pre-event 
windows to capture the pre-event stock behaviour between t-5 and t-1. To capture the post-
event stock movement, I use three different post-event windows between t+1 and t+15. The 
period between the date of announcement and the effective date varies for the sample of this 
study. On average, the FTSE4Good used 11 days to implement the changes. It is, therefore, 
 
22 the estimation window more than 120 trading days is sufficient (Mackinlay, 1997) and 
the daily stock data less than one year are powerful in detecting the abnormal return 
since it more concentrate on event (Kothari and Warner, 2007, p.10) 




the sub-event between t+1 and t+15 will also capture any movement around the 
effective/implementation date. 
The timeline and event windows of this study can be presented as bellows: 







Main event observation window
t-200 t t+15t+10t+5t-11 T-5
 
Event window Window Description 
Estimation window -200 working days to -11working days (E) 
Main event window -10 working days to +15 working day (M) 
Subevent window 1 -5 working days to -1 working day (S1) 
Subevent window 2 -3 working days to -1 working day (S2) 
Subevent window 3 -1 working day to +1 working day (S3) 
Subevent window 4 +1 working day to +5 working day (S4) 
Subevent windows 5 +1 working day to +10 working day (S5) 
Subevent windows 6 +1 working day to +15 working day (S6) 
 
 
I expand the event windows around the announcement date because the financial 
market may have received the information before the announcement, and they may have 
anticipated the news. It is, therefore, one would expect the abnormal return during the pre-
announcement and the addition of 1 day before the announcement would allow us to test my 




hypothesis. Similarly, incorporating several days of post-event and the date of effective 
implementation allows enough time for spreading and exchanging the information which 
could capture the delayed share price and therefore can test the market efficiency (Kothari 
and Warner, 2008; Mase, 2007; Thompson, 1985). The addition of 15 days post-
announcement date will allow examining the post-event performance. Also, the days 
between the announcement date and the effective date will allow us to examine the arbitrage 
opportunity. Finally, the addition of the interval between 200 days prior and 11 before the 
announcement allows us to estimate the systematic risk (beta) of the stock so that I could 
check the robustness.  
There are several methods reported in the literature for estimating market benchmark 
returns including as the use of the market model such as market model (McKinely, 1997; 
Brown and Warner, 1985; Sharpe, 1963), mean adjusted returns (Brown and Warner, 1980), 
and risk-controlled portfolio return (Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999), the CAPM (Treynor, 
1962; Sharpe, 1964; Linter 1965; Mossin, 1966), the Fama and French’s three-factor model 
(Fama and French, 1993). Among them, the use of the market model is the standard 
approach for estimating normal return in the study that examines the impact of events on the 
stock return (Duso et al., 2010; Kothari and Warner, 2005, 2008; Park, 2004; Armitage, 
1995; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). In the absence of the event, the normal returns are 
defined as the expected returns (MacKinely, 1997). According to MacKinely (1997) and 
Brown and Warner (1985), in the market model, the return on the stock price of a firm is 
calculated as  
   𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (5.1) 
where𝐸(. ) is the expectation operator. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡), 𝑅𝑚𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are the company’s expected 
stock return, the returns on the market portfolio and disturbance term which should be equal 




to zero. Similarly, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept and 𝛽𝑖is the slope of the relationship for stock i with 
respect to market return both of these can be estimated using OLS regression (where 𝛼𝑖and 
𝛽𝑖 are regression coefficient) for the period of the 200 trading days prior to the event 
windows. This would be the period between t-200 days and t-10 days.  
The market model does not make any explicit assumption regarding the 
establishment of the equilibrium price of the stock (Strong, 1992) it is, therefore, no 
imposition from theory. Preferably it takes an account that the linear and constant 
relationship between individual stock returns and stock market index return (Brown and 
Warner, 1985).  The market model is relatively more influential and has the best explanatory 
power to detect the effect of the event because using this model eliminates the portion of the 
return that is associated to the discrepancy in the return of the market. This consequently 
reduces the variation of the abnormal return (Mackinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997; Binder, 1998). Hence, it is the most appropriate model to calculate the normal return 
and to estimate the abnormal return. Under the market model, the risk-free rate is suppressed. 
Also, the result may be biased for the stocks which are rising or expected to rise (bull market) 
and stocks which are falling or expected to fall (bear market) (Armitage, 1997, p.31). Fama’s 
et al., (1969) seminal work is one of the earliest to use the market model in event study, 
where the abnormal return of stock has been examined around the stock split announcement 
by companies. This model has been widely used in CSR-CFP literature (Lyon and 
Shimshack, 2015; Kruger, 2014; Flammer, 2013; Ramchander et al., 2012; Clacher and 
Hagendorff, 2012; Curran and Moran, 2007). 
 




5.4.3. Estimation of cumulative abnormal return  
The abnormal return is the difference in the actual return and the expected return 
of the stock. The abnormal return on stock i at time t using the market model is calculated 
as;  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)       (5.2) 
where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return of stock i at time t and 𝜀𝑖𝑡=0.  
Kothari and Warner (2004) assert that the average abnormal return provides 
information regarding the impact of the event on change is the share price. The average 






𝑖=1         (5.3) 
where𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡is the average abnormal return at time t , 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal  return of stock i 
at time t, and N is the numbers of sample companies’ stock associated with the event.  
Further, the cumulative average abnormal returns capture the share price reaction to 
the events (Duso et al., 2010; Kolari and Pynnonen, 2010; Kothari and Warner, 2007; 2004). 
It is a standard metric that used in CSR studies analysing on how much the share price 
deviates from the expected value between the period of the event or window (Lyon and 
Shimshack, 2015; Flammer, 2013; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).   It is an aggregate of the 
average abnormal returns over the event period (Kothari and Warner, 2007; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). Given this study focuses on the impact of FTSE4Good addition and 
deletion to the share price for each window, I total up the daily average abnormal returns.  
Algebraically, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over event period T 
(starting on trading day t-j and ending on the trading day t) can be estimated as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡
𝑡=𝑡−𝑗       (5.4) 
where𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal returns on event period t. 




To test the null hypothesis, which means there is no impact of the event on return. 
The cumulative average abnormal return 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 at time t, equals to zero. If the sample data 






       (5.5) 
where, 𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the standard deviation of cumulative average abnormal return and 
calculated as; 
𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) = √𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)       (5.6) 
Where, 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the variance of average abnormal return, and n is the total number of 
days in the event period.  
In this study, I focus on examining the cumulative abnormal return for the event 
windows, as previously defined in this section. I have four event windows E (E=0,1, 2, 3). 
Among these, my focus is to investigate the abnormal return of event windows after the 
announcement event (i.e. at t=0, t+1 to t+5, T+1 to T+10 and T+1 to T+15). For instance, 
the cumulative average abnormal return for the third event window between T+1 and t+5 is    
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑇+5 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇+1
𝑡=𝑇+5       (5.7) 
moreover, cumulative abnormal return for the fourth event window E3,   
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑇+10 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇10
      (5.8) 
where𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑇+5and 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑇+10represent the cumulative average abnormal 
return for the post-event window from t+1 to T+5 and from t+1 to T+10, respectively. T is 
the announcement day. 
In this study, I examine the impact of firms’ addition in and deletion from the 
FTSE4Good Global Index, primarily focusing on the impact after the announcement date. 
The null hypothesis of this study can be described as there is no cumulative average 




abnormal return after the event. To test the null hypothesis, which means the mean of 
cumulative abnormal return is equals to zero, I use a parametric test statistic. If the sample 




         (5.9) 
where Z is the test statistics, will be tested at 95% confidence level using a critical value.  
 
5.4.4. Empirical Model: Long-Term abnormal stock return   
In this study, I further investigate the impact of FTSE4Good Global index’s 
additions and deletions on long-term stock returns, where the stock return is calculated for 
longer event window which covers more than 30 days after the event. Barber and Lyon 
(1997) assert that the standard methodology of calculating the firm's long-term abnormal 
return leads to biases in the result due to a miss-specified test statistic and the ignorance of 
compounding effect in aggregating monthly or daily stock returns. Further, the cumulative 
abnormal return also has skewness bias, new listing bias and measurement bias (Kolari and 
Pynnönen, 2010; Kothari and Warner, 2008; Barber and Lyon,1997; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 
1999). To eliminate such bias, one should use a matched/controlled firm and the buy-and-
hold return approach where the abnormal return can be computed as the difference between 
the buy-and-hold returns of the sample firms and that of the matched/controlled firms. 
The buy and hold return of stock i at holding period of t (t=30,60,90,120,150,180,210,240 
trading days) is calculated as; 
𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ [(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑛)]
𝑡
𝑡=1 − 1      (5.10) 
where, 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡is the buy-and-hold return of stock i at holding period t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑛 is the return of 
stock i at time n. 
The expected buy-hold-return is calculated as: 




𝐸(𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = [∏ [(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑛))]
𝑡
𝑡=1 − 1]    (5.11) 
where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑛) is the expected return of stock i at time n. The expected stock return is the 
return of market index at time n  
As defined, the abnormal return is the difference between realised buy-and-hold return and 
the expected buy-hold-return, expressed as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡)     (5.12) 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ [(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑛)]
𝑡
𝑡=1 − [∏ [(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑛))]
𝑡
𝑡=1 − 1]  (5.13) 
where, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of stock i at holding period t. 






𝑖=1        (5.14) 
where, 𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of stock i at holding period 
t, N is the total number of sample stocks over the holding period. 




         (5.15) 
where Z is the test statistics, 𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of 
stock i at holding period t, 𝜎(𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation 
of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and N is the number of firms(stocks). 
I assume that there is a 95% level of significance that the buy-hold abnormal 
return will be real, not due to change. If the Z-score lies between -1.96 and +1.96 (for a 
two-tailed test with a 95% confidence level, the critical value lies between -1.96 and 
+1.96), I do not reject the null hypothesis. However, I am expecting to reject the null 
hypothesis meaning the buy-hold abnormal stock return is not equals to zero. I expect a 
positive and significant long-term abnormal stock return for companies added in the 




FTSE4Good Global Index and contrary companies that are deleted from the FTSE4Good 
Global index to experience negative long-term stock return.  
 
5.5. Results 
5.5.1. Short term stock performance 
In this chapter, I investigate whether there is a significant stock market reaction 
on the CSR performance as an announcement of the social index additions and deletions. 
I examine both average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) around (both prior and post) event announcement date. All tables with 
my results are presented in appendix B of this chapter. Table 5.2 reports average abnormal 
stock return of the companies added in the FTSE4Good Global Index and Table 5.3 
reports cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over different event windows. 
Following Kothari and Warner (2007) and Mackinlay (1997), the estimation window 
more than 120 days and less than 1 year are more powerful in detecting stock return since 
it concentrates on the event. I use 190 days of estimation window between T-200 (200 
trading days before event day 0) and T-11 (11 days before the event day 0). Looking to 
average abnormal return (AAR) between T-10 and T+15, the precise, a negative return 
pattern emerges around the announcement day. However, near to the event day(T=0), 
there was a positive return for a few days before the announcement. Also, negative 
average abnormal return around the event day, i.e. from 1 day prior and until two days 
(T+2) after the announcement. On the day of the announcement (T=0), the size of the 
average abnormal return was -0.009 but not significant. Table 5.2 reports a negative 
average abnormal return of -0.0011 (t-value -1.834) and -0.0019 (t-value -2.534) on the 




post-event days t+1 and t+2 respectively. This result corroborates Oberndorfer et al., 
(2013), who reported significant negative stock return after firms’ addition in the DJSI.  
[Insert Tables 5.2 and 5.3 about here] 
 
Table 5.3 reports the CAARs under different event windows around the 
announcement day. I use the main event window of the period from 15 days before the 
event and 10 days after the event. To examine the impact of the event announcement, I 
use two event windows before the event day (0) three post-event windows. Table 5.3 
reports a negative CAAR of -0.0079 (t-value -2.4814) for the main event window (-10 to 
15 days). Similarly, for the sub-event window before the event day, i.e. (-5,-1) and (-3, -
1) are also negative but not statistically significant. The CAAR for the subevent window 
covering one day prior and one-day post-event (T-1 and T+1) is negative of -0.0030 (t-
value -2.7735) and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the CAARs of the event 
windows starting from T+1 and ending on T+5, T+10 and T+15 are also negative and 
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 5% respectively. Most firms experienced a 
negative cumulative average abnormal return for the event day (i.e. 398 of 725, 54.90%, 
also the highest among the different event windows). In most of the event windows, 
companies experience negative CAAR than positive except the event for (-3,-1).  From 
the above result, I found that the companies’ stock experienced negative CAAR for the 
event windows after the addition announcement. Overall, the result is consistent with 
Oberndorfer et al., (2013), whose result also supports shareholder theory by confirming 
that the shareholders penalise the CSR index addition announcement in the short term. 
I examine further by categorising my sample into subgroup according to the 
country of origin. Table 5.4 reports country-specific average abnormal return for the firms 




after their addition in the FTSE4Good index. Table 5.4 shows that firms from the UK and 
the US experienced a significant negative average abnormal return on the day of the 
announcement. The average abnormal return on the day of the announcement is -0.0039 
(t-value -2.1493) and -0.0022 (t-value of -2.518) in case of the UK and the US, 
respectively. In both cases, the AARs were statistically significant at the 10% confidence 
level.  
[Insert Tables 5.4 and 5.5 about here] 
However, In the case of Germany and Australia, Table 5.4 reports negative and 
statistically significant AARs at T+1, of -0.0073 (t value of -2.558) and -0.0073 (t-value 
-1.681) respectively. Similarly, the negative and statistically significant average abnormal 
return of -0.0028 (t-value of -2.584) at T+3 is reported in case of stocks from the rest of 
the Europe region. This study does not report any statistically significant changes in 
average abnormal return around announcement day in the case of France, and Japan. Also, 
it is worth to mention that the average abnormal return after the announcement is positive 
but not statistically significant for the Rest of Asia Pacific. 
Table 5.5 reports the CAAR under the different windows in different regions. In 
the case of the UK and Germany, the CAARs around one day prior and one-day post-
event (-1, 1) are also significantly negative of -0.0081 (t-value -2.1289) and -0.0139 (t-
value -1.6599) respectively.  The CAAR is also negative and statistically significant (at 
10% level) for the post-event period between T+1 and T+5 in the case of Germany. Table 
5.5 also reports negative and statistically significant CAAR of -0.0065 (t-value of -
1.9008) at window period between T+1 and T+5 for Rest of the Europe region. Table 5.5 
reports negative and statistically significant CAARs in case of Japan and Rest of the Asia 
Pacific of -0.0136 (t-value -2.047) and -0.0268 (t value of -1.8902) respectively for the 




main event window (T-10 and T+15). Although negative CAARs reported in case of the 
rest of the countries, the results are not statistically significant.  
[Insert Tables 5.6 and 5.7 about here] 
I further examine the stock market reaction to negative CSR performance using 
deletion from the FTSE4Good index. Table 5.6 reports average abnormal stock return for 
the companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index. I analyse a total of 577 
companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index between September 2001 and 
September 2017. The result does not exhibit any precise pattern of stock return. The 
average abnormal returns are positive (not statistically significant) before the 
announcement of the deletion (for T-3, T-2 and T-1). On the day of the announcement 
and T+1, the average abnormal returns are both negative, but again, these returns are not 
statistically significant. However, Table 5.6 reports the negative and statistically 
significant average abnormal stock return of -0.0010 (z-value -2.037) at 4th trading day 
and -0.0023 (t-value of -1.90) on the 6th trading day (T+6) after the deletion 
announcement/event day. Similarly, Table 5.7 reports negative and statistically 
significant CAAR of -0.0003 (z-value -2.0237) for post-event window covering t+1 and 
t+5. On the other hand, Table 5.7, reports no significant changes in the CAARs for rest 
of post-event windows after the deletion from the FTSE4Good index.  
[Insert Tables 5.8 and 5.9 about here] 
Table 5.8 reports the result of a cross-country analysis of the UK, US, Japan, the 
rest of Europe and the rest of Asia Pacific. The total number of companies deleted from 
the FTSE4Good Global index were very minimum for the rest of individual countries, 
and it is. Therefore, I categorised those into the rest of Europe and the Rest of Asia Pacific. 
Table 5.8 reports negative and statistically significant AAR for the UK (-0.0039, z-value 




-2.0391) on the day of deletion announcement but no significant changes in the AARs on 
the day of the event for rest of the sub-categories. However, in the case of Japan, the AAR 
is negative of -0.0023 (t-value -1.691) at t+1 and -0.0043 (t-value -2.032, z-value -2.3202) 
at t+4, both returns are significant at the 10% level and the 1% level respectively. 
Similarly, firms from rest of Asia pacific also experience a negative and statistically 
significant AAR of -0.0019 (z-value -2.5582) at t+1 day, whereas firms from rest of 
Europe experience significantly negative return on t+3 day. Further, Table 5.8 reports a 
negative AAR of -0.0028 (z-value -2.-391) at t+3, and -0.0132 (t-value -2.725, z-value -
3.1844) at t+10 in the case of the UK, this shows that investors are reacting negatively 
during the effective implementation period of the FTSE4Good changes.  
According to Table 5.9, the CAARs covering the post-event windows are 
significantly negative in the case of the UK. For example, the CAARs for post-event 
window starting from t+1 to t+5, t+10 and t+15 are -0.0188 (t-value -1.7699, z-value -
2.0391), -0.0345 (t-value -2.0497, z-value -2.6117) and -0.0367 (t-value -2.0978, z-value 
-1.7527) respectively. This result for the UK implies that the investors in the UK do 
penalise firms’ deletion from the FTSE4Good index. However, in the case of rest of the 
sub-group such as the US, Japan, Rest of Asia Pacific and rest of Europe, no clear pattern 
emerges in CAARs when firms are deleted from the FTSE4Good index. 
 
5.5.2. Long-term stock performance 
To explain the possible long-term stock performance of CSR firms, I use BHAR 
for both addition and deletion companies.  Table 5.10 reports the mean BHARs for the 
companies added in the FTSE4Good index when compared with market returns. I 
examined the post-event stock performance up to 240 days. Compared with the market 




return, the post-event performance is positive and in increasing trend at all event 
windows. Although there are positive BHARs for the windows period up to post 60 days, 
these abnormal returns are not statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 5.10 about here] 
 According to Table 5.10, the BHARs are significantly positive of 0.0139 (t-value 
2.1969), significant at the 5% level for the event window starting from event day (t=0) to 
90 days. Similarly, a significantly positive BHARs of 0.262 (t-value 3.1010) 0.0322 (t-
value 3.2526), 0.0394 (t-value 3.162), 0.0398 (t-value 3.6508) and 0.0441 (t-value 
3.6651) are reported for the events windows between 120, 150, 180, 210 and 240 days 
respectively, and all BHARs are significant at the 1% level. According to Table 5.10, an 
investor can enjoy a minimum of 1.39% abnormal returns for first 90 days of addition 
and a maximum of 4.41% of abnormal returns in event window between event day to 240 
days. The result indicates that a negative return reported in the previous section (short-
term returns) is temporary as companies experienced a significantly positive abnormal 
return of 1.39% (t-value of 2.1969) within 90 days of the event. This confirms the first 
hypothesis of this chapter that the stock returns of companies added in the FTSE4Good 
Index improve significantly in the long term.  Hence, firms’ addition to the SRI index is 
valued higher by investors over time.  
  
[Insert Table 5.11 about here] 
I further investigate long-term stock returns by categorising the FTSE4Good 
Global index sample into subgroups. Table 5.11 reports the average BHAR of Japan, US 
and Canada, UK, Europe and Asia pacific. According to Table 5.11, the average BHAR 
for Japan, Europe and the Asia Pacific are positive and statistically significant. Although 




the average BHAR for the UK, US and Canada are all positive, returns are not statistically 
significant. The average BHAR from the UK, US and Canada report no price pattern of 
the stock changes in the long term after the firms added in the FTSE4Good Global index. 
For Japan, companies experience a positive and statistically significant return from 210 
days after the addition in the FTSE4Good Global index. An investor can enjoy a minimum 
of 4.2% (t-value 1.8282, skewness adj. 1.9909) abnormal return over 210 days and a 
maximum of 4.90% (t-value 19755, skewness adj.- 2.2600) in 240 days after the addition 
announcement.  
Table 5.11 also report a positive and statistically significant return from 150 days 
after the firms from the Asia Pacific (excluding Japan) are added in the FTSE4Good 
Global index. Companies experience a minimum (positive and statistically significant) 
average BHAR in 150 days (7.30%, t-value 2.3778, skewness adj- 2.7527) after the 
announcement. Investors in the Asia Pacific could enjoy a maximum of 8.62% (t-value 
2.3591, skewness adj- 2.8082) (positive and statistically significant) average return in a 
matter of 180 days. The average BHAR remains positive and statistically significant 
afterwards.  
 Similarly, Table 5.11 reports that companies in Europe also experience positive 
and statistically significant average BHAR from 90 days after the announcement. 
Investors can enjoy a minimum of 2.10% (statistically significant at the 5% level) return 
in a matter of 90 days after the announcement. Table 5.11 reports an increasing trend in 
average BHAR over time as all average BHAR is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. An investor can enjoy a maximum return of 5.05% (t-value 2.5176, 
skewness adj-2.8070) in 240 days after the addition of firms in the FTSE4Global index. 
Hence, the cross-country analysis confirms that companies in Japan, Europe and Asia 




pacific enjoy positive and statistically significant return in the long term after the 
companies from this country/area are added in the FTSE4Good Good index. Hence, 
firms’ involvement in the socially responsible initiative is valued higher by investors over 
time. 
[Insert Table 5.12 about here] 
On the other hand, I further investigated whether stock market penalises 
companies’ deletion from the FTSE4Good index. Table 5.12 reports an average BHAR 
over 210 days after the deletion of the index.  Table 5.12 exhibit negative average BHARs 
up to 60 days after the announcement. The table reports a negative and statistically 
significant abnormal return of 1.09% (t-value of -1.6780) for the event window between 
0 and 30 days. This also confirms that the investor penalises the firms’ deletion from the 
FTSE4Good index. Although the average BHARs are positive afterwards, only within 
150 days the firms experienced a significant positive return of 2.89% (t-value of 1.7497). 
For the rest of the event windows, the average BHARs is positive but not statistically 
significant.  
[Insert Table 5.13 about here] 
Table 5.13 reports the average BHAR of the UK, US and Canada, Europe, Japan, 
and the Asia Pacific. The result for the UK reveals that firms experience negative and 
statistically significant return up to 120 days after they are deleted from the FTSE4Good 
Global index. During 120 days after the event, an investor may suffer the loss of a 
maximum of 8.97% (t-value -2.4158, skewness adj- 2.6646) in 60 days after the firm 
deletion announcement. The negative and statistically significant return continue up to 
120 days after the event. There is no price pattern of changes in the stock return after 150 
days onwards.  




Similarly, European companies also suffer significant loss of 2.67% (t-value 
2.2515, skewness-adj -2.3790) within the first 30 days after they are deleted from the 
FTSE4Good Global index. Table 5.13 reports positive return after 30 days, but not 
statistically significant. The results for the US and Canada, Japan, and the Asia Pacific do 
not exhibit a precise pattern in the stock return after firms are deleted from the 
FTSE4Good Global index.  
 
5.5.3. Robustness check using Fama and French three-factor model  
 To check the robustness of the main finding, I further re-examine the impact of 
firms’ addition and deletion from the FTSE4Good Global Index on the firms’ stock return 
using Fama and French (1992) three-factor model. The Fama and French (1992) model 
is superior and has more explanatory power compared to other assets pricing model (Fama 
and French, 1996; Hussain et al., 2002; Berkowitz and Qiu, 2001; Arx and Ziegler, 2012). 
Under the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model, the return of a stock is calculated 
as 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (5.16) 
where 𝐸(. ) is the expectation operator, 𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡, are the company’s (j) expected stock return 
at t (day), the returns on the market portfolio on t. Similarly, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept and 𝛽𝑖is the 
slope of the relationship for stock i with respect to market premium (the difference between 
the market return, 𝑅𝑚𝑡  and the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑓𝑡). The 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the difference between the 
return of ‘small’ firms portfolio and ‘big’ firms portfolio at t, 𝛽𝑖2 is the slope of 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
is the difference between the returns of a portfolio with ‘high’ book to market equity firms 
and returns of a portfolio with ‘low’ book to market equity firms, 𝛽𝑖3 is the slope of  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, 
and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a disturbance term which should be equal to zero. All the unknown parameters 




are estimated using OLS regression model for the period between 200 trading days prior (t-
200) and 11 days prior (t-11) to the event day. The daily Fama and French (1992) three-
factors are retrieved from Fama and French data library23 (Global, US, Europe, Japan, Asia 
Pacific ex-Japan) and Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment for the UK24. 
Using the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model, the abnormal return is the 
difference in the actual return and the expected return of the stock. The abnormal return 
on stock i at time t using the market model is calculated as;  
𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝑅𝑖 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡)    (5.17) 
where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return of stock i at time t.  
 Table 5.14 reports the average abnormal return after firms are added in the 
FTSE4Good Global index using Fama and French (1992) three-factor model. Consistent 
with the result under market model (Table 5.2), firms experience a significantly negative 
abnormal return on the day and after they are added in the FTSE4Good Global index. The 
AAR at t=0 day is significantly negative of 0.0025 (t-value -3.6954, z-value -4.8922). 
The significantly negative return continues for t+1 and t+2 days of 0.0032 (t-value -
3.9103 and z-value -4.8922) and 0.0004 (t-value-3.2428 and z-value -1.7049) 
respectively. 
According to Table 5.15, the CAAR for the different main event window between 
t-10 day and t+15 days is negative and statistically significant (0.00125, t-value -2.7988 
and z-value -2.6685). Consistent with CAAR result under market model (Table 5.3), all 
 
23 The Fama and French factors are available at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
24 http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi/famafrench/files/ 




the post-event windows CAARs under Fama and French three-factor model are negative 
and statistically significant.  
The AAR and CAARS for country-wise investigation under Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model are reported in Table 5.16 and Table 5.17, respectively. 
According to Table 5.16, firms in the UK, US, Germany and France experience negative 
and statistically significant average abnormal return of 0.0066 (t-value -2.0560 and z-
value -2.1794) at t+1, 0.0038 (t-value -3.0822 and z-value -3.4462) at t=0, 0.0140 (t-value 
-2.6914) at t+1 and 0.0021 (z-value -2.2890) at t=0 respectively. Similarly, for Australia 
and the rest of Europe, the negative and statistically significant AAR is reported on day 
t+1 and t+2, respectively. However, there is no significant movement in the stock return 
for Japan and rest of Asia pacific immediately after the announcement. The AARs of 
under Fama and French (1992) three-factor model are consistent with the market model 
described earlier in section 5.5.1.  
Table 5.17 reports the cross-country CAARs under Fama and French (1992) three-
factor model. The post-event windows CAARs are consistent with the post-event window 
CAARs under market model (Table 5.5). It is worth to mention that the CAARs for France 
and Australia and Rest of Asia Pacific under Fama and French (1992) three-factor model 
reveals negative and statistically significant negative return for post-event windows 
covering t+1 and t+5 days. 
On the other hand, Table 5.18 reports the AAR for the firms deleted from the 
FTSE4Good Global index. According to Table 5.18, no precise pattern emerges after the 
firms are deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index, but firms experience negative and 
statistically significant abnormal return for a few days immediately after the deletion 
announcement. Similarly, Table 5.19 reports negative and statistically significant CAARs 




for all of the post-event windows for the global sample, and it is consistent with the market 
model reported in Table 5.7, for example, the post-event window covering t+1 and t+5 
report negative and statistically significant CAARs Under both models.  
Consistent with the cross-country analysis under market model (Table 5.8), Table 
5.20 reports significant negative AAR for the UK (-0.0050, z-value -1.7604 on the event 
day. Similarly, negative return continues for t+2 and t+3 days. Similarly, firms from the 
US, Japan and the rest of Europe experience negative return on t+1, t+4 and t+2 days 
respectively. Although, firms from the rest of Asia pacific experience negative return 
during the first few days after the deletion announcement, the AARs are not statistically 
significant. However, a positive and statistically significant AAR of 0.0104 (t-value 
3.4452, z-value 1.7248) is reported for the rest of Asia Pacific in Table 5.20. 
Similarly, the cross-country CAAR result of deleted firms under Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model is reported in Table 5.21, and the results are consistent with the 
CAAR result of the market model (as of Table 5.9). In addition, Table 5.21 reports 
significant negative CAARs for all post-event windows the rest of Europe sub-category. 
Hence, in aggregate, the result for both additions and deletions under the Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model is consistent with the market model. 
 
5.5.4. Comparison of mean of CAARs, AARs, and BHAR of firms added 
to and deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index.  
 
I further compare the performance of firms added and deleted from the 
FTSE4Good Global Index, this study further compares the mean difference of AARs, 
CAARs and BHARs of the added and deleted firms. This study uses all the AARs and 




CAARs covering the main event window (-10, 15) and the all BHARs between event 
days to post-event 240 days. Table 5.22 presents the mean comparison test results for the 
firms added and deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index. According to Table 5.22 
Panel A, the mean difference between the AARs of added firms and deleted firms under 
both model (market and Fama and French (1992) three-factor) are negative but not 
statistically significant. The AAR mean comparison result implies that no significant 
difference between the returns for firms added and deleted from the FTSE4Good Global 
Index.  
Table 5.22, Panel B, reports the mean comparison of the CAARs for firms added 
and deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index. Under both market and Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model, the mean difference in CAARs is negative and statistically 
significant. For instance, under the market model, the mean difference of CAARs between 
added and the deleted firm is -0.0025 (t value -2.8890, z value -2.390). Similarly, the 
mean comparison of CAARs result under Fama and French (1992) three-factor model 
also negative and statistically significant of -0.0052 (t-value -4.8500 and Z value -2.521) 
and consistent with the market model. The mean of added companies CAAR is less than 
the mean of deleted companies CAAR. The result of the mean comparison of CAAR 
reveals that negative return of stock return is stronger for added firms compared with 
deleted firms. Hence, in the short-term investors tend to heavily penalise those firms that 
are added to the FTSE4Good Global index.  
I further compare the mean BHAR of firms added with the mean BHAR of deleted 
ones. Table 5.22, Panel C, reports a positive and statistically significant excess return for 
added companies when compared with firms deleted form the FTSE4Good Global index. 
The differential means of BHAR of 0.0127 (t-value 3.3570 and Z-value -2.521) and 




statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, in the long-term, companies added to the 
FTSE4Good Global index enjoy significant positive return compared to the firms deleted 
ones. 
 
5.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
5.6.1. Discussion  
The announcement of firms’ addition and deletion from the social index signals 
firms’ CSR commitment and valuable information regarding companies’ future cash flow 
and growth. Particularly, positive (negative) announcement improves (reduces) firms’ 
reputation and consequently leads to the better (worse) future cash flow in long-run. I 
argue that firms’ commitment to CSR compliance reflects managers’ commitment 
towards the sustainable future growth of the company through stakeholders’ satisfaction. 
Since investors have a vested interest in both short-term and long-term gain; I evidence 
that positive news on CSR performance leads to a positive long-term return and vice 
versa. This is because investors tend to pay attention to CSR news and especially CSR 
reports that contain valuable and relevant information (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). In this 
study, I examined both short and long-term market reaction to the companies’ association 
with socially responsible indices. To do so, I adopt an event study methodology using 
CAARs for short-term returns and BHARs for long-term returns, as well as the 
FTSE4Good index membership as a proxy of firms CSR performance using the cross-
country sample. The firms’ addition in the FTSE4Good index represents the good CSR 
performance, while deletion from the index is a proxy for bad CSR performance.   
Regarding the short-term market performance, I documented that addition in the 
FTSE4Good index does not produce a positive stock return for the investor in the short-




term. Instead, it leads to a significant loss in the short-term. The negative reaction in the 
short-term is because investor looks the short-term profit and do take firms involvement 
in CSR as an additional cost for the business. Table 5.2 and Table 5.14 both report that 
the addition in the index leads to the significant negative abnormal return of -0.09% at 
t=0 under market model (as of Table 5.2) and -0.0025 at t=0 under Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model (as of Table 5.14). Similarly, as of Table 5.3 and Table 5.15 
report significant negative cumulative average abnormal return around the 
announcement. For example, under market model Table 5.3 report a negative and 
statistically significant CAAR of -0.003 (t-value -2.7735) for the event window period 
covering the announcement day, i.e., one day before and +1 days. Similarly, Table 5.15 
reports a negative and statistically significant CAAR of -0.0054 under Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model for the same event window. Also, the short-term cumulative 
average abnormal return for the post-event windows period (1,5), (1,10) and (1,15) are 
significantly negative and reached a maximum of -0.005% for the event window (1,15) 
under market model and -0.0193% under Fama and French (1992) three-factor model for 
the event window (1,10). The country-specific investigation under market model (Table 
5.4) also reports significant negative average abnormal returns for the UK (-0.0039 and 
t-value -2.149 at t=0), the US (-0.0022 and t-value -2.518 at t=0), Germany (-0.0073 and 
t-value -2.558 at t+1), Australia (-0.0073 and t-value -1.681 at t+1), and rest of the Europe 
(-0.0028 and t-value -2.584 at t+3). Consistent with market model, the result under Fama 
and French (1992) three-factor model also reported similar tend as such UK (-0.0066 and 
t-value -2.8853, Z-value -2.1794 at t=0), the US (-0.0038% and t-value -3.0822, Z-value 
-3.4462 at t=0), Germany (-1.04 and t-value -2.6914 at t+1), Australia (-0.0118,  t-value 




-1.6869, z-value -2.1928 at t+1), and rest of the Europe (-0.0034 and t-value -1.6772, z-
value -1.7714 at t+2). 
   Similarly, the CAARs for the event window that covers the event day (-1,1) is 
also significantly negative for the UK and Germany. Also, Table 5.3 also reports that 
CAARs for the main event window covering -10 days to +15 days are also significantly 
negative for Japan (-0.0136 and t-value -2.0407) and rest of Asia Pacific (-0.0268 and t-
value -1.8902). The robustness check result (Table 5.17) using Fama and French (1999) 
three-factor model reveals negative and statistically significant CAARs for event window 
(-1,1) for UK, UK, Germany, France, Australia, rest of Europe and Rest of Asia Pacific. 
In addition, CAARs for post-event windows are negative and statistically significant for 
most not all. This result rules out the possibility of the positive link between the social 
index addition and short-term stock return. Hence, I conclude that the stock market 
penalises the FTSE4Good index addition. The result of the current study is consistent 
with Park and Lee (2018), Oberndorfer et al., (2013), Cheung (2011), all report a 
significantly negative return for firms added in the social index. 
On the other hand, the deletion from the FTSE4Good index does not lead any 
material changes to the stock performance in the short-term under the market model. 
Consistent with Robinson et al., (2011), Curran and Moran (2007), both AARs and 
CARRs do not change significantly after deletion from the FTSE4Good index, suggesting 
market participants do not react immediately on the deletion announcement. The 
robustness check under the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model, deleted firms 
experience a significantly negative average abnormal return on the  day and 1-day post to 
the event. However, Table 5.18 does not exhibit any precise pattern as the trend in AAR 
is rather mixed.  




The post-event CAARs for firms deleted from the FTSE4Good Global index 
under both models (market and three-factor) are statistically significant. For example, 
Tabe 5.7 reports significantly negative CAAR of -0.0003 (z-value -2.0237) for the event 
window covering (1,5) and consistent with CAAR result under Fama and French (1992) 
three-factor model (-0.0044, z-value -3.7500) for the same event window ( Table 5.19). 
Similarly, the AARs and CAARS for sub-group categories, are also consistent under both 
models. This study finds the post-event AARs, and CAARs are negative and statistically 
significant for most after the but not all. This result corroborates the results of Park and 
Lee (2018), Kappou and Oikonomou (2016), Cheung (2011), Doh et al., (2010), Becchetti 
et al. (2009), who also report significant negative returns after the deletion from the social 
index. 
The essence of this study is that it provides valuable insight into the firms’ 
commitment to CSR compliance on their long-run stock returns. The result of this study 
suggests that addition to FTSE4Good global index is valuable for the companies, and they 
generate a significant positive abnormal return to shareholders/investors over the long-
run. Investors could accumulate up to a maximum of 4.41% (as of Table 5.10) abnormal 
returns in a matter of a year (240 trading days) after the announcement. Table 5.10 also 
reports that longer the investor holds the FTSE4Good companies’ stock, higher the return 
they can gain. My long-term stock return result is consistent with Park and Lee (2018) 
and Robinson et al. (2011), both report a positive abnormal return in the long-term for the 
firms added in the SRI index. The cross-country/region investigation reveals that the 
average BHAR for Japan, Europe and the Asia Pacific are positive and statistically 
significant (as of Table 5.11) over a longer period. Hence, for investors and stock market 
participants, the FTSE4Good index membership is a signal of the firm’s 




competitive/distinct capability, essentially lead to an improvement in the cash flow and 
strong growth. The higher abnormal returns in the long-term are the reflection for 
investor's attraction and confidence towards the socially responsible companies. 
However, firms deleted from FTSE4Good Global index do not have similar return 
compared with the added firms. Consistent with Park and Lee (2018) and Kappu and 
Oikonomou (2016), I report that deleted companies to experience a significantly negative 
return for first 2 months (60 trading days) after the announcement (as of Table 5.12). 
Table 5.13 also reports that firms in the UK and Europe experience negative abnormal 
returns up to 120 days and 30 days post-event, respectively.  
I report that the short-term adverse reaction for added companies is temporary and 
do not continue for a longer period. The result for long-term stock return documented the 
positive return over a longer period, and interestingly the returns are getting higher and 
stronger as time elapsed. In aggregate investor can enjoy a maximum of 4.41% CAAR is 
reported in a matter of 240 trading days (i.e. one year). In addition, companies from the 
Asia Pacific (excluding Japan) are among top who can enjoy a maximum of 8.6% (as of 
Table 5.11) return within 180 days after firms’ addition in the FTSE4Good Global index. 
Similarly, investors from Europe and Japan can enjoy a maximum of 5.05% and 4.9% 
positive return respectively, for the period of 240 days.  Also, long-run stock return offsets 
the magnitude of the maximum temporary loss of 0.57% (as of Table 5.3) in the short-
term implying the initial cost to CSR is later compensated by the higher long-run return. 
In this sense, the long-term result strongly supports the business case of CSR and 
consistent with the with enlightening stakeholder theory (Jensen 2001,2010), which 
asserts that multiple stakeholder’s satisfaction is imperative for firms’ long-term value 
maximisation. Hence, firms’ addition in the social index signals valuable information to 




the stakeholders which attract the investors towards CSR firms. Firms’ CSR reputations 
are the reflection of their management capabilities, resource availability, continuous 
commitment to future growth and corporate expansion opportunities.  The higher demand 
for CSR companies’ stock by investors consequently guides to the significant increase in 
the stock return in the long-run. It is, therefore, the firm’s addition and deletion in the 
social index reduces the information asymmetry among stakeholders (as well as 
shareholders, investors) and becoming important criteria for investment decisions. 
 
5.6.2. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine whether the CSR performance signals credible and 
valuable information to the shareholders and other stock market participants. The finding 
of this suggests that companies’ commitment to addressing multiple stakeholder issues, 
expectation and retention of their loyalty benefited from increased financial performance 
over the long term. Especially, firms’ commitment to the CSR compliance signals/reflects 
the firm’s competitive capability and their vision to the long sustainable future business 
growth.  
This study extends the CSR-CFP literature by investigating the impact of the 
firm’s addition and deletion from the social index on the long-term stock performance. 
Although this study finds a significant negative return in the short term, it suggests that 
the firms listed in the social indices are valuable for companies as well as investors in 
long-term as the share price increases significantly over the long term. The long-term 
stock return is much higher than that of temporary loss (i.e. 4.41% of average abnormal 
return in a year compared to the -0.5% cumulative average abnormal loss in the short 
term). Hence, the CSR pay off in long-term as stakeholders have increased confidence 




and loyalty towards the firm. Also, social index addition signals firms reduced risk and 
consequently attract investors. 
Additionally, investors who would like to invest are heavily relied on socially 
responsible firms to balance and manage their portfolio. Further, my finding reports that 
no substantial evidence in stock price movement in short-term for those companies 
deleted from the social index. The long-term analysis for the same reveals that the adverse 
effect for the first few months but no significant changes in the stock price in the long-
term. Hence, being deleted from the FTSE4Good global index does not have any 
influence on the behaviour of stock market participants over the long term.  
The result of this study has several implications for the various parties and also 
for the corporate managers. The result of this study provides the evidence that firms 
addition in the FTSE4Good index leads to a continual rise in their share price in the 
market over the long-term but no significant changes in price after the deletion from the 
index. From the stock market, participants or investor point of view, acquiring the stock 
of added firms around announcement time and holding for long-term gives a significant 
return in a matter of months and years. The significant long-term abnormal return that I 
report in this study implies that the FTSE4Good index announcement regarding the 
addition and deletion do signal the valuable information. Moreover, investors do take 
such changes to the index configuration in evaluating and maintaining their portfolio 
because of such announcements signal to firms future/potential strategy for growth and 
improvement. Also, from the corporate managers’ perspective, although maintaining the 
CSR brand is costly in the short term, but it eventually pays off in the long term as brand 
signals a corporate commitment to the environment, society, community and of course 
the future growth of the company. Managerial focus on CSR commitment leads to the 




improved stakeholder's confidence and investor attraction towards firms. Hence, 
consistency in CSR is vital for future growth. 
In this study, I examined the impact of the social index on both short term and 
long term stock return. Despite my best attempt to improve the generalisability in an 
economic return of the CSR initiative through multi-country setting, there are still some 
ways that the CSR-CFP relationship can be improved or extended. For example, this study 
sample limited to 26 cross-country data all, especially from the developed economies. 
Future research could consider examining the CSR-CFP relationship in the emerging 
economies using multi-country setting, as such a market could have a different 
perspective on CSR. In this study, especially in long-term analysis, I examined buy-hold-
abnormal returns for up to the 240 trading days after the announcement, future research 
could improve a similar return by examining the longer post-event period. Finally, from 
this study, it is evidenced that the firms from emerging countries (rest of Asia Pacific) 
experience significantly positive abnormal return over the long-term. Hence, a holistic 
approach of CSR-CFP analysis from an emerging market is a potential for future research 
which can explore more to help ethical fund manager for their investment decision. 





Table 5. 1 Description of Sample 
Panel A: Data description for short-term stock return (Addition)







Rest of Europe 124 17.10%
Rest of Asia 44 6.07%
Total 725 100.00%
Panel B: Data description for short-term stock return (Deletion)




Rest of Europe 43 7.45%
Rest of Asia 139 24.09%
Total 577 100.00%  
Panel C: Data description for long-term stock return (Addition)
Country Name No of observations %
UK 76 12.75%
US and Canada 137 22.99%
Japan 125 20.97%
Europe 190 31.88%
Rest of Asia 68 11.41%
Total 596 100.00%
Panel D: Data description for long-term stock return (Deletion)




Rest of Europe 101 24.63%








Table 5. 2 Short term average abnormal stock return of companies added in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index – Market model 
Day aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0002 725 0.4308 -0.4601
-9 -0.0001 725 -0.1982 -0.9058
-8 0.0002 725 0.2840 0.3569
-7 -0.0007 725 -1.1449 0.2827
-6 -0.0001 725 -0.1063 -0.8315
-5 -0.0001 725 -0.2178 -1.7972 *
-4 -0.0002 725 -0.3561 -0.9801
-3 0.0005 725 0.7988 1.9168 *
-2 0.0001 725 0.0894 0.3569
-1 -0.0010 725 -1.5061 -1.5743
0 -0.0009 725 -1.6256 -2.4657 **
1 -0.0011 725 -1.8338 * -1.3515
2 -0.0019 725 -2.5345 ** -2.1686 **
3 0.0001 725 0.2054 -0.0887
4 0.0000 725 -0.0544 -1.3515
5 0.0001 725 0.1573 0.5798
6 0.0003 725 0.4624 2.0654 **
7 -0.0005 725 -0.8165 -0.4601
8 -0.0027 725 -1.5299 -0.5344
9 0.0001 725 0.1247 0.2827
10 0.0001 725 0.1204 0.7283
11 -0.0010 725 -1.6517 * -1.9457 *
12 0.0015 725 2.2754 ** -0.3859
13 -0.0004 725 -0.6517 0.1341
14 -0.0012 725 -1.7433 * -2.0200 **
15 0.0000 725 0.0307 1.3226
Global Sample
  
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
Table 5. 3 Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of stock added in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index– Market model 
Window caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0079 725 -2.4814 ** -1.5001
(-5...-1) -0.0008 725 -0.6395 -0.7573
(-3...-1) -0.0005 725 -0.4490 0.2827
(-1...1) -0.0030 725 -2.7735 *** -1.5001
(0...0) -0.0009 725 -1.6256 -2.4657 **
(1...5) -0.0028 725 -1.9169 * -0.6830
(1...10) -0.0046 725 -2.2013 ** 0.1341
(1...15) -0.0057 725 -2.3393 ** -1.7972 *
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 4 Country-wise short-term average abnormal stock return of companies added in the FTSE4Good Global Index– Market model 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0022 102 1.3975 -0.6443 -0.0004 167 -0.3653 0.4110 -0.0013 34 -0.7507 -1.2975
-9 0.0001 102 0.0605 0.3608 -0.0007 167 -0.6432 -0.2175 -0.0017 34 -0.7005 -0.9493
-8 0.0020 102 1.0828 1.3658 -0.0012 167 -0.7359 0.2539 -0.0014 34 -0.6019 -0.6011
-7 -0.0006 102 -0.3555 1.1648 0.0004 167 0.3080 0.0968 0.0017 34 0.8023 -0.2529
-6 -0.0009 102 -0.5049 -0.2423 -0.0009 167 -0.9212 -0.0604 0.0017 34 0.4589 0.0953
-5 -0.0021 102 -1.1963 -1.6493 * 0.0006 167 0.7791 -1.0032 -0.0025 34 -0.6504 -1.2975
-4 -0.0016 102 -0.6824 -0.2423 0.0011 167 1.2121 -0.2175 0.0002 34 0.1396 0.0953
-3 0.0006 102 0.4382 0.5618 0.0035 167 2.7241 *** 3.3967 *** 0.0013 34 0.5167 0.7917
-2 0.0023 102 1.2794 0.9638 0.0002 167 0.1651 0.0968 0.0049 34 1.4674 0.7917
-1 -0.0034 102 -1.6799 * -0.8453 -0.0012 167 -0.9298 -0.8461 -0.0052 34 -1.3111 -1.9938 **
0 -0.0039 102 -2.1493 ** -0.0413 -0.0022 167 -2.5180 ** -2.5746 *** -0.0014 34 -0.3965 -1.2975
1 -0.0008 102 -0.3689 -0.8453 0.0009 167 0.8796 -0.2175 -0.0073 34 -2.5584 ** -1.2975
2 -0.0059 102 -1.8586 * -0.2423 0.0002 167 0.1925 0.4110 -0.0050 34 -1.3028 -1.6456 *
3 0.0009 102 0.3696 1.3658 0.0006 167 0.5773 0.7253 0.0019 34 0.7123 1.4880
4 0.0002 102 0.1010 -0.6443 -0.0008 167 -0.6190 -1.6318 -0.0081 34 -1.6946 * -2.3420 **
5 0.0029 102 1.7153 * 0.3608 -0.0001 167 -0.0926 0.7253 -0.0020 34 -0.5543 -1.2975
6 0.0035 102 2.3897 ** 3.3759 *** -0.0008 167 -0.6151 1.3539 -0.0004 34 -0.1154 0.0953
7 -0.0027 102 -1.5255 0.1598 0.0005 167 0.5295 0.7253 0.0022 34 0.7006 0.7917
8 -0.0028 102 -0.9144 -1.8504 * -0.0018 167 -2.2438 ** -0.6889 -0.0009 34 -0.2346 -1.2975
9 -0.0033 102 -1.7796 * -1.2473 -0.0006 167 -0.6528 -0.6889 -0.0015 34 -0.4936 -1.2975
10 -0.0022 102 -0.9113 -0.6443 0.0006 167 0.4458 0.8825 0.0028 34 1.2922 2.1844 **
11 0.0017 102 0.6425 -0.0413 -0.0016 167 -1.2613 -1.7889 * 0.0008 34 0.3132 -0.9493
12 0.0036 102 1.2104 -1.0463 0.0018 167 1.8306 * 0.2539 0.0029 34 1.1640 0.0953
13 0.0031 102 1.6693 * 1.9689 ** 0.0001 167 0.1515 0.8825 0.0006 34 0.1676 0.0953
14 -0.0020 102 -0.9281 -1.4483 0.0009 167 0.7453 -0.5318 -0.0068 34 -2.1025 ** -0.9493
15 0.0019 102 0.7083 0.7628 0.0002 167 0.1723 1.5110 0.0033 34 0.9296 0.0953
UK US GERMANY
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5.4, cont. 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0002 59 0.1453 0.1687 -0.0005 152 -0.3321 -0.4537 0.0016 43 0.7465 0.3378
-9 0.0012 59 0.6571 -0.0940 -0.0022 152 -1.4879 -0.7815 0.0055 43 1.6692 * 0.9551
-8 0.0014 59 1.0466 0.6940 -0.0001 152 -0.0624 -0.1259 0.0023 43 1.0328 0.6465
-7 0.0014 59 0.6724 0.1687 -0.0005 152 -0.4159 -0.2898 -0.0020 43 -0.6835 -0.5880
-6 0.0015 59 0.9538 2.0074 ** 0.0006 152 0.4664 -0.6176 -0.0005 43 -0.1776 0.3378
-5 -0.0006 59 -0.3816 -0.3567 0.0003 152 0.2568 0.0380 0.0026 43 1.2492 0.0292
-4 0.0029 59 2.1521 ** 1.4821 -0.0012 152 -0.8358 -0.2898 -0.0004 43 -0.1837 0.3378
-3 0.0006 59 0.4311 0.6940 -0.0021 152 -1.3544 -0.6176 0.0001 43 0.0391 0.9551
-2 0.0008 59 0.4483 1.2194 -0.0015 152 -1.2115 -1.2732 -0.0015 43 -0.6645 0.0292
-1 0.0001 59 0.1102 0.1687 0.0012 152 0.7987 0.2018 -0.0001 43 -0.0656 0.6465
0 0.0006 59 0.3558 -0.3567 -0.0006 152 -0.4389 -0.6176 -0.0007 43 -0.3013 -0.5880
1 -0.0013 59 -1.2172 -1.1447 -0.0010 152 -0.7984 -1.2732 -0.0082 43 -1.3104 0.0292
2 -0.0016 59 -1.1187 -1.6701 * -0.0020 152 -1.3819 -1.4371 -0.0129 43 -1.7880 * -1.8224 *
3 -0.0025 59 -1.6331 -1.4074 0.0023 152 1.1088 -0.1259 -0.0121 43 -1.7243 * -1.2052
4 -0.0007 59 -0.3787 -1.4074 -0.0005 152 -0.3321 -0.7815 0.0044 43 1.1919 0.0292
5 0.0027 59 1.4668 0.6940 0.0010 152 0.7015 0.2018 0.0000 43 0.0001 0.6465
6 0.0014 59 1.0252 1.2194 0.0016 152 1.1204 1.6769 * -0.0011 43 -0.5990 -0.8966
7 0.0020 59 0.9608 0.4313 -0.0008 152 -0.5880 0.3657 -0.0005 43 -0.2560 -0.2794
8 -0.0020 59 -1.6584 * -0.8820 -0.0013 152 -0.9534 -0.7815 -0.0001 43 -0.0194 0.6465
9 0.0011 59 0.7953 0.9567 0.0017 152 1.1530 2.3324 ** -0.0008 43 -0.3475 -1.2052
10 0.0006 59 0.4768 -0.6194 0.0013 152 0.7681 1.3491 0.0001 43 0.0562 -0.2794
11 -0.0021 59 -2.5456 ** -1.1447 -0.0022 152 -1.4933 -0.2898 -0.0012 43 -0.5897 -0.5880
12 -0.0002 59 -0.1400 -0.3567 -0.0001 152 -0.0356 0.5296 0.0032 43 1.3925 0.9551
13 0.0000 59 0.0057 0.9567 -0.0017 152 -1.0321 -0.6176 -0.0029 43 -1.4107 -0.2794
14 0.0001 59 0.0824 0.1687 -0.0040 152 -2.3153 ** -1.4371 0.0029 43 1.1722 -0.2794
15 -0.0004 59 -0.3122 0.1687 -0.0014 152 -0.7713 -0.1259 0.0003 43 0.1277 -1.2052
AUSTRALIAFRANCE JAPAN
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5.4, cont. 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0012 124 0.9032 0.7951 -0.0017 44 -1.0002 -0.9947
-9 -0.0008 124 -0.7021 -1.7408 * 0.0025 44 1.1137 -0.0683
-8 -0.0006 124 -0.6357 -1.3785 0.0010 44 0.5293 -0.0683
-7 -0.0009 124 -0.7582 0.2517 -0.0105 44 -2.6257 *** -1.3035
-6 -0.0008 124 -0.7882 -2.6465 *** 0.0003 44 0.1753 -0.6859
-5 0.0003 124 0.2870 -0.6540 -0.0008 44 -0.4993 -0.3771
-4 -0.0016 124 -1.0169 -3.0087 *** -0.0002 44 -0.0903 -0.3771
-3 -0.0013 124 -1.0421 -0.8351 -0.0002 44 -0.0819 -0.0683
-2 -0.0016 124 -1.3751 -0.2917 0.0021 44 0.7373 -0.0683
-1 0.0014 124 0.8997 -0.4729 -0.0078 44 -2.2929 ** -1.3035
0 0.0007 124 0.5289 -1.1974 0.0014 44 0.3772 0.2406
1 -0.0007 124 -0.5599 1.8819 * -0.0002 44 -0.0850 -0.3771
2 -0.0023 124 -1.0323 -1.3785 0.0043 44 1.8678 * 0.5494
3 -0.0028 124 -2.5837 *** -1.9219 * -0.0030 44 -1.0594 -0.3771
4 0.0010 124 0.6496 1.7008 * 0.0024 44 0.6876 0.8582
5 -0.0018 124 -0.9099 0.0705 -0.0042 44 -1.8371 * -0.6859
6 0.0005 124 0.4049 -0.8351 -0.0026 44 -1.0969 -0.6859
7 -0.0022 124 -1.3346 -2.2842 ** 0.0025 44 1.1967 0.2406
8 0.0008 124 0.4903 -0.2917 -0.0067 44 -1.7451 * -2.5388 **
9 0.0024 124 1.7512 * 0.6140 -0.0006 44 -0.1952 -0.0683
10 -0.0008 124 -0.6358 -0.8351 0.0000 44 -0.0026 0.2406
11 -0.0011 124 -0.8945 -1.1974 -0.0021 44 -1.0994 0.2406
12 0.0009 124 0.6953 -1.0163 0.0042 44 1.7808 * 1.1670
13 -0.0007 124 -0.5322 -1.3785 -0.0039 44 -1.7068 * -1.6124
14 -0.0007 124 -0.4127 -0.8351 -0.0014 44 -0.7061 0.2406
15 0.0004 124 0.2232 1.1574 -0.0014 44 -0.4717 0.5494
REST OF EU REST OF ASIA PACIFIC
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 5 Country-wise cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of stock added in the FTSE4Good Global Index– Market model 
Window caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0074 102 -0.6641 -1.0463 -0.0006 167 -0.0893 -0.8461 -0.0213 34 -1.2985 -0.2529
(-5...-1) -0.0043 102 -0.9549 -0.6443 0.0042 167 1.7608 * 0.4110 -0.0013 34 -0.2285 -0.6011
(-3...-1) -0.0006 102 -0.1708 -0.6443 0.0025 167 1.1666 1.5110 0.0010 34 0.1835 0.7917
(-1...1) -0.0081 102 -2.1289 ** -1.4483 -0.0026 167 -1.5298 -1.1604 -0.0139 34 -1.6599 * -0.6011
(0...0) -0.0039 102 -2.1493 ** -0.0413 -0.0022 167 -2.5180 ** -2.5746 *** -0.0014 34 -0.3965 -1.2975
(1...5) -0.0027 102 -0.5391 0.9638 0.0008 167 0.3268 -0.2175 -0.0205 34 -2.4461 ** -1.6456 *
(1...10) -0.0102 102 -1.2198 -0.2423 -0.0013 167 -0.4157 1.6682 * -0.0184 34 -1.4106 -0.9493
(1...15) -0.0019 102 -0.2274 -1.4483 0.0003 167 0.0561 0.7253 -0.0177 34 -1.6916 * -1.2975
UK US GERMANY
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
Table 5.4, cont. 
Window caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) 0.0073 59 1.1398 1.2194 -0.0136 152 -2.0407 ** -1.1093 0.0014 43 0.1163 0.6465
(-5...-1) 0.0038 59 1.3787 1.2194 -0.0032 152 -1.0820 -1.4371 0.0006 43 0.1254 0.0292
(-3...-1) 0.0015 59 0.6612 0.1687 -0.0024 152 -0.9449 -0.6176 -0.0016 43 -0.3960 0.3378
(-1...1) -0.0006 59 -0.2175 -0.3567 -0.0004 152 -0.1850 0.3657 -0.0082 43 -1.3104 0.0292
(0...0) 0.0006 59 0.3558 -0.3567 -0.0006 152 -0.4389 -0.6176 -0.0007 43 -0.3013 -0.5880
(1...5) -0.0034 59 -1.1609 0.1687 -0.0001 152 -0.0448 0.3657 -0.0054 43 -0.7792 -0.8966
(1...10) -0.0003 59 -0.0717 -0.0940 0.0023 152 0.5274 0.0380 -0.0077 43 -0.9344 -0.2794
(1...15) -0.0028 59 -0.5476 -0.3567 -0.0071 152 -1.3170 -1.7648 * -0.0054 43 -0.6042 -0.5880
AUSTRALIAFRANCE JAPAN
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 







Table 5.5, cont.  
Window caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0110 124 -1.4637 -1.1974 -0.0268 44 -1.8902 * -0.9947
(-5...-1) -0.0028 124 -1.0454 -0.6540 -0.0068 44 -1.2910 0.2406
(-3...-1) -0.0016 124 -0.7062 -0.1106 -0.0058 44 -1.1198 -0.3771
(-1...1) -0.0046 124 -0.8344 -0.1106 -0.0066 44 -1.5431 -1.6124
(0...0) 0.0007 124 0.5289 -1.1974 0.0014 44 0.3772 0.2406
(1...5) -0.0065 124 -1.9008 * -1.3785 -0.0007 44 -0.1269 -0.0683
(1...10) -0.0058 124 -1.2679 -0.2917 -0.0082 44 -0.7860 -0.6859
(1...15) -0.0070 124 -1.1738 0.2517 -0.0128 44 -1.1496 -1.3035
REST OF EU REST OF ASIA PACIFIC
 
 Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 




Table 5. 6 Short term average abnormal stock return of companies deleted from the 
FTSE4Good Global Index – Market model 
Day aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0025 577 2.0887 ** 0.4698
-9 0.0000 577 0.0110 -1.5250
-8 -0.0007 577 -0.7695 -1.4419
-7 0.0014 577 1.1126 -0.5276
-6 0.0011 577 1.1665 0.6361
-5 -0.0004 577 -0.4040 -0.6938
-4 -0.0001 577 -0.1154 -2.7718 ***
-3 0.0002 577 0.1570 -1.1925
-2 0.0003 577 0.3129 0.2205
-1 0.0001 577 0.0552 -1.1925
0 -0.0010 577 -1.0676 -1.2757
1 -0.0002 577 -0.2503 -1.5250
2 0.0006 577 0.5627 0.3036
3 0.0001 577 0.1123 -1.4419
4 -0.0010 577 -0.9180 -2.0237 **
5 0.0001 577 0.1186 -1.0263
6 -0.0023 577 -1.9002 * -1.1925
7 0.0018 577 1.2665 1.5504
8 -0.0002 577 -0.2136 -0.2782
9 0.0013 577 1.2723 0.7192
10 0.0009 577 0.9029 -0.3613
11 -0.0013 577 -1.3825 -0.5276
12 0.0005 577 0.5582 -0.0289
13 -0.0010 577 -0.9050 -0.9432
14 -0.0007 577 -0.5633 0.9686
15 -0.0029 577 -0.5966 0.8854
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
Table 5. 7 Short term cumulative average abnormal stock return of companies deleted 
from the FTSE4Good Global Index – Market model 
windows caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0011 577 -0.1210 -1.0263
(-5...-1) 0.0000 577 0.0176 -0.8601
(-3...-1) 0.0006 577 0.2940 -1.8575 *
(-1...1) -0.0011 577 -0.7033 -0.9432
(0...0) -0.0010 577 -1.0676 -1.2757
(1...5) -0.0003 577 -0.1246 -2.0237 **
(1...10) 0.0010 577 0.2804 -1.2757
(1...15) -0.0044 577 -0.5735 -0.9432
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 8 Country-wise short-term average abnormal stock return of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global Index – Market 
model 
windows aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0049 51 1.5609 1.1107 0.0016 193 0.5329 0.0887 0.0016 151 1.2509 0.0229
-9 -0.0022 51 -0.7455 0.2517 0.0006 193 0.6359 -0.2095 -0.0013 151 -1.2109 -1.4834
-8 0.0071 51 2.2582 ** 1.6834 * -0.0012 193 -0.9659 -0.0604 -0.0037 151 -3.3292 *** -3.4917 ***
-7 0.0114 51 2.3177 ** -0.0347 -0.0017 193 -0.8163 -0.5077 0.0007 151 0.5437 0.5250
-6 0.0075 51 2.4413 ** 0.8244 0.0010 193 0.5716 1.2814 -0.0009 151 -0.6788 -0.3118
-5 -0.0057 51 -0.7731 -1.1800 0.0013 193 0.8605 -0.3586 -0.0009 151 -0.7599 -0.4792
-4 -0.0007 51 -0.1518 -0.6073 -0.0028 193 -1.2479 -4.0858 *** -0.0006 151 -0.4349 -0.4792
-3 0.0040 51 1.2943 0.2517 -0.0016 193 -0.9028 -1.9986 ** 0.0009 151 0.6475 0.5250
-2 -0.0005 51 -0.1447 -0.8937 0.0006 193 0.2766 0.0887 -0.0018 151 -1.3131 0.1903
-1 -0.0010 51 -0.2557 -0.0347 0.0002 193 0.0842 -1.5513 -0.0002 151 -0.1270 -0.1445
0 -0.0039 51 -1.5892 -2.0391 ** -0.0002 193 -0.1298 -0.8059 0.0000 151 -0.0194 0.6924
1 -0.0037 51 -1.1810 -0.8937 0.0012 193 0.9289 -0.8059 -0.0023 151 -1.6905 * -1.4834
2 -0.0031 51 -0.8660 0.2517 -0.0001 193 -0.0598 -0.6568 -0.0008 151 -0.6764 0.0229
3 -0.0028 51 -0.6775 -2.0391 ** 0.0007 193 0.4417 0.5359 0.0023 151 1.4263 -0.1445
4 -0.0018 51 -0.4295 -0.8937 -0.0001 193 -0.0766 0.3868 -0.0043 151 -2.9319 *** -2.3202 **
5 -0.0076 51 -1.1402 0.8244 0.0001 193 0.0327 -0.9550 0.0018 151 1.1056 0.1903
6 -0.0031 51 -0.5260 -0.3210 0.0000 193 0.0227 -2.8931 *** -0.0012 151 -0.6123 1.1944
7 0.0051 51 1.0914 0.5380 0.0055 193 1.7627 * -1.4022 -0.0014 151 -0.5822 1.6965 *
8 -0.0082 51 -1.8837 * -1.7527 * 0.0015 193 1.0073 0.6850 0.0015 151 1.2234 1.3618
9 0.0039 51 0.8348 0.5380 0.0041 193 2.3440 ** 1.2814 -0.0008 151 -0.6327 0.0229
10 -0.0132 51 -2.7249 *** -3.1844 *** -0.0013 193 -0.9853 -1.7004 * 0.0036 151 2.4876 ** 1.5292
11 -0.0063 51 -1.6517 * -1.4664 0.0018 193 1.3976 0.9832 -0.0036 151 -1.4087 -0.1445
12 0.0038 51 0.5863 -0.8937 -0.0010 193 -0.8265 -0.8059 0.0012 151 0.5795 0.0229
13 -0.0029 51 -0.7137 -0.3210 -0.0036 193 -2.7654 *** -2.4459 ** -0.0020 151 -0.6704 0.8597
14 -0.0061 51 -1.9328 * -2.3254 ** 0.0012 193 0.7950 0.8341 -0.0065 151 -1.5405 -0.3118
15 0.0094 51 2.1497 ** 1.1107 0.0011 193 0.8987 -0.2095 -0.0170 151 -0.8676 0.8597
JAPANUK US
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5.8, cont. 
windows aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0016 43 0.5334 -0.8077 0.0035 139 1.6566 * -0.1733
-9 0.0025 43 1.0159 0.3593 0.0024 139 0.9245 -0.3522
-8 0.0017 43 0.5550 0.6511 0.0000 139 0.0120 -0.5312
-7 0.0015 43 0.6563 -0.2242 0.0020 139 0.5120 -0.7101
-6 0.0008 43 0.2825 0.3593 0.0010 139 0.3446 -0.8890
-5 0.0011 43 0.5295 0.9428 -0.0006 139 -0.2659 -0.5312
-4 0.0036 43 1.3457 0.3593 0.0036 139 1.5355 -0.5312
-3 -0.0065 43 -0.7647 -1.0994 0.0019 139 0.8460 -0.5312
-2 -0.0033 43 -0.9678 -0.8077 0.0043 139 1.6238 1.2582
-1 -0.0001 43 -0.0224 0.3593 0.0010 139 0.3373 -0.5312
0 -0.0024 43 -1.2054 -0.8077 -0.0018 139 -0.7051 -1.2469
1 -0.0019 43 -0.8127 -2.5582 ** 0.0024 139 1.1904 0.7214
2 0.0105 43 3.0606 *** 1.8181 * 0.0014 139 0.3861 -0.1733
3 0.0026 43 0.9017 0.0676 -0.0029 139 -1.1399 -2.3205 **
4 0.0006 43 0.2120 -0.8077 0.0008 139 0.2071 -1.0680
5 -0.0017 43 -0.5038 -0.5159 0.0013 139 0.4351 -0.7101
6 -0.0001 43 -0.0195 -0.2242 -0.0056 139 -1.6539 * -0.1733
7 -0.0011 43 -0.3565 0.6511 -0.0005 139 -0.1589 1.6161
8 -0.0057 43 -2.4728 ** -1.9747 ** -0.0010 139 -0.4714 -0.8890
9 0.0051 43 1.6853 * 0.6511 0.0004 139 0.2360 -0.5312
10 0.0028 43 1.0990 0.0676 0.0039 139 1.6879 * 1.2582
11 0.0008 43 0.3253 0.0676 -0.0035 139 -1.6100 -1.9626 **
12 0.0047 43 1.8389 * 1.2346 0.0003 139 0.1470 0.7214
13 0.0006 43 0.1520 -0.5159 0.0032 139 1.2265 -0.3522
14 0.0059 43 1.6754 * 1.5263 0.0019 139 1.1795 1.2582
15 -0.0043 43 -1.2570 -0.2242 0.0015 139 0.7658 0.3635
REST OF EUROPEREST OF ASIA PACIFIC
 
  
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 9 Country-wise short-term cumulative average abnormal stock return of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global Index – 
Market model 
 
windows caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0159 51 -0.5667 -0.6073 0.0087 193 0.8095 -2.5949 *** -0.0355 151 -1.2473 0.5250
(-5...-1) -0.0039 51 -0.2887 -1.1800 -0.0023 193 -0.5143 -1.1040 -0.0025 151 -0.7855 0.3576
(-3...-1) 0.0025 51 0.3581 -1.1800 -0.0009 193 -0.2767 -1.7004 * -0.0011 151 -0.4343 -0.3118
(-1...1) -0.0086 51 -1.6461 * -2.0391 ** 0.0011 193 0.3756 -0.5077 -0.0026 151 -0.8244 -0.3118
(0...0) -0.0039 51 -1.5892 -2.0391 ** -0.0002 193 -0.1298 -0.8059 0.0000 151 -0.0194 0.6924
(1...5) -0.0188 51 -1.7699 * -2.0391 ** 0.0017 193 0.5427 -0.8059 -0.0033 151 -0.9411 -0.9813
(1...10) -0.0345 51 -2.0497 ** -2.6117 *** 0.0115 193 1.5573 -0.6568 -0.0015 151 -0.2574 -0.1445
(1...15) -0.0367 51 -2.0978 ** -1.7527 * 0.0109 193 1.2855 -1.4022 -0.0293 151 -1.0927 0.0229
JAPANUK US
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 5.9, cont. 
windows caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) 0.0193 43 0.6948 -0.2242 0.0208 139 1.5039 0.0057
(-5...-1) -0.0051 43 -0.4474 -0.8077 0.0103 139 1.5106 1.0793
(-3...-1) -0.0098 43 -0.9691 -1.3912 0.0073 139 1.4497 0.1846
(-1...1) -0.0045 43 -0.9757 -0.8077 0.0015 139 0.4492 -0.1733
(0...0) -0.0024 43 -1.2054 -0.8077 -0.0018 139 -0.7051 -1.2469
(1...5) 0.0100 43 1.6248 0.6511 0.0029 139 0.3006 -1.6048
(1...10) 0.0111 43 0.9196 -0.2242 0.0002 139 0.0203 -0.7101
(1...15) 0.0188 43 1.2109 0.3593 0.0035 139 0.3961 -0.3522
REST OF EUROPEREST OF ASIA PACIFIC
 
 Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 











(0...30) 0.0023 596 0.6441 0.6513
(0...60) 0.0050 596 0.9040 0.9241
(0...90) 0.0139 596 2.1969 ** 2.2764 **
(0...120) 0.0261 596 3.0101 *** 3.4762 ***
(0...150) 0.0322 596 3.2526 *** 3.7837 ***
(0...180) 0.0394 596 3.6162 *** 4.2897 ***
(0...210) 0.0398 596 3.6508 *** 4.1875 ***
(0...240) 0.0441 596 3.6651 *** 4.2377 ***
GLOBAL SAMPLE
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
















































(0...30) 0.0076 125 0.9032 0.9170 (0...30) 0.0013 137 0.1887 0.1913
(0...60) -0.0110 125 -0.9785 -0.9571 (0...60) 0.0070 137 0.5879 0.6070
(0...90) -0.0070 125 -0.5518 -0.5470 (0...90) 0.0180 137 1.2914 1.3969
(0...120) 0.0127 125 0.8205 0.8189 (0...120) 0.0175 137 0.9809 1.1001
(0...150) 0.0162 125 0.8740 0.8898 (0...150) 0.0208 137 1.0391 1.1556
(0...180) 0.0311 125 1.5182 1.5767 (0...180) 0.0126 137 0.6296 0.6800
(0...210) 0.0420 125 1.8282 * 1.9909 ** (0...210) 0.0113 137 0.5530 0.6020











(0...30) -0.0017 190 -0.2876 -0.2906 (0...30) 0.0122 76 0.9675 1.0723
(0...60) 0.0108 190 1.1833 1.3319 (0...60) 0.0069 76 0.3958 0.3782
(0...90) 0.0210 190 2.1169 ** 2.3575 ** (0...90) 0.0123 76 0.6379 0.6055
(0...120) 0.0317 190 2.1049 ** 2.7327 *** (0...120) 0.0219 76 1.1610 1.1316
(0...150) 0.0331 190 2.0687 ** 2.4906 ** (0...150) 0.0176 76 0.8933 0.9016
(0...180) 0.0413 190 2.4624 ** 2.8214 *** (0...180) 0.0251 76 1.1381 1.1809
(0...210) 0.0419 190 2.4005 ** 2.6517 *** (0...210) 0.0233 76 1.0119 1.0273






(0...30) -0.0074 68 -0.7378 -0.7448
(0...60) 0.0070 68 0.4244 0.4309
(0...90) 0.0171 68 0.9235 0.9449
(0...120) 0.0377 68 1.4604 1.5705
(0...150) 0.0730 68 2.3778 ** 2.7527 ***
(0...180) 0.0862 68 2.3591 ** 2.8082 ***
(0...210) 0.0812 68 2.4514 ** 2.7163 ***







Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.














(0...30) -0.0109 410 -1.6780 * -1.5667
(0...60) -0.0012 410 -0.1104 -0.0826
(0...90) 0.0049 410 0.4029 0.4347
(0...120) 0.0183 410 1.2517 1.3683
(0...150) 0.0289 410 1.7497 * 1.9461 *
(0...180) 0.0272 410 1.5550 1.7038 *
(0...210) 0.0279 410 1.4600 1.5932




Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 































Table 5. 13 Country wise long-term stock return for the companies deleted from the 










(0...30) -0.0695 36 -2.6066 *** -3.0491 *** (0...30) 0.0005 132 0.0397 0.1055
(0...60) -0.0897 36 -2.4158 ** -2.6646 *** (0...60) -0.0102 132 -0.6955 -0.6923
(0...90) -0.0862 36 -2.6174 *** -2.6531 *** (0...90) -0.0088 132 -0.4318 -0.4005
(0...120) -0.0754 36 -1.9508 * -2.0535 ** (0...120) 0.0157 132 0.6800 0.7294
(0...150) -0.0490 36 -1.0631 -1.0775 (0...150) 0.0295 132 1.1883 1.2779
(0...180) -0.0177 36 -0.3818 -0.3858 (0...180) 0.0338 132 1.1246 1.2463
(0...210) -0.0112 36 -0.2091 -0.2089 (0...210) 0.0408 132 1.1754 1.3372










(0...30) -0.0267 101 -2.2515 ** -2.3790 ** (0...30) -0.0067 111 -0.6714 -0.6827
(0...60) 0.0103 101 0.4556 0.4862 (0...60) -0.0018 111 -0.1405 -0.1532
(0...90) 0.0097 101 0.3616 0.3988 (0...90) 0.0150 111 0.9797 1.0224
(0...120) 0.0329 101 0.9212 1.0004 (0...120) 0.0092 111 0.5699 0.5809
(0...150) 0.0437 101 0.9896 1.1104 (0...150) 0.0138 111 0.7604 0.7819
(0...180) 0.0349 101 0.7573 0.8482 (0...180) 0.0111 111 0.5887 0.5996
(0...210) 0.0203 101 0.4156 0.4747 (0...210) 0.0099 111 0.4793 0.5003







(0...30) 0.0379 30 1.0547 1.2982
(0...60) 0.0969 30 1.0550 1.4556
(0...90) 0.1017 30 1.1152 1.5316
(0...120) 0.1140 30 0.9936 1.3897
(0...150) 0.1170 30 0.9961 1.3760
(0...180) 0.0890 30 0.8149 1.0871
(0...210) 0.1137 30 1.0161 1.3058









Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 








Table 5. 14 Short term average abnormal stock return of companies added in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and French 3 Factor model 
 
Day aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0009 725 1.4602 0.5189
-9 0.0015 725 2.1874 ** 2.8909 ***
-8 0.0008 725 1.2094 1.5566
-7 -0.0005 725 -0.7126 -0.4447
-6 0.0007 725 1.1237 0.0741
-5 -0.0009 725 -1.4403 -3.7062 ***
-4 0.0005 725 0.7157 0.6671
-3 0.0002 725 0.2450 -0.3706
-2 -0.0016 725 -2.4221 ** -2.5202 **
-1 0.0001 725 0.1510 -2.2237 **
0 -0.0025 725 -3.6954 *** -4.8922 ***
1 -0.0027 725 -3.9103 *** -4.0769 ***
2 -0.0032 725 -3.2428 *** -1.7049 *
3 -0.0004 725 -0.4836 -0.1482
4 -0.0011 725 -1.3837 -3.8545 ***
5 -0.0018 725 -2.1827 ** -2.5944 ***
6 0.0007 725 0.8820 1.8531 *
7 0.0003 725 0.4515 -0.3706
8 -0.0024 725 -3.0187 *** -4.0769 ***
9 0.0001 725 0.1187 0.0000
10 0.0017 725 2.3307 ** 2.8167 ***
11 -0.0010 725 -1.4470 -3.1132 ***
12 0.0020 725 2.3760 ** 0.3706
13 0.0019 725 2.6485 *** 2.2979 **
14 -0.0041 725 -4.5885 *** -1.4084
15 -0.0016 725 -1.6250 -1.1860
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 5. 15 Short term cumulative average abnormal stock return of companies added in 
the FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and French 3 Factor model 
Window caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0125 725 -2.7988 *** -2.6685 ***
(-5...-1) -0.0017 725 -1.1502 -1.0377
(-3...-1) -0.0013 725 -1.0955 -2.5944 ***
(-1...1) -0.0054 725 -2.2127 ** -3.7804 ***
(0...0) -0.0025 725 -3.6954 *** -4.8922 ***
(1...5) -0.0091 725 -4.9962 *** -5.4111 ***
(1...10) -0.0089 725 -3.5220 *** -3.4097 ***
(1...15) -0.0116 725 -3.4283 *** -3.5580 ***
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 16 Country-wise short-term average abnormal stock return of companies added in the FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and 
French 3 Factor model 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 -0.0016 102 -0.8780 -0.5713 0.0004 167 0.2972 0.6393 0.0004 34 0.2049 -0.3024
-9 -0.0005 102 -0.2418 -0.7723 0.0022 167 1.7350 * 3.3106 *** -0.0024 34 -0.8937 -0.9989
-8 0.0000 102 -0.0163 0.6348 0.0017 167 1.0235 1.7392 * -0.0018 34 -0.6664 0.0458
-7 -0.0017 102 -0.9212 0.2328 0.0008 167 0.5425 -0.4607 0.0003 34 0.1673 -1.3471
-6 0.0004 102 0.1688 -0.3703 -0.0005 167 -0.4800 0.7964 0.0002 34 0.0457 0.0458
-5 -0.0087 102 -3.7639 *** -2.3804 ** 0.0000 167 -0.0281 -2.6605 *** -0.0049 34 -1.3114 -1.6954 *
-4 0.0010 102 0.3971 -1.3753 -0.0005 167 -0.3986 -0.3035 -0.0011 34 -0.4528 -0.3024
-3 -0.0039 102 -2.3990 ** -1.5764 0.0020 167 1.4284 0.4822 0.0022 34 0.9272 1.4388
-2 -0.0050 102 -2.3648 ** -1.1743 -0.0005 167 -0.3239 0.0108 0.0028 34 0.8351 0.0458
-1 -0.0011 102 -0.4506 -0.9733 0.0033 167 1.9615 ** -0.4607 -0.0050 34 -1.0931 -2.0436 **
0 -0.0044 102 -2.1353 ** -0.5713 -0.0038 167 -3.0822 *** -3.4462 *** -0.0016 34 -0.4300 -0.6507
1 -0.0066 102 -2.8853 *** -2.1794 ** -0.0010 167 -0.8964 -2.0320 ** -0.0104 34 -2.6914 *** -1.3471
2 -0.0078 102 -2.0560 ** -0.1693 0.0022 167 1.5188 1.4250 -0.0079 34 -1.5040 -0.6507
3 0.0003 102 0.1246 0.2328 0.0017 167 1.1148 0.9536 0.0014 34 0.5131 0.3941
4 -0.0002 102 -0.1082 -2.3804 ** -0.0052 167 -3.4367 *** -2.8177 *** -0.0076 34 -1.8575 * -1.6954 *
5 0.0008 102 0.3686 -0.1693 0.0004 167 0.2582 -0.9321 -0.0059 34 -1.4928 -2.3919 **
6 0.0026 102 1.6068 1.8409 * 0.0017 167 1.1064 3.1534 *** 0.0008 34 0.2190 -0.3024
7 -0.0003 102 -0.1838 -1.3753 -0.0008 167 -0.5742 -0.6178 0.0032 34 1.1596 0.7423
8 -0.0006 102 -0.1649 -1.1743 -0.0038 167 -3.6212 *** -2.1891 ** -0.0009 34 -0.2034 -1.3471
9 -0.0053 102 -2.6218 *** -2.7824 *** -0.0059 167 -4.4639 *** -4.0748 *** 0.0000 34 -0.0096 -0.3024
10 -0.0023 102 -0.8630 -0.7723 0.0035 167 2.5959 *** 4.5677 *** 0.0047 34 2.0437 ** 0.7423
11 0.0023 102 0.7984 0.6348 -0.0017 167 -1.2984 -1.8749 * 0.0003 34 0.0787 -1.6954 *
12 0.0080 102 2.3269 ** 0.0317 0.0022 167 1.0993 0.9536 0.0028 34 1.0696 0.7423
13 0.0076 102 3.2356 *** 1.8409 * 0.0030 167 2.0413 ** 1.2678 0.0005 34 0.1267 0.0458
14 -0.0040 102 -1.5459 -2.9834 *** -0.0051 167 -2.6861 *** 0.0108 -0.0086 34 -2.4306 ** -0.9989




Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5.16, cont. 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0007 59 0.4590 -0.4506 0.0018 152 1.0923 1.3482 0.0031 43 1.1251 0.5847
-9 0.0026 59 1.2825 1.9130 * 0.0010 152 0.5832 0.3649 0.0061 43 1.9203 * 1.2020
-8 0.0036 59 2.2201 ** 2.1756 ** -0.0003 152 -0.1922 0.8565 0.0020 43 0.8266 -0.9583
-7 0.0025 59 1.1988 1.1251 -0.0005 152 -0.3591 -0.1268 -0.0021 43 -0.6671 -1.5755
-6 0.0005 59 0.2488 -0.1880 0.0023 152 1.5625 0.0371 0.0002 43 0.0588 0.5847
-5 -0.0010 59 -0.6241 -0.9759 0.0015 152 0.9422 -0.7824 0.0017 43 0.8510 -0.3411
-4 0.0040 59 2.5503 ** 2.1756 ** 0.0011 152 0.6811 1.8399 * -0.0029 43 -0.9742 -1.2669
-3 -0.0003 59 -0.2165 -0.7132 0.0018 152 1.0294 0.5288 -0.0026 43 -1.0029 -1.5755
-2 -0.0012 59 -0.5689 -1.5011 -0.0029 152 -1.9858 ** -2.9129 *** -0.0054 43 -2.3691 ** -1.2669
-1 -0.0016 59 -1.1759 -0.7132 0.0022 152 1.3496 0.2010 -0.0012 43 -0.4473 -0.0325
0 -0.0021 59 -0.9542 -2.2890 ** -0.0027 152 -1.7526 * -1.6018 -0.0023 43 -0.8572 -1.2669
1 -0.0030 59 -2.2002 ** -1.5011 0.0010 152 0.6775 -0.6185 -0.0118 43 -1.6869 * -2.1928 **
2 -0.0044 59 -2.5994 *** -3.0769 *** -0.0049 152 -1.6846 * -0.7824 -0.0235 43 -2.8613 *** -3.1186 ***
3 -0.0045 59 -2.3041 ** -1.5011 0.0000 152 -0.0163 0.5288 -0.0255 43 -2.9395 *** -3.4272 ***
4 -0.0032 59 -1.7760 * -2.2890 ** 0.0005 152 0.2768 -1.1101 0.0054 43 1.2364 -0.9583
5 -0.0021 59 -0.9644 -2.0264 ** 0.0005 152 0.2772 0.8565 -0.0014 43 -0.4745 0.2761
6 0.0020 59 0.9996 1.1251 0.0007 152 0.3198 -0.1268 -0.0008 43 -0.3943 -0.0325
7 0.0018 59 0.8237 0.5999 -0.0005 152 -0.3433 -0.4546 0.0020 43 0.9487 1.2020
8 -0.0065 59 -4.6574 *** -3.3395 *** -0.0006 152 -0.3804 -0.1268 -0.0013 43 -0.4821 -1.2669
9 0.0036 59 2.3095 ** 2.7009 *** 0.0035 152 2.3386 ** 1.1843 0.0002 43 0.0759 -0.0325
10 0.0014 59 0.8602 0.0746 0.0029 152 1.4740 1.6760 * 0.0001 43 0.0436 -0.3411
11 -0.0025 59 -2.1993 ** -2.8142 *** -0.0020 152 -1.2972 -1.6018 -0.0001 43 -0.0624 -0.0325
12 -0.0008 59 -0.5490 -0.4506 -0.0015 152 -0.8517 -0.1268 0.0016 43 0.5710 -0.6497
13 0.0029 59 1.8776 * 0.8625 -0.0008 152 -0.3952 2.3316 ** -0.0007 43 -0.2739 -0.3411
14 -0.0043 59 -1.6081 -0.9759 -0.0079 152 -3.3206 *** -2.0935 ** 0.0019 43 0.6545 1.2020




Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5.16, cont. 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0035 124 2.3175 ** 0.9125 -0.0021 44 -1.0305 -1.7625 *
-9 -0.0005 124 -0.3462 0.5547 0.0049 44 1.9806 ** 1.6325
-8 0.0012 124 1.0556 0.1968 -0.0008 44 -0.4017 -1.7625 *
-7 -0.0002 124 -0.2018 0.7336 -0.0084 44 -2.2172 ** -1.4538
-6 0.0003 124 0.2687 -0.5189 0.0010 44 0.5690 -0.8366
-5 0.0009 124 0.6755 -1.2346 0.0006 44 0.2469 0.0893
-4 -0.0006 124 -0.3964 -0.3400 0.0025 44 0.8729 1.0153
-3 -0.0007 124 -0.5472 0.0179 -0.0004 44 -0.1658 -0.2193
-2 -0.0002 124 -0.1126 -0.5189 0.0033 44 1.0806 1.0153
-1 0.0004 124 0.2393 -0.3400 -0.0082 44 -2.5438 ** -2.6884 ***
0 -0.0005 124 -0.3174 -1.5925 0.0000 44 -0.0102 -1.4538
1 -0.0014 124 -1.0997 -1.2346 -0.0039 44 -1.4418 -1.4538
2 -0.0034 124 -1.6722 * -1.7714 * 0.0019 44 0.8520 1.0153
3 -0.0018 124 -1.3863 -1.2346 -0.0070 44 -1.9670 ** -0.5279
4 0.0000 124 -0.0180 0.3758 0.0069 44 1.9375 * 0.7066
5 -0.0057 124 -2.4988 ** -2.1293 ** -0.0093 44 -3.5488 *** -2.6884 ***
6 -0.0004 124 -0.2778 -1.2346 -0.0006 44 -0.2476 0.3980
7 -0.0011 124 -0.6427 -0.3400 0.0082 44 3.5059 *** 2.2498 **
8 -0.0004 124 -0.2083 -0.6978 -0.0056 44 -1.3206 -2.0711 **
9 0.0061 124 3.9181 *** 3.4176 *** 0.0009 44 0.2726 1.0153
10 0.0014 124 1.0113 0.3758 0.0025 44 1.0497 -0.2193
11 -0.0018 124 -1.2461 -1.4135 -0.0003 44 -0.1338 0.0893
12 0.0022 124 1.4427 0.3758 0.0052 44 2.0314 ** 0.7066
13 0.0025 124 1.7719 * -0.1610 -0.0028 44 -1.2533 -0.8366
14 -0.0003 124 -0.1360 1.8072 * -0.0026 44 -1.1612 -0.5279
15 -0.0046 124 -1.5561 0.1968 -0.0017 44 -0.5983 -1.1452
REST OF EU REST OF ASIA PACIFIC
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 17 Short term cumulative average abnormal stock return of companies added in the FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and French 
3 Factor model 
Window caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0303 102 -2.8713 *** -2.7824 *** -0.0073 167 -0.9673 -1.4035 -0.0376 34 -1.6127 -1.6954 *
(-5...-1) -0.0176 102 -3.7010 *** -3.5865 *** 0.0044 167 1.6419 0.7964 -0.0059 34 -0.6094 0.0458
(-3...-1) -0.0099 102 -2.5479 ** -2.9834 *** 0.0049 167 2.0850 ** 0.7964 0.0001 34 0.0072 0.3941
(-1...1) -0.0120 102 -3.0253 *** -3.1845 *** -0.0016 167 -0.7584 -1.7177 * -0.0170 34 -1.6384 -1.6954 *
(0...0) -0.0044 102 -2.1353 ** -0.5713 -0.0038 167 -3.0822 *** -3.4462 *** -0.0016 34 -0.4300 -0.6507
(1...5) -0.0135 102 -2.6617 *** -2.5814 *** -0.0020 167 -0.6057 -1.8749 * -0.0304 34 -2.5913 *** -3.0884 ***
(1...10) -0.0193 102 -2.2452 ** -1.9784 ** -0.0073 167 -1.8461 * -2.0320 ** -0.0226 34 -1.6215 -1.3471
(1...15) -0.0049 102 -0.5180 -1.1743 -0.0125 167 -2.0881 ** -1.5606 -0.0267 34 -2.0403 ** -2.3919 **
GERMANYUK US
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
Table 5.17, cont. 
Window caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0178 59 -1.5487 -0.1880 -0.0009 152 -0.0708 0.3649 -0.0119 43 -0.6287 -1.2669
(-5...-1) -0.0001 59 -0.0214 1.1251 0.0036 152 0.9874 -0.1268 -0.0104 43 -1.7878 * -0.9583
(-3...-1) -0.0031 59 -1.0994 -1.2385 0.0010 152 0.3367 -1.1101 -0.0091 43 -2.1166 ** -2.5014 **
(-1...1) -0.0067 59 -2.0157 ** -3.0769 *** 0.0004 152 0.1667 0.3649 -0.0118 43 -1.6869 * -2.1928 **
(0...0) -0.0021 59 -0.9542 -2.2890 ** -0.0027 152 -1.7526 * -1.6018 -0.0023 43 -0.8572 -1.2669
(1...5) -0.0172 59 -4.5356 *** -3.3395 *** -0.0029 152 -0.5812 -0.1268 -0.0101 43 -1.0511 -0.9583
(1...10) -0.0149 59 -3.0414 *** -2.2890 ** 0.0030 152 0.4938 1.1843 -0.0098 43 -0.8406 -0.9583
(1...15) -0.0254 59 -3.0671 *** -2.0264 ** -0.0060 152 -0.6512 0.0371 -0.0084 43 -0.5649 -1.5755
AUSTRALIAFRANCE JAPAN
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 







Table 5.17, cont. 
Window caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0048 124 -0.4136 -1.0557 -0.0157 44 -1.0348 -0.2193
(-5...-1) -0.0001 124 -0.0350 0.1968 -0.0022 44 -0.3708 -0.2193
(-3...-1) -0.0005 124 -0.1879 -0.8768 -0.0053 44 -0.9994 -0.8366
(-1...1) -0.0038 124 -0.4865 -2.1293 ** -0.0122 44 -2.6189 *** -2.3797 **
(0...0) -0.0005 124 -0.3174 -1.5925 0.0000 44 -0.0102 -1.4538
(1...5) -0.0123 124 -3.2957 *** -3.5607 *** -0.0113 44 -1.6701 * -0.5279
(1...10) -0.0067 124 -1.1571 -2.1293 ** -0.0059 44 -0.5424 -0.8366
(1...15) -0.0086 124 -0.9713 -1.2346 -0.0082 44 -0.7327 -0.8366
REST OF EU REST OF ASIA PACIFIC
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 




Table 5. 18 Short term average abnormal stock return of companies deleted from the 
FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and French 3 Factor model 
Day aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0033 577 308:268 1.6667 *
-9 0.0022 577 2.4081 ** 1.5000
-8 -0.0010 577 -1.0339 -1.6667 *
-7 -0.0006 577 -0.3829 -1.0833
-6 0.0001 577 0.0930 -1.1667
-5 0.0014 577 1.2414 0.7500
-4 -0.0015 577 -1.3489 -2.9167 ***
-3 0.0004 577 0.3330 -2.7500 ***
-2 -0.0003 577 -0.2329 -2.3333 **
-1 0.0018 577 1.4384 1.5000
0 -0.0012 577 -1.1804 -2.8333 ***
1 -0.0011 577 -1.1696 -2.3333 **
2 -0.0010 577 -0.7871 -1.1667
3 -0.0011 577 -0.9887 -3.1667 ***
4 0.0003 577 0.2372 -2.7500 ***
5 -0.0014 577 -1.1775 -2.7500 ***
6 -0.0017 577 -1.1424 -1.3333
7 0.0010 577 0.6863 0.0833
8 -0.0021 577 -1.7653 * -3.0000 ***
9 0.0012 577 1.1163 1.7500 *
10 0.0038 577 3.7216 *** 2.6667 ***
11 -0.0018 577 -1.6864 * -1.1667
12 0.0005 577 0.4978 1.4167
13 0.0001 577 0.1045 0.4167
14 -0.0026 577 -1.8580 * -1.4167
15 0.0002 577 0.0468 5.0833 ***
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 5. 19 Short term cumulative average abnormal stock return of companies deleted 
from the FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and French 3 Factor model 
windows caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0010 577 -0.0953 -1.0833
(-5...-1) 0.0018 577 0.6330 -0.8333
(-3...-1) 0.0019 577 0.9167 -0.7500
(-1...1) -0.0005 577 -0.2793 -0.8333
(0...0) -0.0012 577 -1.1804 -2.8333 ***
(1...5) -0.0044 577 -1.3967 -3.7500 ***
(1...10) -0.0021 577 -0.4976 -1.9167 *
(1...15) -0.0056 577 -0.6670 -2.2500 **
Global Sample
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 20 Country-wise short-term average abnormal stock return of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global Index – Fama and 
French 3 Factor model 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0079 51 1.9667 ** -0.0422 0.0029 193 0.7871 -1.8644 * 0.0047 151 2.7730 *** 4.8539 ***
-9 -0.0040 51 -1.0936 -0.6149 0.0019 193 1.4928 0.6701 0.0043 151 3.2070 *** 2.1774 **
-8 0.0038 51 1.2114 -0.3286 -0.0036 193 -2.3858 ** -2.9081 *** -0.0019 151 -1.2779 -0.6665
-7 0.0150 51 2.9800 *** 0.8169 -0.0056 193 -1.6250 -1.8644 * -0.0013 151 -0.9292 -0.3319
-6 0.0029 51 0.6411 1.3896 -0.0007 193 -0.3092 -2.4608 ** -0.0009 151 -0.5819 -1.0011
-5 -0.0130 51 -1.6708 * -1.4740 0.0059 193 3.4464 *** 1.5647 0.0011 151 0.7915 0.8391
-4 -0.0091 51 -1.9967 ** -1.1877 -0.0066 193 -2.6506 *** -5.1445 *** 0.0009 151 0.5604 0.3372
-3 0.0091 51 1.6988 * -0.0422 -0.0014 193 -0.6494 -3.9517 *** 0.0033 151 2.0687 ** 1.1736
-2 0.0010 51 0.2521 0.2442 0.0027 193 1.0863 -2.0135 ** -0.0039 151 -2.4750 ** -0.6665
-1 -0.0010 51 -0.2331 -1.4740 0.0043 193 1.7029 * 1.2665 0.0032 151 1.9588 * 3.0138 ***
0 -0.0050 51 -1.6428 -1.7604 * 0.0015 193 0.8407 -1.1190 -0.0023 151 -1.2969 -1.1684
1 -0.0034 51 -0.8887 -0.3286 -0.0014 193 -0.8363 -2.3117 ** -0.0013 151 -0.9845 -1.0011
2 -0.0147 51 -2.7538 *** -1.7604 * 0.0010 193 0.5242 0.0738 -0.0027 151 -1.4260 0.3372
3 -0.0121 51 -2.6424 *** -2.3331 ** 0.0035 193 1.7159 * -0.5226 -0.0013 151 -0.6356 -0.6665
4 -0.0066 51 -1.2638 -1.4740 0.0013 193 0.5662 -1.7153 * -0.0020 151 -1.2002 -2.0048 **
5 -0.0072 51 -1.0761 0.2442 0.0006 193 0.3421 -0.8208 -0.0018 151 -0.8141 -1.3356
6 0.0182 51 2.1185 ** 1.6760 * -0.0008 193 -0.5411 -0.8208 -0.0022 151 -0.8130 -1.1684
7 0.0005 51 0.0986 -1.1877 0.0068 193 2.0606 ** -0.5226 -0.0021 151 -0.8816 0.3372
8 -0.0115 51 -2.0109 ** -1.1877 0.0001 193 0.0616 -2.6099 *** -0.0022 151 -1.2162 -1.6702 *
9 0.0033 51 0.6903 1.9623 ** 0.0017 193 0.8692 0.5210 0.0031 151 2.5475 ** 1.5082
10 -0.0071 51 -1.5584 -2.0467 ** 0.0004 193 0.2208 0.3719 0.0124 151 7.6562 *** 5.3558 ***
11 -0.0117 51 -2.4070 ** -0.9013 0.0023 193 1.5484 0.5210 -0.0047 151 -1.7886 * -2.0048 **
12 -0.0049 51 -0.7087 -0.3286 0.0026 193 1.5818 1.2665 -0.0020 151 -0.9969 -1.1684
13 0.0036 51 0.8526 0.8169 -0.0042 193 -2.5492 ** -2.9081 *** 0.0000 151 -0.0049 2.5119 **
14 -0.0043 51 -1.2003 -1.7604 * 0.0012 193 0.7051 -0.3735 -0.0107 151 -2.4180 ** -1.8375 *




Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5.20, cont. 
Day aar N t-test sign test aar N t-test sign test
-10 0.0024 43 0.7667 -0.0261 0.0001 139 0.0323 -0.1629
-9 0.0013 43 0.4924 -0.3179 0.0052 139 1.8963 * 0.9107
-8 0.0031 43 1.0570 0.8494 0.0011 139 0.3323 -0.3419
-7 0.0014 43 0.6608 -0.6098 0.0012 139 0.2960 -0.1629
-6 0.0017 43 0.6120 -0.0261 0.0019 139 0.6946 0.7317
-5 0.0004 43 0.1764 0.5575 0.0022 139 0.8995 -0.6997
-4 0.0074 43 2.7588 *** 1.1412 0.0026 139 1.0967 -0.8786
-3 -0.0076 43 -0.9394 -1.7770 * -0.0008 139 -0.3198 -1.7733 *
-2 -0.0034 43 -0.9836 -2.0689 ** 0.0015 139 0.4928 -0.6997
-1 0.0013 43 0.3696 0.2657 -0.0005 139 -0.1567 -0.8786
0 -0.0003 43 -0.1127 -0.9016 -0.0026 139 -0.9345 -1.5944
1 -0.0009 43 -0.2337 -0.6098 0.0007 139 0.2923 -1.2365
2 0.0104 43 3.4452 *** 1.7248 * -0.0014 139 -0.3949 -3.0258 ***
3 0.0019 43 0.5898 -0.9016 -0.0044 139 -1.5095 -3.7415 ***
4 0.0022 43 0.5632 -0.0261 0.0033 139 0.9376 -0.8786
5 -0.0076 43 -2.4799 ** -2.6525 *** -0.0007 139 -0.2371 -2.1312 **
6 -0.0011 43 -0.2437 -0.3179 -0.0065 139 -1.8512 * -0.6997
7 -0.0009 43 -0.2969 0.8494 -0.0023 139 -0.7493 0.3739
8 -0.0054 43 -2.2551 ** -2.6525 *** -0.0016 139 -0.6347 0.9107
9 0.0040 43 1.0469 -0.0261 -0.0001 139 -0.0594 -0.3419
10 0.0019 43 0.6998 -0.9016 0.0019 139 0.7802 0.0160
11 0.0020 43 0.6618 1.1412 -0.0038 139 -1.5597 -2.1312 **
12 0.0076 43 2.5579 ** 2.3085 ** 0.0008 139 0.3704 0.5528
13 0.0029 43 0.6466 -1.1934 0.0033 139 1.1755 0.9107
14 0.0040 43 0.9866 0.2657 -0.0017 139 -0.9945 -0.8786
15 -0.0013 43 -0.3635 0.5575 0.0063 139 3.0915 *** 2.3421 **
REST OF ASIA PACIFIC REST OF EUROPE
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 




Table 5. 21 Country-wise cumulative short-term average abnormal stock return of companies deleted from the FTSE4Good Global Index – 
Fama and French 3 Factor model 
windows caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) -0.0495 51 -1.6642 * -2.3331 ** 0.0205 193 1.3347 -1.4172 -0.0218 151 -0.7542 1.1736
(-5...-1) -0.0131 51 -0.9413 -1.1877 0.0048 193 0.9429 -1.1190 0.0046 151 1.3767 1.8428 *
(-3...-1) 0.0091 51 1.1891 -0.0422 0.0056 193 1.4485 -1.2681 0.0026 151 1.0308 1.6755 *
(-1...1) -0.0094 51 -1.8870 * -2.6195 *** 0.0044 193 1.1455 -0.3735 -0.0003 151 -0.1145 0.8391
(0...0) -0.0050 51 -1.6428 -1.7604 * 0.0015 193 0.8407 -1.1190 -0.0023 151 -1.2969 -1.1684
(1...5) -0.0440 51 -3.3608 *** -4.0513 *** 0.0050 193 1.1154 -1.1190 -0.0091 151 -2.2465 ** -2.1721 **
(1...10) -0.0406 51 -2.3410 ** -2.9058 *** 0.0131 193 1.5308 -0.8208 0.0000 151 0.0005 1.0064
(1...15) -0.0570 51 -2.8607 *** -2.0467 ** 0.0193 193 1.7779 * -1.2681 -0.0290 151 -1.0633 0.3372
JAPANUK US
 




Table 5.21, cont. 
windows caar N t-test sign test caar N t-test sign test
(-10...15) 0.0274 43 0.7921 0.2657 0.0054 139 0.3157 -1.5944
(-5...-1) -0.0019 43 -0.2032 -0.9016 0.0050 139 0.7027 -0.8786
(-3...-1) -0.0098 43 -1.0688 -2.0689 ** 0.0002 139 0.0429 -0.6997
(-1...1) 0.0001 43 0.0196 -0.9016 -0.0025 139 -0.6197 -0.3419
(0...0) -0.0003 43 -0.1127 -0.9016 -0.0026 139 -0.9345 -1.5944
(1...5) 0.0060 43 0.6940 0.2657 -0.0026 139 -0.2576 -2.1312 **
(1...10) 0.0045 43 0.2643 -0.9016 -0.0112 139 -1.2838 -2.6680 ***
(1...15) 0.0197 43 0.8739 -0.3179 -0.0063 139 -0.5678 -3.0258 ***
REST OF ASIA PACIFIC REST OF EUROPE
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 





Table 5. 22 Panel A :  Comparison of mean of AARs of companies added to and deleted 





AAR (Addition, Deletion)    
- Market Model
-0.0003 0.0003 -1.0860 -1.015
AAR (Addition, Deletion)    
- Three-Factor Model
-0.0004 0.0003 -1.5060 -1.385
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 5.22 Panel B: Comparison of mean of CAARs of companies added to and deleted 





CAAR (Addition, Deletion) 
- Market model
-0.0025 0.0009 -2.8890 ** -2.380 **
CAAR (Addition, Deletion) 
- Three-Factor model
-0.0052 0.0011 -4.8500 *** -2.521 **
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 








Table 5.22  Panel C: Comparison of mean of BHARs of companies added to and 





BHAR (Addition, Deletion) 0.0127 0.0038 3.3470 ** -2.521 **
 
Notes: * Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 








































Chapter 6:  Heterogeneousness in CSR and CFP relationship 




Corporate social responsibility is becoming the dominant paradigm in the 
current corporate world. With the growth of the industrial revolution, environmental 
and social issues also have increased immensely. The continuous increase in the 
global temperature has turned the fertilise land to the drought and have put the lives 
at risk. Pollution, social incongruity, hunger, insecurity and refugees are emerging 
as global problems. It is essential that international communities, countries and 
corporations tie up together to tackle these issues. Along with the international 
governments, NGOs, INGOs and other not for profit organisations, the private 
corporate world have increased their presence, commitment and investment 
significantly to make a positive change in the world. 
The impact of firm’s investment in CSR initiatives is widely debated by 
academics, professionals, and the corporate world. CSR is a source of the corporate 
reputation (Preston and O’Bannon, 1987; Godfrey, 2005; Carroll and Shabana, 
2010) as it improves firm’s brand recognition (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen, 2010). CSR 
also acts insurance-like protection (Shiu and wang, 2017; McGuire et al., 1988; 
Godfrey et al., 2009) that could lead to a reduction in the company’s cost and 
improve operational excellence (Laczniak and Murphy, 1991; Isaksson et al., 2014). 




Greening, 1996), customer loyalty (Sen et al., 2016; Brammer and Millington, 2008) 
and additional source capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). These 
benefits subsequently lead to improved financial performance (Du et al., 2017; 
Godfrey et al. 2009; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Studies in the past have reported mixed results in CSR-CFP relationship. 
Majority of studies that have concluded the positive relationship between CSR and 
firm performance (Peloza,2009; Margolish et al., 2009). However, the 
inconsistencies, in conclusion, could be due to the number of issues in the 
investigation such as methodological and conceptual differences adopted in alternative 
CSR measurements used in these studies (Wartrick and Cochran, 1985; Lee et al., 2009; 
Alikaj et al. 2016). Most of these studies have used relatively small samples and typically 
investigate the profitability or stock return in the short-term. Similarly, studies comparing 
the performance of CSR and non-CSR firms have typically ignored the various micro-
characteristics of those firms.  
The debate is continuing because CSR is becoming the mainstream of the 
company’s business strategy and facilitated several business benefits. Consistent 
with the Porter (1998) focus strategy, companies are implementing CSR 
programmes according to the need and expectation of their stakeholders rather than 
broader stakeholder’s groups. Due to the firm’s focus on the  specific stakeholders 
and formulation of niche CSR strategies, the CSR-CFP relationship varies from 
companies to companies and the type of industry they are operating. Although the 
potential heterogeneity of CSR-CFP relationship has been in the discussion for a 
while (Barnett, 2007, Hart, 1995), insufficient attention has been given to the 




Past studies have mainly investigated the aggregate impact of CSR on firm’s 
financial performance (Du et al., 2017, Qui et al., 2016, Ding et al., 2016), rather 
than investigating the CSR-CFP relationship amongst the industry sector to sector. 
Also, studies have attempted to examine the CSR-CFP relationship using single and 
specific industry (Baron et al., 2009; Esteban-Sanchez et al., 2017; Wu and Shen, 2013; 
Jo et al., 2015; Loureiro et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016; Lee and Kang, 2013). However, 
Omar and Zallom (2016) and Feng et al., (2017) attempted to investigate the impact of 
CSR on CFP in the cross-industry setting. The former study used three different industries 
with a minimal sample size from Jordan and reported a mixed conclusion. The latter 
research examined the CSR-CFP relationship using ten different industry sectors but 
limited to the US dataset. 
 On the other hand, prior studies that examined the CSR-CFP relationship have 
primarily focused on developed markets, such as those of the US, UK, Canada, and other 
European countries, with the investigation using emerging market been rather seldom. 
However, due to the increased popularity of socially responsible business practices 
around the world, companies in developing economies are equally pursuing CSR 
initiatives. There is a significant increase in investment opportunities in the emerging 
markets due to the rise in socially responsible and ethical investing (Jamali and Karam, 
2018). In the recent years, socially responsible and ethical fund managers have directed 
more funds in emerging markets and increased their ownership in firms with high CSR 
commitments. This pattern is also followed by mutual funds that are also diverting their 
investment towards socially responsible firms (Tosun, 2016). Hence, the CSR debate is 
in its peak in the emerging markets. For example, Tosun (2017) suggests that socially 




a firm’s CSR score (p.710).  Moreover, studies have given insufficient attention to the 
emerging market when reviewing the impact of CSR on CFP. Notably, research on the 
differences across industries and across countries still lacks in the CSR-CFP literature.  
In addition, some companies from emerging countries have expanded 
internationally and are listed in the foreign stock markets such as those of the US, UK, 
Germany, Hong Kong, etc. Such trends of cross-listing have a significant impact on the 
firms’ CSR investment; hence, cross-listed firms need to adapt/implement CSR to 
legitimise themselves in the stock market of the host country (Bell et al., 2012; Boubakri 
et al., 2016). Cross-listing in a foreign country’s stock market, especially a developed 
one, can significantly improve CSR performance and therefore its financial performance. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, prior studies have not examined the impact of 
cross-listing in the CSR-CFP relationship. Hence, in this study, I aim to examine the 
moderating impact of firms’ cross-listing on the CSR-CFP relationship. 
Hence, to address the gap discussed above, I examine the heterogeneousness in 
the CSR-CFP relationship using the data from the emerging market. I also examine the 
moderating impact of cross-listing on CSR-CFP relationship.  Also, to improve the 
limitation of generalisation from a previous study (Feng et al., 2017), I use companies 
from 23 countries whose CSR performance is evaluated by the FTSE4Good Emerging 
Index. To the best of my knowledge, for the first time, I use the FTSE4Good index ESG 
rating score as a proxy for corporate social responsibility performance. The FTSE4Good 
Emerging Index consists of companies from the emerging market around the world, and 




environment, social and governance themes25. Using the total of 1,244 firm-year 
observation (representing 779 individual companies) between 2016 and 2017 from 
emerging market countries and yearly CSR performance score (measured as firms ESG 
rating score), I investigate the CSR-CFP relationship across ten ICB (industry 
classification benchmark) developed by the FTSE. I found a positive and significant 
impact of CSR performance (ESG rating score) on Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets 
(ROA). Consistent with Feng et al., (2017), this study concluded that the CSR-CFP 
relationship varies across the industry sectors. I also found that cross-listing has a 
significantly positive impact on the CSR-CFP relationship suggesting the impact of CSR 
on CFP is more pronounced for the firms that are cross-listed in the foreign stock market.  
The current study makes several contributions to CSR-CFP literature. First, I used 
a unique measure of CSR performance developed by the FTSE4Good index. For the first 
time in the literature, I use the ESG rating score as a proxy of CSR performance provided 
by the FTSE4Good index to examine the impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance. 
Secondly, previous studies have primarily focused on the aggregate and specific industry 
data to examine the CSR-CFP relationship and given less attention to the cross-industry 
investigation.  This study attempted to provide evidence of heterogeneousness in CSR-
CFP relationship by analysing the cross-industry dataset. Thirdly, this study is the first to 
examine the moderating impact of cross-listing on the CSR-CFP relationship and 
provides evidence of an economically and statistically significant positive relationship 
between CR-CFP for those firms that are cross-listed, as opposed to the ones that are not. 
 






This addresses the call by Feng et al., (2017) and Omar and Zallom’s (2016) for further 
investigation using different country data as well as different and unique CSR 
performance proxies.26 Finally, I examine the impact of CSR on CFP using the emerging 
country dataset, and I am one of the front-runners in using multi-country setting to explore 
the CSR-CFP relationship that contributes the generalizability of the CSR effect on firm’s 
financial performance.  
This rest of this empirical chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2, I discuss 
the relevant literature on CSR-CFP relationship, theoretical perspective and hypotheses. 
Data and methodology are presented in section 6.3. I have shown the result and finding 
of this study in part 6.4. Section 6.5 displays the discussion and conclusion of this 
research. 
 
6.2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
In recent years, CSR has gained significant attention from all over the world. It is 
widely talked theme by the corporate world, academics, practitioners and public in recent 
years and has been used several CSR themes (corporate citizenship, sustainability, 
governance, carbon emission, climate change etc.). Especially in emerging market, CSR 
has been in the peak of the debate (Jamali, 2008; Jamali and Karam, 2018). The CSR 
implementation differs from country to country due to the state’s legislation, the cultural 
differences and the industry they are operating (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007; Moon, 2004). 
Especially in emerging market companies pursue CSR due to domestic regulatory 
pressure, cultural issues, the threat of regulation, and increased SRI investment (Baskin, 
 
26 Most of the previous studies have used similar CSR performance benchmark and rating such as KLD, 




2006, p24). Notably, the corporate scandals and events have contributed to the increased 
stakeholders’ awareness of the impact of the company’s operation to the society and 
community. Companies have increased their presence in the CSR activities along with 
their business operation.  
CSR is becoming an essential element of the modern business model to 
differentiate among competitors and to gain competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 
2006). The stakeholders’ power has increased significantly in recent years, and it varies 
according to their concern over the company. The stakeholders’ concerns differ from 
company to company and the industry sector to sector. Stakeholders may have the 
stronger interest towards those companies from industrial, mining, utilities and chemical 
industry sector as they highly exposed to the environmental risk and have a more 
significant impact on the environmental pollutions because of their operation. This is 
because they are heavily involved in the activities that may damage the greenery and 
wildlife due to leak and other polluting substances. However, some stakeholders may 
have relaxed approaches to the companies in the financial industry sectors but are more 
significant exposure to social risk.  
The level of CSR investment/strategy depends on the stakeholders’ interest, 
power, urgency and salience (Mitchell et al., 1997). The stakeholders’ concerns towards 
companies vary industry to industry and the nature of the business. Companies respond 
to stakeholders by formulating and developing a CSR strategy that also fits in their 
business model. The existence of variation in the CSR investment across the industrial 
sector could also imply significant variation/implication in the CSR-CFP relationship. 
Ullmann (1985) argues that the nature of the firm’s industrial sector moderates the CSR-




impact of CSR on CFP is found to be less pronounced to those companies which are 
classified under the industry that lead to a higher level of negative impact on the 
environment. On the other hand, Lee et al., (2009) found that the CSR-CFP relationship 
for companies within chemicals, mining and forest products were found to be more 
pronounced. Hence, I expect the heterogeneousness in the CSR-CFP relationship across 
the industry sector.  
6.2.1. Previous work on CSR-CFP relationship heterogeneity   
So far, studies have examined the CSR-CFP relationship widely and reported 
mixed conclusions (Margolish and Walsh, 2009; Lu et al., 2014). In particular, studies 
have used the industry sector as a control variable and also have considered the industry 
effect on the CSR-CFP relationship (Du et al., 2017; Hawn et al., 2017; Mishra, 2017). 
Also, studies have examined the CSR-CFP relationship within the specific industry such 
as industrial (Baron et al., 2009); banking (Esteban-Sanchez et al., 2017; Wu and Shen, 
2013; Simpson and Hohers, 2002); financial services (Jo et al., 2015); automobile 
(Loureio et al., 2012), construction (Wang et al., 2016); hospitality and restaurant (Lee 
and Kang, 2013) etc. Although CSR literature has evidenced the discussion of the 
potential heterogeneity on CSR-CFP relationship (Hart, 1995; Barnett, 2007), a limited 
number of studies have empirically investigated the heterogeneousness in CSR-CFP 
relationship across industries (Hoepner and Yu, 2010; Omar and Zallom, 2016; Feng et 
al., 2017).  
Ullman (1985) argues that CSR-CFP relationship is moderated by the industry 
sectors. Hoepner  and Yu (2010) examined the heterogeneousness of  CSR-CFP 
relationship among industry and found a positive and significant relationship for 




benefit of implementing the CSR initiatives due to the high proximity to the end consumer 
(p.25). Similarly, Omar and Zallom (2016) make an effort to analyse the 
heterogeneousness relationship between CSR and CFP using three different industrial 
sectors and a relatively smaller sample size from Jordan. They reported that CSR 
decreases the profitability for food and beverage industries, while no effect on the 
profitability in case of chemical, and pharmaceutical and medical industry. 
Feng et al., (2017) extend the industry-wide investigation by comparing the CSR-
CFP relationship across ten industrial sectors: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, information technology, materials, 
telecommunication services, and utilities. Using a sample of the US companies between 
1991 and 2011, they found that the association between CSR and firms financial 
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA) is heterogeneous across the industry 
sector (p.106). The study evidenced a positive impact of CSR on CFP for most of the 
industrial sectors except energy companies and utility companies. They concluded that  
CSR has a significant positive effect on a firm’s financial performance for most but not 
all (p.116). Feng et al., (2017) suggested the extension of the study to include the data 
from other countries due to the generalisation issue as the author primarily focus on the 
US data. Since the heterogeneousness of CSR exist across the industry, it is still important 
as well as relevant to examine the heterogeneity of CSR-CFP relationship across industry 
sector and outside the developed economy. In this study, I investigate the industry sector-
wise CSR-CFP relationship using the emerging market dataset and will explore what type 
of industry that has a more significant impact of CSR on financial performance. 
Also, although prior studies that investigate CSR-CFP relationship primarily 




results may not be relevant/applicable to the emerging market as CSR differs country to 
country due to the difference in norms, values and institutional settings. Also, in the 
context of the emerging market, limited studies examined the impact of CSR on firm 
financial performance using a cross-country sample. Due to the lack of reporting 
requirement regulations and information intermediaries in emerging markets, it is 
difficult to obtain the CSR performance (Kelley et al., 2018). Hence, prior studies used 
their assessment of CSR performance (primarily content analysis) in their empirical 
examination. The major limitation of such analysis is the degree of bias and lack of 
researcher experience during the marking and coding of the CSR performance of firms. 
Also, such analysis may be misleading due to the conflict arise between what is written 
in the disclosure and what these companies do (Adams, 2004). Hence, to overcome the 
above limitations in the literature, a holistic investigation of CSR-CFP relationship in the 
emerging market using third party CSR performance compiled by the third party. 
 
6.2.2. Hypothesis development  
The stakeholder theory asserts that firms should act in the interest of the 
stakeholders that are affected rather than merely the benefit of its shareholders. According 
to Post et al., (2002), “stakeholders are individuals and constituencies that contribute, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creation capacity and activities, and who 
are therefore its potential beneficiaries and risk bearers” (p.2). Businesses have a social 
responsibility towards the several elements, parties, groups of the society that are directly 
or indirectly affected by the business operation (Freeman, 1984). Such stakeholders hold 
a significant amount of resources and the power that is essential for any business to grow 




interest and expectation of several stakeholders. The businesses’ relationship with their 
stakeholder is the ultimate source of business success rather than the transaction (Branco 
and Rodrigues, 2006). Hence, it is essential to build, maintain and sustain the healthy 
relationship with them via investment in the corporate social responsibility programmes. 
The advocates of CSR argue that a firm’s investment in socially responsible 
initiatives is the instrument of improved financial performance (Wood and Jones, 1995; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Addressing and meeting the needs, expectation and 
demand of the society is essential for business is favourable to their financial 
performance. The most significant advantage of meeting stakeholders expectation is to 
win their confidence, loyalty and eventually improved reputation in the society. Porter 
and Krammar (2006) argue that a firm’s reputation is vital to achieving competitive 
advantage because the firm’s participation in CSR is to differentiate themselves from 
competitors. Hence, firms are linking their CSR initiatives to their business strategy to 
gain competitive advantages. 
Also, according to the value maximisation theory (Jensen, 2010), a company that 
consider and address the demand and expectations of the stakeholder will improve the 
company’s value. In the absence of the stakeholders’ satisfaction, companies do not 
achieve their objectives. In line with Jensen’s (2010) argument, I argue that a firm in 
emerging economies with higher CSR performance will enjoy a higher level of financial 
performance. Firms’ broader involvement in the CSR initiatives improves their 
relationship with their stakeholder, who strictly follows their operations. Customers not 




the company is involved. One of the significant consequences of the firm’s wrongdoing 
is that they tend to lose their market share immediately.27  
On the other hand, emerging markets are fast-growing economies and are 
introducing comprehensive economic policies to enhance their international 
competitiveness and to promote high economic growth. Firms from emerging countries 
are more of the function of national business systems and low economic development 
(Chapple and Moon, 2005). Compared with the developed economies, there is a 
significant difference in the business environment, economic growth, business 
management, and corporate governance practices in the emerging countries that result to 
lower level of attention and investment in the CSR initiatives compared to developed 
economies (Hah and Freeman, 2014). Even the multinational companies face challenges 
in implementing CSR due to the difference in norms, values and intuitional setting over 
countries.  For example, firms in emerging economies are highly owned by families and 
have the CEO duality effect, which consequently leads to a low level of transparency (Jo 
and Harjoto, 2011). Also, the use of natural resources is as key for contributing to rapid 
economic growth in these countries. The excessive use of natural resources to gain 
international competitiveness is contributing to degradation, depletion and destruction of 
the environment. The improper management of natural resources can lead to social 
injustice, inequality and poor labour practice. 
 
27 For example, in 2012, when the news broke that one of the widely popular coffee chain Starbucks 
didn’t pay the fair share of taxation to the UK government, there were angry voices among customers 
against Starbucks. The Starbucks scandal consequently led to the decline in the yearly like to like sales 
for following years. Starbucks later voluntarily paid the millions of taxes to the UK government to gain 




Moreover, companies operating in emerging countries may pursue unethical 
practices to sustain their competitiveness and gain short-term financial gain. Also, 
compared to foreign (multinational) counterparts, local firms in an emerging market may 
have limited access to resources and may be costlier to pursue CSR initiatives. Only the 
market leader will implement the CSR in emerging market and hence may enjoy 
improved/better financial performance.  
Emerging economies are in a race towards rapid economic development. As 
emerging economies become more developed/mature, corporate social responsibility play 
a key role in enhancing corporate reputation and subsequently lead to improving the 
firms’ financial performance. Also, the investment opportunity in the emerging markets 
is more open compared to the past. Since the introduction of the United Nations Principle 
for Responsible Investment (UNIPRI, 2006), the socially responsible investment is 
growing significantly (Cheung et al., 2010; Investment week, 201928) and ethical fund 
managers are shifting their fund towards emerging markets.  Hence, based on the above 
rationale, first, I expect a positive association between firm CSR and financial 
performance in the emerging market.  
Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: There is a positive association between the financial performance of the companies 
and the CSR performance in an emerging market. 
 
Further, Porter (1998) elaborates on the generic strategies to create and sustain the 







competitive advantage either by cost leadership strategy or by differentiating themselves 
from competitors. The firms’ involvement in CSR may provide the opportunity to gain 
competitive advantage through cost and risk reduction, and through differentiation 
(developing reputation and legitimacy) (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). However, similar to 
Porter’s (1998) focus strategy, companies should concentrate niche group of stakeholders 
because the stakeholders’ composition and expectation differ from industry to industry 
(Feng et al., 2017).  
Also, industry sectors do not have the same level of exposure to environmental 
and social issues. For example, oil and gas, industrials, mining, chemicals are more 
exposed to environmental risk whereas consumer service, consumer goods, financials, 
technologies, telecommunications industries are more exposed to the social risk (Simnett 
et al., 2009). Such variation of firms’ exposure to environmental and social risks lead to 
variation in implementing the CSR practices. Hence, companies should design their CSR 
initiatives/strategies by understanding the dynamics of stakeholders and their influence 
on the business. Further, the variation in the CSR initiatives among industry to industry 
could lead to the difference in the CSR-CFP relationship across the sector and 
hypothesised that, 
H2: There is variability in the CSR-CRP relationship across the industry. 
 
Companies from the emerging markets also have a global reach. These firms are not only 
involved in importing and exporting of their goods and services but also expanding their 
operation internationally. This cross-listing trend has increased in recent years, especially 
with a large number of firms from the emerging countries becoming listed in markets 




respond to the expectations of diverse stakeholder when they cross-list themselves in the 
foreign stock market. As CSR in developed countries is more matured, firms from the 
emerging market may need to invest significantly in CSR to attract shareholders from the 
developed countries as the latter are more conscious on the impact of firm’s operation in 
the environment and society. Besides, the corporate governance of a firm tends to improve 
after cross-listing due to the high listing requirement in a developed country which has a 
positive impact on the firms CSR performance (Harjoto and Jo, 2011). Also, emerging 
countries’ firms face significant litigation risks as they are more closely monitored by the 
various listing authorities and the various market participants. Hence, their engagement 
with CSR activities can reduce such risks (Coffee, 2001). Prior literature discusses the 
relationship between cross-listing and firms’ corporate social responsibility and argues 
that cross-listed firms’ engagement in CSR is driven by those firms’ improved corporate 
governance, reputational bonding to the international stock exchange and higher exposure 
to litigation risk (Boubakri et al., 2016; Del Bosco and Misani, 2016). Boubakri et al., 
(2016) find a positive relationship between cross-listing and firms’ CSR performance 
using 10,815 observations from 54 countries during the period 2002 to 2011. This result 
is also corroborated by Del Bosco and Misani (2015) who report that firms’ ESG 
performance improves significantly after firms becoming cross-listed. Moreover, cross-
listed firms need to adapt/implement CSR to legitimise themselves in the capital market 
of the host country (Bell et al., 2012) and tend to have higher valuations. Doidge et al., 
(2004) report that the firm that cross-listed firms tend to have higher Tobin’s Q when they 
are compared with same country firms that are not cross-listed. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the cross-listing provides additional 




cross-listed companies tend to invest significantly in CSR initiatives. If such an argument 
is a case, then I expect firms that cross-listed in a different country might strength the 
impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance (value and profitability). Hence, it can be 
hypothesised that, 
H3: The impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance is more pronounced for those 
firms that are cross-listed in foreign stock market. 
 
6.3. Methodology 
To examine the relationship between CSR and firm performance, I use the firms’ 
ESG rating score by FTSE4Good Emerging (FTSE4Good-EM) index as a proxy of CSR 
performance. The firm-level yearly ESG rating score is obtained from FTSE4Good-EM 
index series. The firm performances measures including yearly accounting and financial 
data such as Tobin’s Q, Total Assets, Capital Expenditure, Sales/Revenue, Total Debt, 
Asset Turnover, Operating Margin, Market Value of the Firm, PTBV and ROIC etc. are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
One of the reasons for choosing FTSE4G-EM index is that it records in detail the 
CSR performance of companies from a large number of emerging markets from around 
the world. Also, the FTSE4Good index series is a widely popular index which implements 
a robust and consistent methodology (explained previously in chapter 3) for evaluating 
those companies and developing the index. The index is also aligned with the UN 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the UN Principle for Responsible Investment 
(PRI). To provide a comprehensive assessment aiming towards a common global standard 
(principle of harmonization), the FTSE4Good is working with Expert in Responsible 




Global Reporting Standard (GRI), the OECT Guidelines, Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), the Transparency International’s Business Principles for Countering Bribery, the 
GHG Protocol (FTSE, 2016). 
[Insert Table 6.1 about here] 
Every year, companies around the world apply to be associated / added in the 
FTSE4G-EM index. The FTSE evaluates the companies by the publicly available ESG 
data regarding 300 indicators across 14 themes across the three main pillars (FTSE, 
2018)29. According to Table 6.1, (presented in appendix C), the final sample contains 
1,244 firms-year observations (main model) from 779 firms across 23 emerging 
economies/markets for the period 2016 and 2017.  
This study uses firm-level ESG rating scores as a proxy of CSR, and it is the main 
independent/explanatory variable to investigate the impact of corporate social 
responsibility performance on the firms’ financial performance. In line with prior studies 
(Feng et al.,2017; Omar and Zallom, 2016), I use Return on Assets (ROA) to measure 
firms’ profitability (net income divided by the total assets) and Tobin’s Q  to measure the 
value of a firm. The Tobin's Q is measured as; 
Market value equity +Total liabilities
Book value of Total Assets 
Tobin's Q =
  (6.1) 
I use firms’ specific characteristics to control the CSR-CFP relationship because 
firms’ value and  financial performance can be affected by them (Kang et al., 2016; 
 
29 The 14 themes are climate change, water use, biodiversity, pollution and resources, environmental 
supply chain, health and safety, labour standard, human rights and community, customer responsibility, 
social supply chain, anticorruption, tax transparency, risk management, and corporate governance. These 




Aggrawal et al., 2010; Lee and Grewal, 2004). Consistent with the CSR-CFP literature 
(Li et al., 2018; Kang et al., 2016; Attig et al., 2013; El Ghoul, 2011; Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008; Manescu and Starica, 2007; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ullmann, 1985), 
I use size (natural logarithm of Total Assets), leverage (total debt by total assets), growth 
(percentage change in net revenue), capital expenditure to sales ratio, employee size (log 
of total number of employees) and profitability (measured by operating margin) as control 
variables as these firm-specific characteristics are linked with firms' performance.30  
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate the heterogeneity of the CSR 
and CFP across industries. I use industry classification benchmark (ICB) to group the 
total observations into an industry-based subgroup. The ICB classification comprises ten 
industry sectors such as Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials goods, Consumer goods, 
Healthcare, Consumer service, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials and 
Technology. First, to examine the impact of CSR on CFP I first use ordinary least squares 
regression model, whereas Tobin’s Q and ROA as a dependent variable, CSR 
performance (ESG rating score) as an independent, size, leverage, growth, asset turnover 
and profitability as controlling variables. I use a linear form of regression which is widely 
used in the CSR-CFP literature (Li et al., 2018, Fent et al., 2017; Surroca et al., 2010; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). The main estimation model for each firm for corporate 
financial performance (CFP) is as follows: 
𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽6𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖 + ∑ 𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
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𝑚=1 + 𝑒𝑖         (6.2) 
 




where j stands for the industry, i stands for the firm, 𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖 is the financial variable of a 
firm i measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA; 𝛼0 is the intercept; 𝛽1is the coefficient of CSR 
performance 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖; CSR is the CSR performance (ESG rating score as a proxy of CSR) 
of firm i; 𝛽2 is the coefficient of size; size represents the natural logarithm of total assets 
of firm i; 𝛽3 is the coefficient of leverage measured  as the total debt of firm i divided by 
the total assets of firm i; 𝛽4 is the coefficient of growth measured as the percentage change 
in the sales compared to the last year of firm i; 𝛽5 is the coefficient of Capex (capital 
expenditure to sales ratio) of firm i; 𝛽6 is the coefficient of profitability of firm i measured 
by the operating margin, 𝛽7 is the coefficient of employee size of firm i. I further used 
the industry, year and country fixed effect. The error term in the estimation is 𝑒𝑖. Overall, 
we expect a positive impact of CSR (ESG rating) on the firms’ financial performances in 
the case of the emerging markets.  
In line with prior studies (Li et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018; Du et al., 2017; Feng 
et al., 2017) I also use the fixed effect to control for industry, time and country. As CSR 
varies industry to industry (discussed in chapter 3, section 3.2.4.) I control for the industry 
effect using a dummy variable (assigning 1 for Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials 
Goods, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, 
Utilities, Financials and Technology). In Equation 6.2, I also use a dummy to control for 
the year to capture the time effect as changes in the market sentiment. In this study, I use 
a sample firm observation from 2016 to 2017 (with 2016 as an omitted dummy). Also, I 
further control for the country as the CSR implementation differs from country to country 
due to the state’s legislation and  cultural differences (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007) and 
therefore, the financial performance. The sample of this study spans across 23 emerging 




wide sample numbers), and I categorise the dummy variables to represent these emerging 
countries.  
Further, to test the heterogeneousness of the relationship between CSR and CFP 
across the industry, I estimate the following model for each firm for corporate financial 
performance: 
𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 +





𝑚=1 + 𝑒𝑖         (6.3) 
 To test the moderating effect of the cross-listing on the CSR-CFP relationship, I 
use a dummy variable (cross-listed firm equals to 1 and 0 otherwise) in equation 6.2 as 
an additional interaction term.  
𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽6𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +
∑ 𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
10
𝑘=1 (𝑘)𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟(𝑙)𝑖
2
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦(𝑚)𝑖
23
𝑚=1 + 𝑒𝑖     (6.4) 
where, 𝛽8 is the coefficient of cross-listing. 
 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Descriptive statistics, correlations and Variance Inflation Factor Test 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance 
across industries using a sample of firms from emerging economies. I use the FTSE4Good 
emerging market index rating score as a proxy of firms’ CSR performance and Tobin’s 
Q and Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies of financial performance. All results are 
presented in Appendix C of this chapter. Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics and 




the effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Panel A of 
Table 6.2 reports the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum for each 
variable in each benchmark criteria alongside data normality indicators. The variables are 
that of CSR performance (ESG rating score), Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets (ROA), Return 
on Invested Capital (ROIC), Price to Book Value (PTBV), Size (log of assets), Leverage, 
Growth, Capital Expenditure to Sales ratio, Operating Margin and Employees (log of 
number of employees). For example, according to Table 6.2 (Panel A), the mean (median) 
of Tobin’s Q and ROA are 0.5920 (0.5904) and 0.0478 (0.0363) respectively. The 
standard deviation for Tobin's Q and ROA are relatively smaller compared to the standard 
deviation of the CSR performance. Similarly, the mean (median) of CSR performance, 
ROIC and PTBV are 0.0008 (0.0004), 0.04782.1399 (2.1000), 8.7403 (7.1800) and 
2.2154 (1.3344) respectively. In all cases, standard deviations for each variable is close 
to zero, except for the cases of CSR, ROIC, PTBV and size. All variables except Tobin’s 
Q and Employee Size are positively skewed which is expected as they are associated with 
operating performance measures. The negative skewness of Tobin’s Q (-0.1277) and 
Employee size (-0.3635) meant that the majority of Tobin’s Q and Employee size lies left 
to the mean. Also, excess Kurtosis is positive for all the variables used in this study. The 
high values for Kurtosis across all variables suggest that, on average, the data of our 
sample is not normally distributed. Our descriptive statistics reveal a positive skewness 
suggesting data are not symmetrical. The Jarque Bera test (J-B thereafter) results reveal 
a statistically significant finding (p-values<0.05) in all cases with positive skewness and 
a positive kurtosis for the data set. Although the J-B test is not the most powerful test for 
normality, as compared to other modelling approaches, i.e. Anderson-Darling test, 




examination as the results are overwhelmingly supportive of the violation of the normality 
assumption.  
[Insert Table 6.2 about here] 
Table 6.2 (Panel B) presents the results of the collinearity diagnostic tests. Apart 
from the variables ROA and ROIC which are nearly perfect correlated (Pearson 
correlation of 0.907) no other variable is highly correlated with one another and especially 
with the CSR indicators. This is also corroborated by the VIF values reported on Panel 
C, which range between 1.02 and 1.08 for both the cases of the Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Since, the VIF of all variables used in this study does not exceed 10 (Hair et al., 2006); 
we can conclude that our study does not suffer from the problem of multicollinearity.  
I further run the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. To do 
so, I run the main regression model (using dependent variables as Tobin’s Q and ROA) 
using equation 6.2 and run the heteroskedasticity test31. The results reveal that the 
variance is not constant in the model (using both dependent variables)32. As of Table 6.2 
(Panel D), the heteroskedasticity test result chi2(1) is 12.85 (p-value of 0.003) for 
dependent variable Tobin’s Q and 145.41 (p-value of 0.000) for ROA. This result rejects 
the assumption of constant variance. To deal with this problem, I adopt the relevant, 
robust standard error procedures using the Stata command robust. The heteroskedasticity 
test results support the use of robust error procedures.  The robust standard error 
procedure does not affect the actual regression coefficient and corrects bias in standard 
 
31 Stata command: estat hettest 
32 The result of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is 





errors and relevant statistics (significance level of the estimation) (Bianco et al., 2005; 
Maddala, and Lahiri, 2009). The Stata command of robust33  is used in the models, 6.2, 
6.3 and 6.4 respectively. 
 
6.4.2. Key findings on the impact of CSR on financial performance. 
This study examines the impact of CSR performance (measured by ESG rating 
score) on firms’ financial performance. The financial performance, such as market value 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) and profitability (measured by ROA) are the dependent variable. 
Consistent with previous studies (Li et al., 2018; Kang et al., 2016; Attig et al., 2013; El 
Ghoul, 2011; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Waddock and Graves, 1997), I control the 
CSR-CFP relationship using firm-specific characteristics such as size (natural logarithm 
of assets), leverage, growth, Capex to Sales (capital expenditure divided by sales),  
operating margin, employee size (natural logarithm of number of employees). I further 
control for industry, time (year) and country effects. 
Since firms having strong financial performance in the past tend to invest heavily 
in CSR initiatives, they may subsequently experience higher CSR (ESG rating score) 
performance. To control for possible endogeneity bias and reverse causality, I re-estimate 
the CSR-CFP investigation (equation 6.2) using an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
to check whether the result of this study suffers any endogeneity between CSR 
performance and firm’s financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Consistent with previous studies (Siueia et al., 2019; Li et al., 2018; Benlemlih and Bitar, 
2018; Attig et al., 2013; El Ghoul et al., 2011), I also use firm-level yearly CSR 
 





performance (ESG score) and industry average CSR performance (ESG score) as 
instrumental variables (IV). Both IVs are strongly relevant to contemporary CSR 
performance and strong instrumental exogenous with contemporary CFP. To assess and 
control for the bias caused by the possible presence of endogeneity, this study utilises a 
two-stage least square method (2SLS) (Model 2) and the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) (Model 3) as two additional modelling approaches.  
[Insert Table 6.3 about here] 
Using the 2SLS (Model 2) and GMM (Model 3), I regress the CSR performance 
(ESG rating score) on both instrumental variables together with other control variables 
that are used in the main regression mentioned above, i.e. equation 6.2. Moreover, I 
preserve the predicted value for the CSR performance and fit it with the baseline equation 
6.2. According to Table 6.3, the first-stage regression result shows that the relationship 
between both instrumental variables and the firms’ CSR performance is positive and 
statistically significant. According to Table 6.3, the coefficient of the initial value of CSR 
performance (Initial value of ESG rating score) is 0.9378 (t-value of 8.509). Similarly, 
the coefficient of the second instrumental variable industry average CSR performance 
(industry average CSR performance measured by ESG rating score) is 0.9267 (t-value of 
7.56). Both instrumental variable coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These results confirm that the instrumental variables are significantly related to firm CSR 
performance (ESG raging score). 
[Insert Table 6.4 about here] 
The first hypothesis (H1) of this study expects that the CSR performance of the 
firm is positively related to the financial performance of the firm as measured by Tobin’s 




performance (ESG score) on firms’ financial performance of firms measured by Tobin’s 
Q and ROA under the OLS, 2SLS and GMM models. According to Table 6.4 for OLS 
(Panel A - model 1), the CSR performance (ESG rating score) coefficient is positive with 
a value of 0.0113 (t-value of 1.75) and statistically significant at the 10% level.  Similarly, 
the results from using the 2SLS and the GMM models (Panel A - models 2 and 3) 
corroborate those of the OLS model as the coefficients for CSR performance (ESG score) 
under both models (2 and 3) are positive and statistically significant. For example, the 
coefficient using the 2SLS is 0.0128 (t-value of 1.85) and for the GMM is 0.0128 (t-value 
of 1.84). Apart from the variables Growth and Employees, the controlling variables of 
size and leverage have a positive impact on the Tobin’s Q under all three alternative 
modelling approaches. A positive and statistically significant coefficient of size means 
that larger firms tend to invest more in the CSR activities and subsequently lead to higher 
valuation (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Doh et al., 2010; Braymer and Pavalein, 2008). Similarly, 
a positive and statistically coefficient of leverage implies firms with heavily debt-funded 
tend to have additional resources to invest in the CSR which subsequently maximise 
firm’s value (Du et al., 2017; Lourence et al., 2012).  On the contrary, the Capital 
Expenditure to Sales ratio and the Operating Margin are significantly negatively related 
to Tobin’s Q. For example, the capital expenditure to sales is a proxy of slack resources 
and higher capital expenditure to sales ratio mean low available of resources for the CSR. 
The negative and significant coefficient of capital expenditure to sales, meaning firms 
with lower slack resources will limit the investment in CSR and have a negative impact 
on the firm value. Overall according to the result from Table 6.4 (Panel A), CSR activities 
appear to improve the value of a firm in the emerging markets. These results are consistent 




This study also investigates the impact of CSR performance on firms’ profitability 
measured by return on assets (ROA). Table 6.4 (Panel B) reports the regression results 
with the ROA been the dependent variable. The CSR performance coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant under all three models. For example, the coefficient of CSR 
performance (ESG rating score) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level 
under standard OLS (coefficient of 0.0036, t-value of 2.14). The 2SLS (model 2) and 
GMM (model 3) also corroborate the result of the OLS case by reporting positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for CSR performance. According to Table 6.4, Panel 
B the CSR coefficients are 0.0035 (t-value of 1.97) and 0.0034 (t-value of 1.93) under 
2SLS (model 2) and GMM (model 3) respectively. The CSR performance coefficient 
under both models is statistically significant at the 10% level. Also, all models confirm 
that firms’ growth and operating margin are both positive determinants.  On the other 
hand, firms’ size, leverage, capital expenditure to sales ratio are significantly negative 
determinants. The only exception is that of the variable employee size, which is positive 
but statistically insignificant.  The aggregate/all industry result (as of Table 6.4) implies 
that firms’ commitment to socially responsible initiatives has a positive implication on 
their financial performance in the case of emerging economies. Hence, we can argue that 
our first hypothesis of a statistically significant relationship between CSR and firms’ 
value can be accepted. The results of this study are consistent with Feng et al., (2017) and 
Li et al., (2018) who examined the CSR-CFP relationship using US and UK companies 
respectively and report a positive impact of CSR on firm performance.  
Our second hypothesis tests that there is variability in the CSR-CRP relationship 




various industries.34 According to Table 6.5 - Panel A, when financial performance is 
measured in terms of Tobin’s Q, there is a positive and statistically significant result for 
CSR performance in the case of consumer services and the financial services sectors. For 
example, the CSR performance coefficient under OLS is 0.0286 (t-value of 2.22) for 
consumer services and 0.0321 (t-value of 2.07) for the financial industry. The result using 
the 2SLS and GMM approaches are consistent with this finding.  
[Insert Table 6.5 about here] 
On the other hand, according to Table 6.5 - Panel B, the CSR performance (ESG 
rating) coefficient in case of ROA is positive and statistically significant for the industries: 
oil & gas, consumer goods, customer service and telecommunications. This is again 
consistent across all three different models (OLS, 2SLS and GMM). For example, Table 
6.5 (Panel B) reports a positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficient 
for Oil & Gas of 0.0089 (t-value of 1.85), 0.007 (t-value of 1.73) and 0.0074 (t-value of 
1.69) for models 1 (OLS), 2 (2SLS) and 3 (GMM). Table 6.5 - Panel B also reports 
positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) CSR performance coefficients of 
0.0171 (t-value of 2.02), 0.0087 (t-value of 1.79) and 0.0029 (t-value of 1.68) for all OLS, 
2SLS and GMM models for the sector of Telecommunications. For consumer services, 
the CSR performance coefficients are positive with values of 0.0113 (t-value of 2.32), 
0.0140 (t-value 3.19) and 0.0150 (t-value 3.68) under OLS, 2SLS and GMM respectively. 
The results for consumer service sectors are more pronounced compared to other sectors. 
Table 6.5 - Panel B also reports positive and statistically significant (10% level) CSR 
 
34 Table 6.5 reports the regression result across industries. However, for brevity purposes I report only 




performance coefficient for the consumer goods industry. Similarly, the results for ROA 
are consistent for all three different estimation models. 
The industry-wise investigation result implies that CSR has a positive impact on 
firms’ financial performance for firms within consumer services, consumer goods, 
financial services, telecommunication and oil and gas. This study evidenced that the 
impact of CSR on a firm’s financial performance varies across industries. Such a 
difference in CSR-CFP relationship among the industry is due to several factors such as 
the potential of environmental and social damage, end-user proximity, product and 
service differentiation and dependence on stakeholder group (Hopener and Yu, 2010; Lev 
et al., 2010; Simpson and Khoers, 2002). The consumer goods, consumer service, 
financial services and telecommunication industry operate in proximity to end-consumers 
who show more social concern in their consumption (Hoepner and Yu, 2010) and the 
consumer trust and loyalty are highly related to firms CFP (Hopener and Yu, 2010; Lev 
et al., 2010). Consumers reward them with their wallet and investors prefer to invest in 
firms that implement a socially responsible business model (Su et al., 2016; Nielsen, 
2015). The result of this study also corroborates Lev et al., (2010), who report that firms 
operate close to end-consumer tend to experience higher sales when they made a 
charitable contribution. 
Also, I find that the positive CSR-CFP relationship in the oil and gas industry but 
less pronounced compared to Consumer Service, Consumer Goods, Financials, and 
Telecommunication. The result of this study is also consistent with Derwall et al., (2005) 
who find the CSR-CFP relationship is less pronounced in environmentally problematic 
industry.  Firms in the oil and gas industry face greater environmental and social concern, 




These companies invest significantly in technology and training to reduce/mitigate the 
environmental and social risk, which acts as insurance-like protection (Godfrey et al., 
2009; Shiu and wang, 2017) and subsequently leads to an improved reputation and cost-
saving (Laczniak and Murphy, 1991; Isaksson et al., 2014).  Although such investment 
in CSR improve efficiency as these issues are critical for firms’ long-term success, due 
to the higher cost of environmental performance, the positive impact of CSR on CFP is 
less pronounced in the oil and gas industry (Derwall et al., 2005; Hoepner and Yu, 2009).  
 
6.4.3. Testing the moderating impact of cross-listing on CSR-CFP relationship. 
This study also investigates the role of firms’ cross-listing in the foreign stock 
market on the CSR-CFP relationship using equation 6.4. I use a dummy variable (1 for 
cross-listing firms and 0 for non-cross listing firms) to test the moderation hypothesis, 
which captures variation in the CSR-CFP relationship between cross-listed firms and non-
cross-listed firms. Table 6.6 - Panel A presents a positive and statistically significant CSR 
performance coefficient under all three models. Similarly, the coefficient of cross-listing 
is positive and statistically significant in all cases. The coefficient of CSR performance is 
0.0105 (t-value of 1.65) for the OLS model indicating that, ceteris paribus, the increase 
in firms’ value (Tobin’s Q) led by CSR performance is higher for firms that are cross-
listed in a foreign country as the coefficient of cross-listing is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level (coefficient of 0.0267, t-value of 1.82 for the OLS model). In 
fact, according to the results, one standard deviation increase in firms’ CSR performance 
leads to a 2.6% increase (0.0267×0.9766) in Tobin’s Q for the cross-listed firms. This 
finding is also corroborated by the use of the 2SLS and GMM models. 




 A similar result is presented in Table 6.6 - Panel B, where we have positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for the variables CSR performance and cross-listing 
under all three models and for ROA as a proxy for financial performance. According to 
Table 6.6 - Panel B, the cross-listing coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
for all three models. i.e. 0.0068 (t-value of 1.85), 0.0068 (t-value of 1.88) and 0.0069 (t-
value of 1.90) for OLS, 2SLS and GMM respectively. These findings imply that firms’ 
cross-listing plays a significant role in the CSR-CFP relationship by boosting such a 
relationship and increasing operating performance for companies that engage in CSR 
activities. Based on these results, we have to accept our third hypothesis, H3. 
 
6.4.4. Robustness test  
 According to the previous CSR-CFP examination, CSR performance has a 
positive impact on firms’ financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. For 
robustness testing, I use alternative definitions of financial profitability such as the ratio 
of Price to Book Value (PTBV) (instead of the Tobin’s Q ratio) and that of Return on 
Invested Capital (ROIC) (instead of the ROA). Table 6.7 presents the impact of CSR 
performance on the firm’s PTBV and ROIC. The results are again positive and 
statistically significant (CSR performance proxied by ESG rating score) for all three 
models. For example, according to Table 6.7 - Panel A reports the impact of CSR on 
PTBV is positive and statistically significant with values of 0.439 (t-value of 4.22), 0.460 
(t-value 4.03) and 0.475 (t-value 4.21) for model 1 (OLS), 2 (2SLS) and 3 (GMM) 
respectively.  




Similarly, this study further tests the impact of CSR performance on firms’ ROIC. 
According to Table 6.7 - Panel B, the impact of firms’ CSR activities on their ROIC ratio 
is positively and statistically significant. This result is consistent for all three models 
(OLS, 2SLS and GMM). An interesting aspect is that this relationship is considerably 
stronger for these alternative profitability proxies.  For example, the CSR performance 
coefficients under OLS, 2SLS and GMM are 0.723 (t-value of 3.10), 0.737 (t-value of 
2.97) and 0.729 (t-value of 2.94), all statistically significant at the 1% level.  
[Insert Table 6.8 about here] 
Table 6.8 reports the regression result across the industries sectors. When 
financial performance is measured in terms of PTBV, I report a positive and significant 
ESG rating coefficient for all cases of oil & gas, consumer goods, customer service and 
financial sectors. According to Table 4.8 - Panel A, the CSR performance coefficients for 
oil & gas, consumer goods, customer service, and financial sectors using the OLS model 
are 0.267 (t-value of 1.71), 1.301 (t-value of 2.85), 0.881 (t-value of 2.02) and 0.304 (t-
value of 3.12) respectively. The results for model 2 (2SLS) and model 3 (GMM) are also 
consistent with the OLS model for these industries except for Oil & Gas in the case of the 
GMM definition. In terms of the other controlling variables, the coefficients for size and 
capital expenditure to sales ratios are consistently negative and statistically significant in 
all four industries. This indicates a reverse relationship between CSR and financial 
performance with Size and Capex to sales ratio firms, i.e. the larger the size and capital 
expenditures in a firm the lower the impact of CSR activities on profitability. This is quite 
logical given the possibility that CSR activities in already large firms might have a smaller 




variables, all coefficients are insignificant for most industries and for all alternative 
modelling approaches.  
Furthermore, Table 6.8 - Panel B presents the regression result of the impact of 
CSR performance on ROIC. The coefficient of CSR performance regression is positive 
and statistically significant for oil & gas, consumer services, consumer goods and 
telecommunication sectors under all three models. Table 6.8 - Panel B shows that for oil 
& gas, consumer goods, consumer services and telecommunications, the CSR 
performance coefficient under OLS (model 1) is 1.318 (t-value of 1.97), 1.532 (t-value of 
1.89), 2.006 (t-value of 2.67) and 2.901 (t-value of 2.43) respectively. Table 6.8 - Panel 
B also reports positive and statistically significant CSR coefficient for models 2 (2SLS) 
and 3 (GMM), which is consistent with the OLS model. Overall, these results mean that 
the CSR has a positive impact on firms’ return on invested capital as firms involved in 
the CSR initiatives can increase significantly their return on investments. However, the 
effect is less pronounced for the case of larger firms.  
[Insert Table 6.9 about here] 
 This study further examines the impact of cross-listing on the CSR-CFP 
relationship for both PTBV and ROIC. According to Table 6.9, the CSR coefficients for 
both PTBV and ROIC are both positive and statistically significant in all OLS, 2SLS and 
GMM methods. For example, the cross-listing coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant (0.538, t-value of 2.71) for the dependent variable PTBV in the OLS model. 
The results for the 2SLS and GMM models are also consistent with the OLS and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A similar finding is reported in Table 6.9 - Panel 
B for the ROIC proxy. The CSR performance coefficients are again positive and 




6.9, Panel B) also confirm that the firm’s cross-listing positively moderates the 
relationship between CSR performance and ROIC. According to Table 6.7 - Panel B, the 
cross-listing coefficient is 0.952 (t-value of 1.70) under OLS, 0.950 (t-value of 1.72) 
under 2SLS, and 0.988 (t-value of 1.79) under GMM. These are significant at the 10% 
level. 
Overall, the robustness test corroborates the original results of Tables 6.4 and 6.5 
of the study. The CSR performance has a significantly positive impact on the firms’ value 
(Tobin’s Q) and profitability (ROA), supporting our first hypothesis, H1. Furthermore, 
Table 6.5 confirms that the CSR-CFP relationship varies across the industry; hence, 
supporting the second hypothesis, H2. The result of the robustness test (Tables 6.7 and 
6.8) also supports the first hypothesis and second hypothesis, respectively. As of Table 
6.7, the CSR has a positive and statistically significant impact on PTVB (value) and ROIC 
(profitability). Similarly, Table 6.8 again confirms the variability in CSR-CFP 
relationship among industry sectors. Finally, the results of Table 6.9 are consistent with 
the result of Table 6.6 highlighting the significantly positive impact of cross-listing on 
the CSR-CFP relationship. Hence, the positive impact of CSR on CFP is more 
pronounced for firms that are cross-listed on foreign stock markets. 
 
6.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The popularity of CSR is increasing significantly in recent years. The firms’ 
participation in CSR differs from industry to industry and country to country. Firms 
design their CSR initiatives according to the nature of their business, the industry they 
are operating and the strategy they adopt. Therefore, I argue that the relationship between 




argument, I aimed to examine this heterogeneous link between CSR and CFP across 
industries. Further, I sought to investigate the CSR-CFP relationship in the emerging 
economies and expected to be a positive one. 
This is examined for the first time in the literature. I use 1,244 firms-year 
observations representing 779 companies from 23 emerging markets. This sample 
consists of the companies that applied to be associated with the FTSE4Good emerging 
market index between 2016 and 2017. Also, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
time that the FTSE4Good Emerging index Rating Score is used as a proxy for CSR 
performance. This study employs instrumental variables (IV) to eliminate endogeneity 
issues alongside the use of alternative modelling approaches to test the CSR-CFP 
relationship, such as those of 2SLS and GMM.  
To investigate the financial effect, I use Tobin’s Q and ROA, where I regress 
financial performance with the firms overall CSR Performance (ESG rating score) and 
controlling for various micro-characteristics such as the firm’s size, leverage, capital 
expenditure to sales ratio, growth, operating margin and employee size. I found that the 
CSR performance is positively associated with all Tobin’s Q, PTBV, ROA and ROIC 
indicators. These results are consistent with our first hypothesis, namely the existence of 
a positive association between the financial performance of the companies and the CSR 
performance in the emerging market. Overall, it implies that the more the firms invest in 
socially responsible business practices, the better their financial performance is going to 
be. This result is consistent with Choi and Wang (2009), Chueng et al., (2009), Jo and 
Harjoto (2011), Feng et al., (2017) and Li et al., (2018). Prior studies primarily focus on 
the developed economies, for example, the most recent studies by Feng et al., (2017) and 




relationship between CSR and financial performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). They 
reported the positive impact of the overall CSR score on firms’ financial performance. 
The aggregate result of this study is also consistent with the instrumental stakeholder 
theory which argues that firm participation in the CSR initiatives is instrumental for the 
better economic benefit (Wood and Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Consistent with the second hypothesis (H2), I find that the relationship between 
firms’ CSR initiatives and corporate financial performance varies across 
industries/sectors. For example, in the case of Tobin’s Q and ROA, out of ten industries, 
I found the coefficient for CSR performance to be positive and statistically significant for 
the cases of financial and consumer services for the Tobin’s Q and oil & gas, customer 
service, consumer goods and telecommunication sectors for the case of the ROA. For the 
rest of the industries, the CSR does not have any material impact. The industry-wise 
robustness test results (Table 6.8 - Panel A) confirms that the significant impact of CSR 
on PTBV for oil & gas, consumer services, consumer goods and financial industry. In the 
case of ROIC, CSR has a significant impact on ROIC for oil & gas, consumer services, 
consumer goods and the telecommunication industry.  Hence, we can conclude that the 
CSR-CFP relationship is heterogeneous and varies across industries in the case of 
emerging markets. The impact of CSR on CFP varies among these industries possibly 
because different industries have different visibility with regards to potential negative 
effect from their operation to the environment (Ziegler et al., 2007; Hopner et al., 2010; 
Lev et al., 2010). For example, the impact of CSR on CFP in the oil & gas industry is less 
pronounced as compared to the other industries. Companies in the oil & gas sector have 
high reputational risk and primarily focus on legitimising themselves with society and 




positive impact of CSR on CFP in the Oil & Gas industry appears to be less pronounced.  
On the other hand, industries such as consumer goods, consumer service, 
telecommunication and financials are in relatively close proximity to the end-users and 
less proximity to environmental damage. End-users are more concerned with the social 
issues on their consumptions and are heavily dependent on the issue of trust. Hence the 
impact of CSR on CFP among consumer goods, consumer service, telecommunication 
and financials are more pronounced.  
 The third hypothesis examines the moderating role of cross-listing on the CSR-
CFP relationship. The results confirm that cross-listed firms tend to enjoy higher positive 
and statistically significant financial performance. Also, the coefficient of cross-listing is 
positive and statistically significant using all three models.   
This study is amongst very few that have examined the heterogeneous relationship 
between CSR and CFP across industries/sectors and builds upon the works of Omar and 
Zallom (2016) and Feng et al., (2017) who investigate the heterogeneous association 
between firms’ participation in socially responsible initiatives and financial return across 
industrial sectors. However, the former study by Omar and Zallom (2016) is limited to 
only 26 observations from three industrial sectors (chemical, food and beverage, and 
pharmaceutical & medicine); while the latter one used a large sample of 17,083 
observations but all from the US only. The result of this study is consistent with Feng et 
al., (2017) by showing that the CSR-CFP relationship is heterogeneous across industries 
and this effect is valid not only in the case of developed markets but also for the emerging 
ones. I expanded the study by examining the value relevance of the CSR scores with 




Also, the very first time in the literature, this study examines the moderating effect 
of cross-listing in CSR-CFP relationship. Tables 6.6 and 6.9 confirm that cross-listing 
positively and significantly moderate the CSR-CFP relationship. This result means that 
the positive impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance is more pronounced when the 
firm is a cross-listed. This is because such firms are required to improve corporate 
governance and CSR activities as a form of boosting their reputation and legitimise 
themselves in the international stock exchanges (Boubakri et al., 2016; Del Bosco and 
Misani, 2016; Del Bosco and Misani, 2015). In addition, cross-listed firms tend to enjoy 
higher valuation compared with firms from their own country that are not cross-listed due 
to their improved reputation (Doidge et al., 2004). 
The current study examines whether corporate social responsibility has a positive 
impact on firms’ financial performance in the emerging market and explores the 
heterogeneous relationship across industries. The result of this concludes that firms in the 
emerging market tend to enjoy better financial return when they commit to socially 
responsible activities in their business operation. Higher the firm’s involvement in CSR, 
the better their financial return. However, this result differs across industries.  
This study contributes to the CSR-CFP literature in several ways. First, I extend 
the literature by providing evidence using new CSR dataset. I am the first to use the ESG 
rating as a proxy of CSR performance developed by the FTSE4Good index. The 
FTSE4Good index is widely recognised as one that uses very comprehensive and expert 
criteria in the selection of the firms that will become part of the index and provides a very 
wide geographical coverage. Its framework is aligned with the UN sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) and committed to providing a comprehensive assessment. It 




frameworks such as the Global Reporting Standard (GRI), the OECT Guidelines, Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), the Transparency International’s Business Principles for 
Countering Bribery, the GHG Protocol (FTSE, 2016), etc.. Also, I use 1,244 firm-year 
observation representing 779 individual firms from 23 emerging countries across the 
world. This improves the generalisability of my findings in the literature. Secondly, this 
study is among the very first to examine the effect of cross-listing on the CSR-CFP 
relationship and confirms that cross-listing has a positive and significant impact on the 
CSR-CFP relationship. Thirdly, this study is among the few that examined CSR-CFP 
heterogeneous relationship across industries. Only a few studies, Feng et al., (2017) and 
Omar and Zallom (2016) previously examine CSR across many industries. However, both 
studies are based on single country data (US and Jordan). Hence, in this study, I respond 
to Feng et al., (2017) call for additional examination using data from countries outside 
the US. 
There are several implications from the result of the current study. The improved 
financial performance driven by an increase in CSR activities may be due to a better 
relationship between the firm and several stakeholders that are directly and indirectly 
connected to the business operation. Also, the evidence of heterogeneousness association 
between CSR and CFP across industry implies that firms or managers in an emerging 
market should focus on linking the CSR strategies that better suits to the nature of their 
business and the model they are operating. Hence, it is important for managers to design 
their CSR programs in line with their business strategy so as to maintain some consistency 
in meeting stakeholders’ expectations. Also, continuous improvement in the firms’ CSR 
programme facilitates improved economic performance as firms with higher CSR rating 




with firms implementing fewer CSR initiatives. Further, as regards the examination of 
the value relevance of the CSR rating, our tests revealed that the stock market also 
responds positively with the firms' commitment to CSR. Since this study reports a positive 
association between CSR rating and CFP in emerging markets, both multinational and 
local firms in these markets should focus on those CSR activities/initiatives that are more 
suitable to the country they are operating in. What are these activities is a question that 
































Table 6. 1 Sample Table 
Industry Code Industry No of Observations Percentage 
1 Oil & Gas 81 6.51%
1000 Basic Materials 136 10.93%
2000 Industrials 205 16.48%
3000 Consumer Goods 141 11.33%
4000 Health Care 55 4.42%
5000 Consumer Services 119 9.57%
6000 Telecommunication 61 4.90%
7000 Utilities 99 7.96%
8000 Financials 293 23.55%
9000 Technology 54 4.34%
1,244                       100.00%
 
Table 6.1 (Panel B): Country-wise Sample
Country code Country Name No of ObservationsPercentage 
BRAZ Brazil 81 6.51%
CHL Chile 32 2.57%
CHN China 320 25.72%
COL Colombia 18 1.45%
CZE Chez Republic 4 0.32%
EGY Egypt 6 0.48%
GRC Greece 12 0.96%
HUN Hungary 5 0.40%
IND India 156 12.54%
INDO Indonesia 38 3.05%
MAL Malaysia 63 5.06%
MEX Mexico 53 4.26%
PAK Pakistan 5 0.40%
PER Peru 3 0.24%
PHIL Philippines 41 3.30%
POL Poland 34 2.73%
QA Qatar 11 0.88%
RUS Russia 44 3.54%
SAF South Africa 85 6.83%
THAI Thailand 49 3.94%
TUR Turkey 52 4.18%
TWN Taiwan 112 9.00%
UAE United Arab Emirates 20 1.61%




Table 6. 2 Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Variance Inflation Factor Test 
Panel A: Descriptive 







CSR (ESG) 2.1399 2.1000 4.3000 0.4000 0.9766 0.1396 2.2027 36.9955 0.0000 2662.0000 1185.4620 1244
Tobin's Q 0.5920 0.5904 0.9484 0.1276 0.2130 -0.1277 2.1476 41.0484 0.0000 736.4023 56.4015 1244
ROA 0.0478 0.0363 0.2472 -0.0859 0.0506 1.1204 5.3828 554.5575 0.0000 59.4492 3.1770 1244
ROIC 8.7403 7.1800 36.5600 -7.7600 6.9669 1.2656 5.7295 718.2653 0.0000 10872.9100 60332.0900 1244
PTBV 2.2154 1.3344 17.8549 0.1763 2.5446 3.5136 18.7586 15431.6700 0.0000 2755.9840 8048.6200 1244
Size 8.2779 8.1471 11.2451 6.4375 0.9770 0.7201 3.4019 115.8856 0.0000 10297.6900 1186.4870 1244
Leverage 0.2781 0.2659 0.7774 0.0037 0.1753 0.4917 2.7334 53.8173 0.0000 345.9422 38.2118 1244
Growth 0.0963 0.0685 0.9112 -0.3765 0.1903 1.3044 7.0632 1208.5190 0.0000 119.8290 45.0031 1244
Cpex /Sales 0.0919 0.0517 0.7107 0.0016 0.1184 2.8979 13.0828 7010.6450 0.0000 114.3395 17.4233 1244
Operating Margin 0.1590 0.1406 0.5460 -0.2664 0.1326 0.3880 3.9306 76.1066 0.0000 197.7677 21.8393 1244
Employee 4.1480 4.1654 5.5593 2.2856 0.6338 -0.3635 3.4537 38.0641 0.0000 5160.1570 499.2743 1244  
 
Panel B: Correlations 
Variables CSR Tobin's 
Q 
ROA ROIC PTBV Size Leverage Growth Capex/Sales Operating 
Margin 
Employee 
CSR 1.000                     
Tobin's Q 0.082 1.000                
ROA 0.026 -0.494 1.000              
ROIC 0.089 -0.260 0.907 1.000            
PTBV 0.101 -0.037 0.442 0.494 1.000          
Size 0.198 0.304 -0.199 -0.172 -0.211 1.000        
Leverage -0.013 0.357 -0.251 -0.262 -0.008 -0.015 1.000         
Growth -0.098 -0.006 0.109 0.130 -0.015 -0.052 0.051 1.000       
Capex/Sales -0.034 -0.211 0.000 -0.077 -0.045 -0.040 0.177 -0.040 1.000     
Operating Margin -0.055 -0.041 0.298 0.292 0.105 0.085 0.023 0.154 0.186 1.000   





Panel C: Variance Inflation Factor Test 
VIF: Dependent variable Tobin's Q   VIF: Dependent variable ROA 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Operating Margin 1.0800 0.9256  Operating Margin 1.0800 0.9256 
Cpex /Sales 1.0800 0.9259  Cpex /Sales 1.0800 0.9259 
Size 1.0600 0.9455  Size 1.0600 0.9455 
CSR (ESG) 1.0600 0.9460  CSR (ESG) 1.0600 0.9460 
Growth 1.0500 0.9521  Growth 1.0500 0.9521 
Leverage 1.0400 0.9590  Leverage 1.0400 0.9590 
Employee 1.0200 0.9846  Employee 1.0200 0.9846 






















Panel D: Heteroskedasticity Test 
Variables  Tobin's Q   ROA     
CSR 0.0113*   0.00355**     
 (1.84)  (2.24)   
Size 0.0969***  -0.0210***   
 (11.83)  (-9.86)   
Leverage 0.527***  -0.0770***   
 (20.67)  (-11.63)   
Growth -0.0246  0.0193***   
 (-1.08)  (3.26)   
Capex to sales -0.305***  -0.0421***   
 (-7.90)  (-4.19)   
Operating 
margin -0.214***  0.166***   
 (-6.08)  (18.13)   
Employee -0.00122  0.00135   
 (-0.19)  (0.80)   
Constant -0.352***  0.207***   
 (-4.68)  (10.65)   
Adj square 55.39%  44.49%   
N 1244   1244     
 estat hettest  estat hettest   
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test 
for heteroskedasticity  
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroskedasticity  
 
Ho: Constant 
variance   Ho: Constant variance   
 Variables: fitted values of Tobin's Q Variables: fitted values of ROA 
      
 chi
2(1)      =     12.85  chi
2(1)      =   145.41  






















Initial Value of CSR 0.9378*** 
 (8.509) 
Industry Average CSR 0.9267*** 
 (7.56) 
Constant  -2.1325*** 
 (-7.09) 
Industry effect Yes 
Year effect Yes 
Country effect Yes 





Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, *** 











Table 6. 4 Impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance  
Variables 
Panel A: Tobin's Q   Panel B: ROA 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
OLS 2SLS GMM   OLS 2SLS GMM 
CSR 0.0113* 0.0128* 0.0128* 
 
0.0036** 0.0035** 0.0034* 
 (1.75) (1.85) (1.84) 
 
(2.14) (1.97) (1.93) 
 
       
Size 0.0969*** 0.0964*** 0.0965*** 
 
-0.0210*** -0.0209*** -0.0210*** 
 (6.65) (6.72) (6.73) 
 
(-8.52) (-8.62) (-8.66) 
 
       
Leverage 0.527*** 0.527*** 0.527*** 
 
-0.0770*** -0.0770*** -0.0766*** 
 (18.44) (18.72) (18.71) 
 
(-11.36) (-11.55) (-11.50) 
 
       
Growth -0.0246 -0.0244 -0.0243 
 
0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0190*** 
 (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
 
(2.88) (2.92) (2.89) 
 
       
Capex to sales -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.306*** 
 
-0.0421*** -0.0421*** -0.0426*** 
 (-7.87) (-7.99) (-8.05) 
 
(-3.70) (-3.77) (-3.82) 
 
       
Operating margin -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** 
 
0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (-5.02) (-5.10) (-5.09) 
 
(13.30) (13.52) (13.51) 
 
       
Employee -0.00122 -0.00115 -0.00120 
 
0.00135 0.00135 0.00122 
 (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.19) 
 
(0.83) (0.84) (0.77) 
 
       
Constant -0.352** -0.350** -0.350** 
 
0.207*** 0.207*** 0.209*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.82) (-2.82) 
 
(9.26) (9.40) (9.49) 
Adj R square 56.79% 56.79% 56.79% 
 
48.36% 48.36% 48.35% 
N 1,244  1,244  1,244    1,244  1,244  1,244  
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 




Table 6. 5 Impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance- Industry-wise  
Panel A: Corporate financial performance is measured as Tobin’s Q 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 0.0286** 0.0209* 0.0198* 0.0321** 0.0375** 0.0398**
(2.22) (1.76) (1.72) (2.07) (2.23) (2.39)
Size -0.0669* -0.0657** -0.0635** 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.164***
(-1.89) (-2.06) (-2.06) (10.06) (9.95) (9.77)
Leverage 0.729*** 0.731*** 0.732*** 0.0902* 0.0856 0.0826
(9.56) (10.80) (11.21) (1.65) (1.63) (1.60)
Growth -0.0214 -0.0253 -0.0204 -0.0501 -0.0494 -0.0509
(-0.27) (-0.36) (-0.30) (-1.15) (-1.20) (-1.23)
Capex to sales -0.336*** -0.331*** -0.326*** -0.302*** -0.296*** -0.302***
(-3.84) (-4.23) (-4.12) (-3.92) (-4.05) (-4.15)
Operating margin -0.930*** -0.922*** -0.923*** -0.148* -0.149* -0.149*
(-6.06) (-6.75) (-6.78) (-1.80) (-1.91) (-1.91)
Employee 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0007 0.00503 0.00492 0.00406
(0.01) (0.05) (-0.04) (0.42) (0.43) (0.36)
Constant 0.957*** 0.951*** 0.932*** -0.741*** -0.722*** -0.682***
(3.23) (3.58) (3.66) (-4.30) (-4.30) (-4.10)
Adj R square 61.52% 61.50% 61.11%
N 119 119 119 293 293 293
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the level 5%, *** indicates 






Panel B: Corporate financial performance is measured as ROA 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 0.0089* 0.007* 0.0074* 0.0118** 0.00874* 0.00832* 0.0113** 0.0140*** 0.0150*** 0.0171* 0.00867* 0.00294*
(1.85) (1.73) (1.69) (2.06) (1.88) (1.92) (2.32) (3.19) (3.68) (2.02) (1.79) (1.68)
Size -0.0422*** -0.0421*** -0.0391*** -0.0212** -0.0208** -0.0191** -0.00884 -0.00928 -0.00898 -0.0377 -0.0357** -0.0161
(-3.85) (-4.51) (-4.42) (-2.16) (-2.30) (-2.36) (-0.77) (-0.91) (-0.90) (-1.80) (-2.15) (-1.26)
Leverage -0.106** -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.0784*** -0.0790*** -0.0821*** -0.0232 -0.0219 -0.0326
(-2.47) (-2.92) (-3.02) (-4.58) (-4.95) (-4.93) (-3.17) (-3.63) (-4.05) (-0.75) (-0.91) (-1.08)
Growth 0.0523* 0.0547** 0.0628** 0.00788 0.00700 0.00753 0.0110 0.0124 0.0129 -0.0785 -0.0837** -0.111**
(1.77) (2.22) (2.39) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.45) (0.47) (-1.64) (-2.11) (-2.33)
Capex to sales -0.106* -0.105*** -0.101*** 0.0512 0.0443 0.0417 -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.251** -0.267*** -0.224**
(-2.55) (-2.94) (-2.74) (0.41) (0.39) (0.37) (-4.72) (-5.38) (-5.56) (-2.11) (-2.95) (-2.43)
Operating margin 0.150** 0.145** 0.147** 0.177*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.139* 0.137** 0.140** 0.410*** 0.416*** 0.418***
(2.16) (2.44) (2.54) (2.81) (3.08) (3.16) (1.94) (2.15) (2.20) (7.28) (9.66) (7.73)
Employee 0.0043 0.0042 0.0047 0.00652 0.00609 0.00617 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.00167 -0.000783 -0.000281
(0.64) (0.76) (0.83) (1.30) (1.33) (1.34) (-0.28) (-0.35) (-0.27) (-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.04)
Constant 0.388*** 0.390*** 0.364*** 0.194** 0.196*** 0.183*** 0.108 0.110 0.108 0.392** 0.386*** 0.191*
(4.02) (4.81) (4.70) (2.51) (2.75) (2.84) (1.26) (1.44) (1.45) (2.27) (2.85) (1.82)
Adj R square 68.05% 68.62% 67.88% 48.57% 48.57% 48.26% 80.28% 79.89% 73.37%
N 81 81 81 141 141 141 119 119 119 61 61 61
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the level 5%, *** indicates significant at 1% level.







Table 6. 6  Moderating impacts of cross-listing on CSR-CFP relationship. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 0.0105* 0.0120* 0.0120* 0.0033** 0.0033* 0.003*
(1.65) (1.74) (1.73) (2.00) (1.84) (1.80)
Size 0.0942*** 0.0937*** 0.0937*** -0.0217*** -0.0216*** -0.0217***
(6.36) (6.42) (6.43) (-8.43) (-8.55) (-8.59)
Leverage 0.525*** 0.525*** 0.525*** -0.0775*** -0.0775*** -0.0771***
(18.41) (18.70) (18.69) (-11.46) (-11.65) (-11.60)
Growth -0.0235 -0.0233 -0.0232 0.0196*** 0.0196*** 0.0193***
(-1.02) (-1.03) (-1.02) (2.91) (2.96) (2.93)
Capex to sales -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.0413*** -0.0413*** -0.0418***
(-7.83) (-7.96) (-8.02) (-3.63) (-3.70) (-3.75)
Operating margin -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.213*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166***
(-5.04) (-5.13) (-5.12) (13.27) (13.49) (13.48)
Employee -0.00201 -0.00193 -0.00199 0.00115 0.00115 0.00102
(-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.32) (0.71) (0.72) (0.64)
Cross Listing 0.0267* 0.0265* 0.0263* 0.0068* 0.0068* 0.0069*
(1.82) (1.84) (1.82) (1.85) (1.88) (1.90)
Constant -0.350** -0.348** -0.348** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.209***
(-2.80) (-2.83) (-2.83) (9.21) (9.36) (9.45)
Adj R square 56.95% 56.94% 56.94% 48.53% 48.53% 48.53%
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the level 5%, *** indicates significant at 1% level.





Table 6. 7 Impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance on financial performance- 
Robustness Test: Corporate financial performance is measured as PTBV and ROIC 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 0.439*** 0.460*** 0.475*** 0.723*** 0.737*** 0.729***
(4.22) (4.03) (4.21) (3.10) (2.97) (2.94)
Size -1.445*** -1.451*** -1.453*** -2.571*** -2.575*** -2.590***
(-7.56) (-7.69) (-7.70) (-7.73) (-7.86) (-7.90)
Leverage 0.433 0.434 0.304 -10.11*** -10.11*** -10.08***
(0.81) (0.82) (0.60) (-10.35) (-10.52) (-10.51)
Growth -0.574 -0.571 -0.535 3.107*** 3.109*** 3.064***
(-1.55) (-1.56) (-1.47) (3.22) (3.27) (3.23)
Capex to sales -2.290*** -2.285*** -2.216*** -9.670*** -9.667*** -9.703***
(-4.04) (-4.09) (-4.05) (-6.34) (-6.45) (-6.50)
Operating margin 4.171*** 4.172*** 4.053*** 21.74*** 21.74*** 21.64***
(6.35) (6.45) (6.44) (13.42) (13.64) (13.62)
Employee -0.0898 -0.0889 -0.0820 0.156 0.157 0.146
(-1.05) (-1.06) (-0.98) (0.67) (0.68) (0.63)
Constant 12.16*** 12.19*** 12.20*** 27.81*** 27.83*** 28.05***
(7.46) (7.60) (7.60) (9.16) (9.32) (9.41)
Adj R square 37.15% 37.15% 37.11% 43.99% 43.99% 43.99%
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the level 5%, *** indicates 
significant at 1% level.






Table 6. 8 Impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance- Industry-wise- Robustness Test  
Panel A: Corporate financial performance is measured as PTBV 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 0.267* 0.259* 0.263 1.301** 1.419** 1.337* 0.811** 0.928** 1.238*** 0.304*** 0.328*** 0.316***
(1.71) (1.82) (1.54) (2.85) (2.78) (2.57) (2.02) (2.43) (2.87) (3.12) (3.32) (3.24)
Size -0.685*** -0.685*** -0.653*** -2.683*** -2.699*** -2.414*** -3.115*** -3.135*** -2.867*** -0.250** -0.263** -0.245**
(-3.80) (-4.44) (-4.41) (-4.00) (-4.37) (-4.07) (-4.17) (-4.71) (-4.29) (-2.24) (-2.45) (-2.32)
Leverage -0.823 -0.825 -0.904 3.036 3.017* 2.989* 1.967 1.939 0.930 -0.104 -0.124 -0.0992
(-0.77) (-0.90) (-1.02) (1.54) (1.70) (1.67) (0.94) (1.05) (0.48) (-0.21) (-0.27) (-0.22)
Growth -0.0676 -0.0573 0.0288 1.293 1.327 1.465 -2.472* -2.414** -1.872 0.307 0.310 0.318
(-0.08) (-0.08) (0.04) (0.68) (0.76) (0.80) (-1.84) (-2.03) (-1.59) (1.34) (1.43) (1.48)
Capex to sales -2.471*** -2.467*** -2.425*** -5.304 -5.036 -5.255 -8.539*** -8.608*** -8.889*** -1.528** -1.505*** -1.484***
(-2.73) (-3.20) (-3.18) (-0.72) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-2.90) (-3.31) (-3.42) (-2.59) (-2.67) (-2.64)
Operating margin 1.287 1.266 1.282 11.94*** 11.85*** 11.31*** 1.636 1.518 2.524 1.629** 1.625** 1.619**
(1.06) (1.22) (1.23) (3.25) (3.52) (3.36) (0.62) (0.64) (1.05) (2.33) (2.45) (2.45)
Employee 0.128 0.128 0.133 -0.0675 -0.0508 -0.0348 -0.277 -0.286 -0.249 0.0548 0.0543 0.0602
(1.10) (1.30) (1.34) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.14) (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.61) (0.92) (0.96) (1.08)
Constant 6.764*** 6.775*** 6.493*** 20.23*** 20.16*** 17.96*** 26.08*** 26.18*** 24.05*** 2.228** 2.313** 2.128**
(3.85) (4.53) (4.53) (4.01) (4.34) (4.02) (4.28) (4.83) (4.44) (2.19) (2.37) (2.24)
Adj R square 56.40% 56.39% 56.00% 55.21% 55.18% 53.67% 33.37% 33.35% 33.03%
N 81 81 81 141 141 141 119 119 119 293 293 293
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the level 5%, *** indicates significant at 1% level.
Consumer service
Variables




Panel B: Corporate financial performance is measured as ROIC 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 1.318* 0.820* 0.884* 1.532* 1.340* 1.280* 2.006*** 2.266*** 2.400*** 2.901** 1.860* 1.76*
(1.97) (1.84) (1.72) (1.89) (1.71) (1.69) (2.67) (3.45) (3.94) (2.43) (1.77) (1.82)
Size -6.843*** -6.818*** -6.311*** -1.238 -1.212 -1.028 -2.688* -2.731* -2.652** -5.840** -5.597*** -2.279
(-4.23) (-4.94) (-4.80) (-0.89) (-0.95) (-0.89) (-1.71) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-2.25) (-2.71) (-1.36)
Leverage -11.91** -12.01** -13.25*** -13.78*** -13.75*** -13.79*** -9.444** -9.508*** -9.922*** 3.491 3.648 2.344
(-2.06) (-2.44) (-2.63) (-4.06) (-4.42) (-4.41) (-2.31) (-2.62) (-2.91) (0.75) (1.00) (0.50)
Growth 8.203* 8.844** 10.20** 2.612 2.556 2.686 1.731 1.861 2.014 -7.935 -8.576 -13.20*
(1.82) (2.37) (2.55) (0.67) (0.72) (0.76) (0.39) (0.48) (0.52) (-1.08) (-1.43) (-1.75)
Capex to sales -15.74*** -15.48*** -14.82*** -5.812 -6.248 -6.196 -29.00*** -29.15*** -29.32*** -32.72** -34.67*** -29.43**
(-2.85) (-3.23) (-2.97) (-0.35) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-7.06) (-8.02) (-8.24) (-2.17) (-3.05) (-2.43)
Operating margin 14.52 13.24 13.48 21.61*** 21.75*** 21.19*** 11.28 11.01 11.42 54.63*** 55.36*** 56.44***
(1.52) (1.64) (1.73) (2.68) (2.94) (2.98) (1.13) (1.24) (1.29) (6.90) (9.07) (6.99)
Employee 0.595 0.607 0.677 0.869 0.842 0.854 -0.696 -0.716 -0.683 -0.563 -0.454 -0.328
(0.63) (0.74) (0.83) (1.18) (1.25) (1.26) (-0.82) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.30)
Constant 63.53*** 64.23*** 59.79*** 16.21 16.33 14.90 30.05** 30.27*** 29.66*** 59.31** 58.68*** 26.52*
(4.53) (5.46) (5.33) (1.49) (1.63) (1.65) (2.45) (2.78) (2.79) (2.70) (3.40) (1.89)
Adj R square 64.00% 63.90% 62.36% 50.20% 50.18% 49.93% 81.26% 80.94% 72.97%
N 81 81 81 141 141 141 119 119 119 61 61 61
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
Oil and Gas Consumer Goods Consumer service Telecommunications






Table 6. 9 Moderating impact of cross-listing on CSR-CFP relationship- Robustness Test 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM
CSR 0.422*** 0.443*** 0.459*** 0.693*** 0.708*** 0.699***
(4.07) (3.88) (4.05) (2.95) (2.82) (2.79)
Size -1.500*** -1.507*** -1.509*** -2.669*** -2.674*** -2.693***
(-7.85) (-7.99) (-8.00) (-7.80) (-7.95) (-8.01)
Leverage 0.393 0.395 0.263 -10.18*** -10.18*** -10.15***
(0.73) (0.75) (0.52) (-10.46) (-10.63) (-10.62)
Growth -0.552 -0.549 -0.514 3.146*** 3.148*** 3.106***
(-1.48) (-1.50) (-1.41) (3.26) (3.31) (3.27)
Capex to sales -2.230*** -2.226*** -2.155*** -9.564*** -9.561*** -9.594***
(-3.90) (-3.95) (-3.91) (-6.29) (-6.40) (-6.45)
Operating margin 4.187*** 4.187*** 4.067*** 21.77*** 21.77*** 21.67***
(6.38) (6.49) (6.49) (13.43) (13.65) (13.63)
Employee -0.106 -0.105 -0.0981 0.128 0.128 0.117
(-1.24) (-1.25) (-1.18) (0.54) (0.55) (0.51)
Cross Listing 0.538*** 0.535*** 0.540*** 0.952* 0.950* 0.988*
(2.71) (2.73) (2.76) (1.70) (1.72) (1.79)
Constant 12.19*** 12.22*** 12.23*** 27.86*** 27.88*** 28.10***
(7.61) (7.76) (7.76) (9.15) (9.31) (9.40)
Adj R square 37.61% 37.60% 37.57% 44.17% 44.17% 44.16%
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* Indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the level 5%, *** indicates significant at 1% level.
Panel A: PTBV Panel B: ROIC
Variables








Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1. Summary of findings 
Corporate Social Responsibility is becoming a vital business strategy for firms’ 
success. Stakeholders’ awareness of the effects/consequences of business operation to society 
has increased significantly over the years. Recent corporate scandals and environmental 
violations have put significant pressure on the business to compel socially responsible 
business practices. Due to most recent corporate scandals, the issue of whether the CSR lead 
to improved financial performance or decrease has got significant attention from the 
researchers over the years. This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature of Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial Performance relationship by examining the 
CSR-CFP link in several ways. 
This study investigates the impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance using the 
CSR index (FTSE4Good) addition/deletions and its ESG rating score as a proxy of the firms’ 
corporate social responsibility performance. First, I examined the impact of CSR on the firm's 
long-term operating performance. I compared the long-term operating performances of firms 
associated with the CSR index with the performances of firms that are not associated with the 
CSR index. Also, the prior and post addition (deletion) operating performance is also 
investigated. Secondly, I investigate the impact of CSR index addition/deletion on firms’ 
long-term stock return. Using CSR index addition and deletion as CSR performance, this 
examined the firm's long-term sock return after the firms’ addition (deletion) in the CSR 
index. Finally, this study also investigates the heterogeneity in CSR-CFP relationship among 
industry sectors using the emerging market data. In this instance, I used the FTSE4Good ESG 
rating score as a measure of the CSR performance and examined its impact on the firms’ 




Having provided the extensive literature review in chapter 2 including the history of 
CSR, theories, and the empirical evaluation of the CSR -CFP relationship, the chapter 3 of 
this thesis primarily focused on the research philosophy and methodologies that have used in 
this research. The theoretical underpinning used is described in each empirical examination 
of chapter 4, 5 and 6. The main results of the three-different empirical chapter are summarised 
in the following section. 
As mentioned in previous sections, the primary objective of this thesis is to contribute 
the CSR-CFP literature by examining the impact of firms’ addition (deletion) in the CSR 
index on their financial performance. This study used the FTSE4Good index series as the 
proxy of the CSR performance. FTSE4Good is widely popular for its comprehensive 
methodologies in evaluating CSR matters. The FTSE4Good index series consists of the 
companies that have demonstrated a significant commitment to the key three fundamental 
issues such as Environment, Social and Governance issues. For first and second empirical 
investigation (chapter 4 and chapter 5) FTSE4Good Global index addition as positive CSR 
performance and deletion from the index as a negative CSR performance. For the third 
empirical investigation (chapter 6), I use the FTSE4Good Emerging market index ESG rating 
score as a proxy of CSR performance. The CSR related data and rating score are retrieved 
from the FTSE4Good index. The financial performance is measured using accounting and 
financial indicators such as; operating profit margin, operating cash flow per sales, current 
ratio, working capital, total debt to equity ratio, ROIC for examining the operating 
performance. Similarly, stock return for both short and long return stock market performance; 
and Tobin’s Q, and return on assets (ROA) for the third empirical chapter (chapter 6). I 




In chapter 4 of this study, I examined the impact of firms’ addition (deletion) in the 
FTSE4Good Global index on the long-term operating performance. The chapter 4 of this 
thesis focuses on the first two research objectives of the thesis, which are to determine the 
impact of CSR on firms’ long-term operating performance and to determine if companies 
listed in CSR index perform better after addition than those not listed in the non-CSR index. 
Using the FTSE4Good Global index and a proxy for CSR conformity, the sample of this 
chapter comprises 819 additions and 462 deletions between the beginning of March 2002 and 
ending of December 2015 (26 developed countries). I explored the excess operating 
performance by comparing operating performances of the FTSE4Good companies against the 
median of a relevant non-FTSE4Good as a non-CSR benchmark, e.g. industry-, size-, B/ME-
, Momentum-matched (firm-matching approach). 
The investigation of this study evidenced the excess or positive abnormal long-term 
operating performance in most of the cases when they were compared against the median of 
the benchmark (non-CSR) companies’ portfolio. The post-addition excess performance is 
positive as well as significant for cash flow per sales, operating margin, ROIC, and total debt 
to total capital when compared to all matched benchmark criteria. Although the 
differential/excess of current ratio and working capital growth are negative, they are in 
increasing (and statistically significant) trend after the addition in the FTSE4Good index. On 
the other hand, this study also finds that the long-term operating performance deteriorates 
significantly after they are deleted from the FTSE4Good index. The result of this study 
indicated that the firms that are added in the CSR index (higher CSR performance) tend to 
enjoy the better and improved long-term operating performance. More explicitly being 
socially responsible towards the environment, society, community helps companies to achieve 




The third and fifth research objectives are investigated in chapter 5 of this thesis. The 
main focus of chapter 5 is to determine if the addition (deletion) in the CSR index has any 
long-term effect on stock performance. Although the primary focus in chapter 5 is to examine 
the long-term impact of CSR, I began my investigation from short-term effect. I find the 
company suffers negative cumulative average abnormal return immediately after the addition 
from the CSR index. However, the long-term investigation results evidenced that the negative 
impact on the short-term is just a temporary and firms experience a significantly positive 
abnormal return over the long-term. This study finds that an investor could enjoy a positive 
average abnormal return of 4.41% over the 240 days after the addition in the index. The 
investors that buy and hold the shares of CSR index addition companies up to a year or so 
could enjoy higher return over the long term implying that investors value the CSR index 
addition. However, in case of the deletion, the results do not document any significant changes 
in stock return for the neither in short-term nor long-term. This study also finds the impact of 
CSR on short-term, and long-term stock return varies across the countries.  
Finally, chapter 6 of this thesis focused on the CSR-CFP relationship in the emerging 
market. This chapter primarily focused on the fourth, sixth and seventh research objectives 
that aimed to determine the heterogeneous impact of CSR in CFP among industries/sectors 
and to determine if the cross-listing moderates the CSR-CFP relationships. Also, chapter 6 
also aimed to determine if the CSR-CFP relationship varies across the geographical location. 
Using data sample observation of 1,244 firm-year observations from 23 emerging market 
nations, I investigate the impact of CSR performance (FTSE4Good ESG rating score) on the 
firms’ financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). Using OLS 
regression model and control with several variables (size, leverage, growth, operating margin, 




association between CSR performance and financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Further, I use instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for any endogeneity bias 
caused by the reverse causality, especially firms with strong financial performance in the past 
might be able to invest more in the CSR initiatives. The first stage regression result of 2SLS 
and GMM confirms that both instrumental variables (initial value of CSR performance and 
industry average CSR performance) are significantly related to firm CSR performance (ESG 
raging score). Further, the main regression results of 2SLS and GMM also consistent with the 
OLS and confirms a positive impact of CSR performance on Tobin’s Q and ROA. Chapter 6 
results also evidenced that the positive impact of CSR on the firm’s financial performance is 
more pronounced for those firms’ that are cross-listing in a foreign country. Further, the result 
of chapter 6 also revealed that the relationship between CSR and CFP varies across industry 
sectors. Companies tend to enjoy higher and better financial return if they invest or implement 
socially responsible business practices. Higher their involvement in CSR better their financial 
performance. 
Overall, this study examines the impact of firm’s involvement in CSR to their financial 
performance (operating performance, market return, ROA and Tobin’s Q) using a theoretical 
framework combining the stakeholder theory and signalling hypothesis. According to the 
framework, firms invest in CSR initiatives to address the needs and demands of their 
stakeholders. Firms improved reputation is the rational of their CSR leadership, and it reduces 
the economic uncertainty, more predictable earning and improves investor attractiveness 
towards firm. The results of chapter 4, 5 and 6 support the theories of modern corporate 
stakeholder (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Cornell & Shaprio, 1987), as well as enlighten value 
maximisation or enlighten stakeholders theory (Jensen 2001; Jensen, 2010) with firms’ 




environment, society, community and stakeholders overall. Also, the firms’ cannot achieve 
their financial objectives by ignoring the importance of stakeholders and their interest and 
demands. The positive impact of CSR on firms financial performance (chapter 4, 5 and 6) 
confirms that Stakeholder management is becoming the key success factors in a competitive 
business environment. The primary objectives (shareholders’ wealth maximisation) of a firm 
cannot be met without considering its stakeholders (Jenson, 2010; Jamali, 2008, p.217). 
Hence, in line with stakeholder instrumental theory, firm’s involvement to the CSR is an 
instrument for improved financial performance (Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Wood and Clarkson, 1995).  
Further, firms’ participation in the CSR initiatives signals their leadership and 
commitment to improving their reputation and subsequently, their performance. I use addition 
in FTSE4Good Global index as a signal of firm’s commitment and their reputation. For 
example, the addition to the FTSE4Good Global index signals the possibility that a firm will 
consistently commit adequate resources in socially responsible initiatives/leadership and 
could be signal of managerial optimism towards the firm’s future growth and investment 
opportunities through sustainable and ethically responsible business practices. The result of 
chapter 4 and 5 provides the further evidence that the positive CSR leadership signal not only 
attracts the potential investors but also lead to improving operating performance as a result of 
improved customer loyalty, employee productivity, relationship with business partners, and a 
reduction in potential charges and fines. The positive and statistically significant long-term 
stock return in chapter 5 evidenced that the firms’ CSR leadership disclosure triggers a 
complementary effect by creating a positive ‘halo’ effect that could provide a yardstick for 
subsequent investment decisions (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011; Lourenco et al., 2011). Hence, 




carries important signals about their CSR performance as well as their capability, resources 
and expertise the firms hold to grow and invest in the future. Hence, the CSR index 
configuration is a vital source of important information for everyone.  
The evidence that this study provides on the CSR index addition and deletion effect to 
firms performance is contributing to the existing literature by providing the evidence of long 
term performance effect of CSR. This study reported the positive excess operating 
performance when comparing CSR companies against the non-CSR matching portfolio. 
While this study also reported the significant improvement (deterioration) in the long term 
operating performance after addition  (deletion) in/from the CSR index, existing empirical 
literature have not covered the impact of CSR index configuration on the long term operating 
performance. Also, this study evidenced a positive long-term stock return after the addition in 
the CSR index. 
 
7.2 Implication of this study  
The findings of this have important implications for the corporate managers, investors 
and the stakeholder's groups. On the corporate manager’s perspective, it is essential for them 
to know the long-term impact of CSR on the firm's long-term performance, as a result, 
suggests that firm’s consistent commitment to CSR improves stakeholders confidence and 
lead to the improved overall performance of the company in the long term. On the other hand, 
negative CSR performance could lead negative impact on their stakeholders and consequently 
to their financial performance as the investigation on the impact of firm’s deletion from the 
CSR index evidenced the significant deterioration in operating performance. Hence manager 
should maintain their commitment towards the environment, society and the community so 




On the investors’ perspective, CSR index membership is an important source of 
companies performance. This study suggests that the CSR  index addition and deletion not 
only signal firms CSR commitment but also convey the company’s ability to generate future 
cash flow and their resources to pursue potential investment opportunities and growth. For 
investors, buying the stock around CSR index announcement, especially acquiring the stock 
of companies added in the index will benefit the investor in the long term as this study 
evidenced a positive and significant increment in the stock price in long-term. Finally, from 
the stakeholders’ group perspective, CSR index is a vital source of evaluating the firms’ 
commitment towards the environment, society and community as an addition in the CSR 
index reflect their positive approach and vice versa. 
The result of this thesis evidenced that CSR is becoming the central attention of the 
stakeholders in recent years and companies who care about stakeholders, tend to enjoy better 
performance. Besides, CSR is also becoming the criteria for the investor’s decision and 
investors value CSR companies higher in long-term. Stakeholders (including stockholders and 
investors) are closely monitoring the company’s commitment towards environment, society 
and community. Also, they are demanding the greater transparency of quantifiable CSR 
initiatives and investment reports. Although the CSR is voluntary, the only possible way for 
stakeholders to get greater transparency and quantifiable CSR reports is to oblige companies 
to do so legally. The governments around the world, when formulating or revising the CSR 
related legislation, wish to take this into consideration of the stakeholders’ information need 
of CSR. Further, governments around the world should encourage firms to invest in the 
environment, society and community to make a positive change in the world. Governments 
collaboration with private sectors (including businesses) can play an important in improving 




society and communities. The government contributions towards responding the global 
warming issues are also reflective to the primary rationale behind CSR (such as improving 
quality of life through improving environmental and social issues). In line with the finding of 
this study, government collaboration to encourage private sectors/companies to invest in CSR 
will promote not only government objectives but also help companies to grow in the future. 
Hence, governments around the world should introduce the legislation/policy that encourages 
companies to invest in the CSR and creates a win-win situation. 
 
7.3 Future research avenues 
Corporate social responsibility is a widely discussed topic by academics and 
practitioners over the years, and its financial impact has been examined extensively. In this 
thesis, I examined the impact of corporate social responsibility on firms financial performance 
using the social index (FTSE4Good Index and its ESG rating score) as a proxy. The result of 
this study are instinctive for academics and perhaps benefits the firms (corporate managers). 
Despite my best attempt to examine the economic return of the CSR initiative through multi-
country setting, there are still some ways that the CSR-CFP relationship can be improved or 
extended. The first limitation, for example, in empirical chapter 4 and chapter 5 I only used 
firm’s first-time addition (deletion) to (from) the FTSE4Good Global index as a proxy of CSR 
performance to examine the impact on both operating performance and market return. But, 
firms are continuously included in the CSR index over the years. Does the continuing or 
consistent inclusion in the CSR index lead to significant improvement in CFP for a longer 
period? It is interesting to examine the impact of continuous inclusion in CSR index on firms’ 




In this study, I also focused on examining the heterogeneousness in the association 
between CSR and the firm's financial performance using the sample from the emerging 
market. Although I tried to cover a wider geographical area, the sample size is relatively small. 
Future research could expand to a wider area to extend the heterogeneity on CSR-CFP 
literature using developed countries, especially using larger industry-wise sample size. Also, 
this study identifies that the CSR-CFP relationship varies across industry sectors, and it is 
important to investigate why such a difference exists. Future studies in CSR-CFP relationship 
can be expanded by explaining why firms have such variability among industry sector and 
would help the corporate manager to design their CSR accordingly.  
Despite my best attempt to improve the generalisability in an economic return of the 
CSR initiative through multi-country setting, there are still some ways that the CSR-CFP 
relationship can be improved or extended. Our study sample limited to 49 cross-country (26 
developed and 23 emergings) with 1,281 observation for chapter four, 1,302 observation for 
chapter five, and 1,244 observations for chapter three. Future research could consider covering 
the broader geographical area and greater sample size to improve the generalisability in CSR-
CFP literature especially focusing on the emerging market because of increased attraction of 
socially responsible and ethical fund in emerging markets. Studies focusing on the emerging 
market would benefit ethical manager to make their decision on fund allocation and 
investment.  
Also, this study is only based on the FTSE4Good index series (and its ESG rating 
score). Although the FTSE4Good index series covers a wider geographical area, firms that 
are not associated with the FTSE4Good index series tend to be associated with other CSR 
related index. The CSR-CFP literature can be improved by analysing the sample from multiple 




using CSR index rating as a proxy of CSR could examine the impact of different CSR themes 
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